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This is a study of political change - the Indian Emergency of June 
1975 to March 1977. It examines the events that led up to the Emergency 
and the political and constitutional changes instituted under it. This 
examination should contribute to an understanding of the dilemma posed 
by the subversion of democratic political systems through ostensibly con­
stitutional means.
All constitutional democracies recognize the need to circumscribe 
under conditions of crisis the functionings of democratic processes. Most 
democracies are designed to function in time of peace. In times of crisis 
democratic constitutional governments must be temporarily altered to 
whatever degree necessary to overcome peril and restore normal conditions.
To this end, democratic governments arm themselves, under their consti­
tutions, with extraordinary powers to deal with such threats to the security 
of the nation as could not be dealt with within the framework of normal 
democratic procedure. The institution of an emergency govetnment with ex­
panded powers is treated in the advanced democracies of the west as a 
temporary departure from normal democratic processes. Such governments 
are reconciled with constitutional democracy only because they are regimes 
established for the sole purpose of meeting genuine threats to the security 
of the nation, threats which could not otherwise be dealt with effectively; 
and most importantly they are acceptable only if there is a firm expectation 
that democratic conditions will be restored when the threat diminishes.
Currently, the concession of emergency powers to the executive is 
among the most abused of all democratic constitutional provisions. This 
is particularly so in the developing nations. In these nations, emergencies
are declared with such frequency that they are more often the norm than
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the exception, and democratic rule is displaced by authoritarian rule. 
Emergencies are invoked not just when the security of the nation is 
jeopardized but, even more frequently, when the authority of the rulers 
is challenged. As, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has 
asserted in its study of the "State of Siege" on Latin America, such a 
state is most often invoked on the pretext of a threat to the security 
of the nation when, in fact, the threat amounts to no more than a challenge 
to the personal power of those in office. ^
The Indian Constitution, like those of other democracies, provides 
for the assumption of authoritarian powers by the government under such 
crisis conditions as war, external aggression and internal disturbances. 
When such crises arise, normal democratic procedures may be suspended by 
a declaration of emergency. The most recent occasion when an emergency 
was declared was on June 25, 1975. Citing internal disturbances as threats 
to the security of the nation, the President of India, Dr. Fakhruddin 
Ali Ahmad, acting on the advice and recommendation of the Prime Minister, 
Mrs. Indira Gandhi, declared a state of emergency.
During the 21 months the Emergency lasted, several changes were made 
to the Indian political system that sanctioned a fundamental shift away 
from democratic institutions and processes and toward authoritarianism.
The emergence of authoritarian rule in India, and particularly the 
ease with which it was imposed and maintained, raise disturbing questions 
about the vulnerability of democracy to subversion by those brought to 
power by democratic means. This study seeks answers to these questions 
by an examination of the Indian Emergency in terms of the events, insti­
tutions and processes that spawned and sustained it.
The case study method was selected because the author is convinced 
that a detailed examination of those factors that impaired the function­
ing of democracy in India would illuminate the larger issue of the fragility 
of democracy in emerging nations.
The Indian example is noteworthy for several reasons. First, it is 
perhaps the only known instance in which authoritarian rule was ended through 
the unlikely means of democratic elections. In late January 1977,
Mrs. Gandhi dissolved the Lok Sabha, the Lower House of the Indian Parliament, 
and called for General Elections to be held in March. The victory she fully 
expected would have conferred political legitimacy on her autocratic regime 
and thereby strengthened it. But the Opposition succeeded in portraying 
the electoral confrontation as a referendum on "dictatorship versus demo­
cracy" and the public which had appeared on the surface to have accepted 
the Emergency, if not with enthusiasm, at least with equanimity, opted for 
democracy and dealt Mrs. Gandhi and her Congress Party a crushing defeat.
The victory by the Opposition paved the way for the restoration of 
democracy in India. With democratic rule reestablished, the new govern­
ment set up a Commission of Inquiry, headed by J. C. Shah, a former Chief
Justice of India to look into the
"Subversion of lawful processes and well established 
conventions, administrative procedures and practices, 
abuse of authority, misuse of powers, excesses and/or 
malpractices committed during the period when the 
Proclamation of Emergency made on the 25th June 1975 
under Article 352 of the Constitution was in force or 
in days immediately preceding the said proclamation." 2
The report of the Commission provides detailed data on many of the actions 
of the Emergency government of Mrs. Gandhi. It is unlikely that such 
well documented information relating to emergency rule in other develop­
ing nations will be available.
The second reason the Emergency is especially noteworthy is that 
until the Emergency, India was an open polity with a free and lively press. 
There is abundant research material regarding the nature and conditions 
of Indian democracy prior to the institution of the 1975 Emergency.
Third, the problems of Indian democracy are similar to those which 
face democracies in other emerging nations. These include extreme poverty, 
low level of education, high birth rate, divisive plural tendencies, un­
informed public opinion, absence of effective opposition to government 
and pervasive corruption. In differing degrees all developing nations 
share all or most of these problems. Their role in influencing the course 
of democracy in India has relevance to the prospects of democracy elsewhere.
Finally, the strengths of Indian democracy are also worthy of our 
attention. For years, against all odds, Indian democracy had seemed to 
survive while elsewhere most other post war democracies of Asia and Africa 
collapsed. The termination of the Emergency is itself evidence of its 
strength.
The study posits the following theses:
(1) that the Indian political system, as envisaged by the
Constitution at the time of independence, in 1947, was 
a constitutional democracy;
(2) that the Emergency of 1975 was the logical and inevitable
culmination of a trend towards personalization of power
that had become pervasive under Mrs. Gandhi, particularly 
since the V General Elections of 1971; and
(3) that the Emergency witnessed a systematic perversion of 
the fundamental principles of constitutional democracy 
leading to the institutionalization of an authoritarian 
government in place of the democratic system adopted at 
independence.
It is not possible in a study of this nature to abide strictly by 
any single conceptual framework or model frequently employed in the field 
of comparative politics. As Rajni Kothari, a leading Indian political 
scientist pointed out in 1977,
"Thanks largely to a series of illfated moves over the 
last ten years, politics in India has been transformed 
from a conscious act of intervention in the historical 
process, informed by a set of values, into a game in 
which power became an end in itself. During this period 
the political system progressively lost its institutional 
moorings and sensitivity tc the larger social reality.
It gradually became the playground of a few individuals 
whose number kept shrinking and whose capacity to monitor 
people and events and to implement policies at various 
levels progressively diminished " 3
The major focii of this study are power and political institutions, 
within the constitutional framework of democracy. These focii are,of 
course, traditional to political science, but their treatment in this 
study illuminate not merely the existing structure of political institutions 
within a particular constitutional order but the process of political 
change, involved in the realignment of power relations among such insti­
tutions. While seeking answers to the central problem of the replacement 
of democracy by authoritarianism, the study will examine briefly the nature 
of the Indian socio-economic and constitutional frameworks and evaluate 
the political institutions and processes adopted at the time of independence 
for achieving the democratic ideals of freedom, equality and justice.
The study consists of four parts.
Chapter One deals with the general topic of Indian democracy. At the 
time of Indian independence, in 1947, India faced a host of problems 
inimical to the successful functioning of democracy - mass poverty, wide­
spread illiteracy, a barely viable economy, a rigidly stratified social 
structure and divisive plural tendencies. The Indian democratic dilemma 
was to find ways and means to achieve rapid social and economic progress 
without sacrificing the democratic institutions and processes she had 
adopted under her constitution. These institutions and processes were 
inspired by the Western liberal tradition India had been exposed to through 
her most recent educational and political experience under the British; 
however, in the historical perspective, they were, by and large, alien 
to her political and social traditions. The major portion of this chapter
is devoted to the discussion of the basic structure of the Indian demo­
cratic system - in particular, those features which were radically trans­
formed by Mrs. Gandhi. These include the separation of power among the 
branches of the government, judicial review and the guarantee of the fun­
damental rights of the individuals. Those fundamental rights most adversely 
affected by the Emergency were the right to liberty, the freedom of speech 
and expression (including the freedom of the press) and the right to con­
stitutional redress against legislative and executive excesses. An exam­
ination of these features is crucial to an understanding of the Emergency 
if the Emergency is viewed, as it is in this study, not merely as a tem­
porary crisis government but as an attempt at institutionalization of a 
process of political change - from democracy to authoritarianism.
Chapter Two moves from the general to the particular. The focus is on 
the aggrandizement of power by Mrs. Gandhi. In some respects, this is 
the pivotal chapter of the study, because it highlights the process of 
political change that ultimately culminated in the Emergency. This chapter 
examines the transformation of the Congress Party, particularly the nature 
of its leadership, the erosion of the autonomy of local and state polit­
ical machinery leading to the concentration of decision making at the centre, 
the breakdown of the Indian tradition of consensual politics, the emergence 
of a radical idiom in politics, the growth of repressive legislation and 
legislation to alter the balance of power among political institutions, 
the personalization of power by Mrs. Gandhi and the public’s loss of faith 
in the Government's ability to solve problems. These changes combined with
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the frequent resort to coercive power both by the Government and the 
Opposition were the factors that led inexorably to the proclamation of 
emergency on June 25, 1975.
Chapter Three focuses on the actions of the emergency regime. The Emergency 
was a period during which individual liberties were repressed, freedom 
of the press destroyed, judicial review delimited and rule of law denied.
A series of hastily drafted bills and constitutional amendments lent 
"legality" to the measures that sought to institutionalize authoritarian 
rule in India. Massive coercive powers of the State were manifest every­
where, especially in the implementation of the sterilization program of 
family planning under which more than eight million people were sterilized 
in one year, many involuntarily, and in the arrests of tens of thousands 
of political opponents of the government. The arbitrariness of State 
power found its clearest expression in the Attorney General’s declaration 
to the Supreme Court that "if a man is taken to prison today and he is 
told he will be hanged the day after, even in such a case, during the 
emergency, the courts cannot do anything." ^ This chapter will critically 
evaluate the actions of the emergency regime that institutionalized 
authoritarian norms and procedures in Indian politics.
Chapter Four sums up the significance of the Indian Emergency and offers 
specific recommendations for the political system so that similar crises 
could be avoided in future.
I should add a personal note concerning my interest in this topic 
and my initial research into it. My interest in evaluating the emergency 
rule in India was aroused primarily because of my presence there at the 
time of the Proclamation. During the four months of my stay there^I 
witnessed the tame and tragic transformation of a once vibrant, though 
unruly, democracy into what a Wall Street Journal article referred to 
"as the World's largest banana republic." ^ As the oppressive emergency 
rule took hold with relative ease, it seemed to me, as it did to most 
observers in those days, that Indian democracy could never recover from 
the blow Mrs. Gandhi had dealt it. It was natural under the circumstances 
that I would want to explore the decline and fall of democracy in India.
I am grateful to my dissertation Committee and especially to Dr. Stephen 
Sloan, its chairman, for the active encouragement I received from them 
regarding my decision to study the Emergency.
The Study draws on a lifetime familiarity with the Indian society 
and the political system it has supported since independence in 1947.
Over the years, I have had the opportunity to meet with and discuss 
political and administrative matters with all classes of Indians - from 
Ministers, politicians and senior administrators to the impoverished 
laborer, obsessed only with survival. Even in the immediate aftermath 
of the proclamation of the Emergency when the mood in India was, as the 
New York Times put it, one of "caution and fear," ^ I was able to discuss 
the implications of the Emergency with various individuals among whom 
were the senior public servants entrusted with the task of enforcing the 
draconian emergency measures. These discussions were inevitably off-the-
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record and informal, - not interviews in the traditional sense of the 
word. They were most valuable to me since, at a time when rigid cen­
sorship hid it from public view, I was made aware of the abuses of author­
ity by the government. It was only because of my knowledge of the manner 
in which power was exercised both during and before the Emergency, that 
I saw what was happening not as a brief and benevolent dictatorship but 
as the systematic denigration of democratic processes. It helped me to 
maintain perspective, enabling me to perceive that the causes of the 
Emergency lay not just in the events immediately antecedent to the de­
claration of the Emergency but that they stretched back to Mrs. Gandhi's 
accession to undisputed leadership of both the Party and Government. I 
have chosen not to identify the many invaluable sources of much of my 
personal information about the Emergency. I have, instead, cited published 
material regarding similar or in some cases the same incident.
Finally, some comments on the other source materials I have found 
most useful for this study. For the political events that are discussed 
in this study I have depended heavily on newspaper reporting. The Indian 
newspapers provide reliable information on the events leading ^  the 
Emergency. However, because of the censorship imposed on Indian news­
papers following the declaration of Emergency, for information on events 
in India, during the Emergency, the British journalistic reports, the 
Indian Opposition and underground newsletters and, until they were silenced, 
a few Indian journals, offer dependable coverage. From late January 1977, 
when censorship in India was partially lifted to accomodate the forth­
coming Elections in March, and especially after all censorship was ended
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with Mrs. Gandhi's defeat at the polls and the lifting of the Emergency, 
the Indian newspapers again provide substantive information, not just 
government propaganda. A list of newspapers, scholarly journals, party 
periodicals and journals of news and opinion which I found most informative 
and useful is provided in the Bibliography.
The most detailed and documented data on the attempted institutionali­
zation of the authoritarian emergency regime and the abuses of power 
that it engendered, come from the report of the Commission of Inquiry 
set up by the post Emergency Janata Government and headed by former 
Chief Justice J. C. Shah to look into the abuses of power by the Emergency 
government. The availability of these data is what makes the discussion 
of the actions of the Indian Emergency particularly convincing.
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CHAPTER I 
DEMOCRACY IN INDIA
On June 26, 1975 a state of emergency was imposed on India. Acting 
under Article 352 of the Indian Constitution, the President issued the 
following proclamation
In exercise of the powers conferred by Clause One, 
Article 352 of the Constitution, I, Fakhruddin Ali 
Ahmed, President of India, by this proclamation declare 
that a grave emergency exists, whereby the security of 
India is threatened by internal disturbances.
Clause One, Article 352 states ^
If the President is satisfied that a grave emergency 
exists whereby the security of India or of any part 
of the territory thereof is threatened whether by war 
or external aggression or internal disturbance, he may 
by proclamation, make a declaration to that effect.
This state of emergency was the first of its kind to have been imposed 
on India since she gained independence in 1947. Twice before, in 1962 
and 1971, states of emergency had been proclaimed, but on both these 
occasions the objective had been to meet threats to the nation's security 
from external aggression. As a matter of fact, the state of emergency 
declared in 1971 during the Bangladesh crisis was still in force when 
the 1975 Emergency was declared.
The proclamation of the Emergency was preceded by the predawn arrests 
of hundreds of opposition leaders and a power cut which stopped the presses 
of Delhi's most prominent newspapers. In a brief broadcast to the nation
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immediately following the president's proclamation of the Emergency,
Mrs. Gandhi explained that the Emergency had been declared to meet in­
ternal disorders threatening the security of the nation. She referred 
to "a deep and widespread conspiracy" by the opposition to create country­
wide disturbances, including large-scale violence, "new programs that 
challenged law and order" and incitement to the military and police by 
"certain persons." ^ By afternoon, new press guidelines were issued 
which barred the publication of all unauthorized, irresponsible or 
demoralising news items, anything "likely to bring into hatred or con­
tempt or excite disaffection towards the government, and any attempt at 
denigrating the institution of the Prime Minister." Further, all news 
items relating to internal developments were to be passed by the govern­
ment censor and newspapers were obligated not to publish any reports or 
comments on the Emergency, arrests, deployment of police or army, meet­
ings, reactions, etc. *
Under the Emergency, basic individual freedoms of speech and ex­
pression, assembly, association, domicile, travel, etc. were suspended 
as was the citizens* right to move any court of law for the enforcement 
of fundamental rights, such as those guaranteeing equal protection under 
the law, freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention, and the protection 
of life and personal liberty.5 A new ordinance, promulgated on June 30, 
reduced further the structure of civil liberties by removing a prisoner's 
right to be informed of the grounds of his detention under the Maintenance 
of Internal Security Act, and by stipulating that detainees could be in­
carcerated without trial for up to 12 months provided all such cases were 
reviewed every four months.&
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By the end of the week, 26 organizations of both left and right 
had been banned, in what was described as a bid to curb the activities 
of communal and political groups that believed in the cult of violence. 
Reliable estimates put the number of those arrested during that week at 
around 5,000 ^ and soon, with the rigid censorship in operation, the 
press was all but reduced to putting out government handouts on the far 
reaching economic and social reforms being announced daily by the emergency 
regime.
Although many of the opposition leaders were in jail, within the 
month, both Houses of parliament were called into session to ratify the 
emergency declaration as required under the Constitution. Both Houses 
first voted to suspend, in view of the emergency, the relevant rules of 
procedure and transact only government business. ^ The proclamation was 
the very first issue taken up for consideration. Enabled by the unprecedented 
majority it enjoyed in Parliament, the ruling Congress Party voted over­
whelmingly to approve the emergency declaration, whereupon the leaderless 
opposition parties, protesting the suspension of parliamentary rules and 
the censorship of the news accounts of the parliamentary proceedings, 
walked out in a boycott of the session. Parliament then passed with little 
discussion or opposition a sweeping economic program requested by the 
government. It also enacted amendments to several statutes and to the 
Constitution all aimed at institutionalizing the emergency rule.
There was little immediate resistance to the imposition of emergency 
rule in India. "Hardly a cheep of dissent breaks the silence" the Manchester 
Guardian Weekly had declared, on September 27, of the reaction to the
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Emergency. To the masses, living below the subsistence level and con­
cerned but with survival, the Emergency, at first, was an irrelevant ab­
straction they did not fully comprehend. The arrests of political leaders 
they knew little about or the censorship of newspapers they could not
I
read would appear to have been of no immediate moment to them. Similarly, 
the abridgement of civil liberties meant little to them since they had 
never really enjoyed their benefits to the extent that the affluent, 
the educated and the more politically conscious Indians had. The latter, 
while not wholly satisfied with the administration’s justification for 
the Emergency or the changes being initiated under it did realize the 
justice of the government's claim that the steps taken in connection with 
Emergency were permitted by the Constitution. K. Brahmananda Reddy, the 
Home Minister, emphasized this in his address to the opening session of 
the parliament, in July, when he said that the emergency provisions of 
the Indian Constitution were intended to face, within the framework of 
the Constitution, the threat to the working of the Constitution. The 
declaration of the Emergency was, therefore, functionally, a perfectly 
constitutional act which involved no detraction from the allegiance one 
owed to the Constitution.  ̂ Mrs. Gandhi, too, defended the Emergency in 
the Lok Sabha on July 22, as not only within the constitutional frame­
work, but as action "undertaken not to destroy the Constitution, but to 
preserve the Constitution, preserve the Parliament and to preserve 
democracy."
As stated earlier, the Indian Constitution does provide for the in­
stitution of an emergency government with expanded powers to meet conditions
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of crisis. There is also general agreement that there was, indeed, per­
vasive social, economic and political unrest in India on the eve of the 
Emergency. The political situation, in particular, was volatile with 
the Prime Minister of the country on the verge of being removed from 
office for electoral offences. Whether the overall situation was of such 
crisis proportions as to justify the imposition of a state of emergency 
is however, an open question which is outside the scope of this study.
But even if we were to concede that the declaration of the Emergency was 
not only permitted under the law, but also necessary to prevent major 
political disorder, in light of what ensued, it still cannot be viewed 
as an attempt at the preservation of the constitutional order. The basic 
theme of this study is that, under Mrs. Gandhi, the Indian political 
system was transformed from a basically democratic one to a predominantly 
authoritarian one and that this process of political change intensified 
during the Emergency. That this transformation was achieved, for the most 
part, through statutes and constitutional amendments and, therefore, "legal" 
in a formal sensej still does not attenuate the adoption of such measures 
as which amounted to violations of, if not the letter of the law, certainly 
the intent and spirit of constitutional democracy embodied in the Indian 
Constitution. However, before there can be a meaningful discussion of 
the process of transformation of the Indian political system under 
Mrs. Gandhi it is necessary to arrive at an understanding of the nature 
of Indian democracy and its- constitutional framework. Such an examination 
is undertaken in this chapter.
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The Background
India, like most non-Westem nations that achieved independence 
following World War II became a democracy primarily through the expedient 
of introducing democratic political institutions without having undergone 
the requisite democratic transformation in the social and cultural out­
look of her people. The Constitution with its commitment to democratic 
ideals of liberty and equality was construed as the instrument for the 
transformation of society into a democratic one. It was not, as many of 
its Western counterparts were, the result of a protracted struggle for 
liberty and equality on the part of the masses. The democracy that India 
achieved at independence was therefore a democracy imposed from above.
The liberty that had concerned her during the struggle for independence 
was primarily liberation from foreign domination rather than the liberty 
of the individual. As for the notion of equality as understood in demo­
cratic thought, it was alien to her social tradition, based as it was on 
the caste system which not only did not discourage inequality but, indeed, 
provided religious sanction to the basic inequality of individuals. Until 
her recent exposure to and experience with democracy, the Indian political 
tradition was largely authoritarian, contrary to the claims that have been 
made on behalf of the supposedly strong democratic traditions that pre­
vailed in the "Village Republics" of ancient India.
From the time Sir Henry Maine’s "Village Communities of the East 
and West" appeared in 1871, the theory of a harmonious Indian village 
community that owned and cultivated land in common exercised the imagina­
tion of many students of Indian culture and tradition. Other writers
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following Maine's lead made even greater claims on behalf of the ancient 
Indian villages and wrote of the spirit of cooperation, consensus and 
even democracy that was said to have characterized these village "republics." 
As self-sufficient units, many of these villages did withstand the vicissi­
tudes of time and provided stability to the social structure; but they 
were far from the vigorous democratic units they were asserted to be. 
Professor A. S. Altekar, a leading Indian anthropologist, in his study 
of the history of village communities in India has cautioned against 
exalting the villages of old as preeminently democratic:
History shows us that our village communities 
were never in historic times republics...In 
the Vedic times it appears probable enough that 
each village community was an independent republic, 
but throughout the historical period the community 
was always subordinate to and constituent of larger 
political units.
The word republic again is very unfortunate. It 
conveys notions of democracy, or equal rights, of 
general election and so on. Nothing of the kind 
took place in our villages. There was no idea of 
equality. We in m o d e m  times should never forget 
that democratic notions were never prevalent in 
our village communities. 13
All available data on these so-called republics indicates that except 
perhaps in an unrecorded golden age they were little more than tribal 
oligarchies. The Buddhist literature refers to 7,707 kings within the 
Lichchavi republican assembly (Gana) who, according to Altekar, were 
the descendants of the first Kshatriya settlers who founded the republic. 
The non-Kshatriyas merely carried out the orders of the aristocratic 
decision makers. The Youdheyas, Sakyas and Koliyas, other alleged
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republics, were similar oligarchies. Participation in the political 
process was restricted to those who met various conditions of eligibility. 
Among the Youdheyas, for instance, only those who presented an elephant 
to the state were qualified to participate in the affairs of the state.
Far from supporting a democratic tradition, the Indian ideal was 
monarchical. Early Indian literature abounds with references to the 
kingless state as a state without notions of law, justice, or duty.
Hindu political theory took a Hobbesian view of human nature, which was 
expressed rather graphically by the doctrine of Matsya-Nyaya - the prin­
ciple that the stronger fish devours the weaker. It was generally agreed 
that society would be helpless and incapable of progress unless it had 
at its helm a king who possessed the power of danda - coercive sanction 
(literally meaning the rod of punishment). Sircar observes that danda, 
as interpreted by the mythical sage Manu, is "obviously the very prin­
ciple of omnipotence, comparable to the majestas of Bodin or the Summa 
potestas ... of Grotius ... it is absolute with jurisdiction over all,
uncontrolled by any entity..."
The wielder of danda was the king. He was entrusted with the pro­
tection of the subjects and the preservation of law. Because he stood 
between society and its destruction he was treated with great deference. 
The Ramayana describes a kingdom without a king as a forest without past­
ure, a river without water and cattle without a cowherd. In the sixth
century A.D., Kautilya in his Arthasastra, the great Indian treatise on 
statecraft, extolled the merit of sovereignty and upheld Ra.jniti - or 
reason of state - as the highest value. Autocratic government would seem
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to be the only type that has existed in the Indian historical perspective. 
As Malcolm Hause has pointed out
"...The basic principle of power in early India 
was authoritarianism - a concept that was un­
questionably accepted to the Buddhist doctrine 
of status quo, to the Hindu's cyclical concept 
of history, to the Muslim theory of stable authori­
tarian rule, and to the Brahman philosophy of 
moral validity in the acceptance of one's sta­
tion in life. The orthodox tradition in regard 
to leadership was the acceptance of authority... 
There was no concept of freedom of the individual 
nor of his inalienable rights - the popular theme 
of Western political thinkers..." 16
Whatever rights the individual possessed was related to the performance 
of caste obligations. Also, the Hindu polity did not postulate an 
institutional relationship between the ruler and his subjects. The only 
bond between them was the paternal feeling which the ruler had towards
1 Qhis subjects and the filial affection and regard which they had for him.
The political authoritarianism of Hindu India continued through the 
Muslim period into the British. The three centuries of Mughal rule that 
preceded the British period in India has been described by the English 
historian Vincent Smith as "an absolute despotism tempered by rebellion 
and assasination." The British, for their part, pursued a highly 
centralized system of administration and in their assertion of absolute 
power kept alive the tradition of authoritarian rule in India. Further, 
aside from suppressing the very worst abuses of Hindu India, the British, 
by and large, left undisturbed the socio-cultural and religious traditions 
of India. Nor were the Indian subjects of the British Raj granted the
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political and constitutional rights that Englishmen possessed. By late 
nineteenth century, however, as the British Civil Service in India was 
opened up to the Indians and as increasing number of Indians travelled 
to England for their education,the British political tradition of liberal 
democracy entered the mainstream of political thought in India. Further­
more, the Indian National Congress founded in 1885, which subsequently 
became the leading proponent of Indian independence was for years dominated 
by English-educated Indian liberals whose system of values in the political 
realm was conditioned by their exposure to and admiration of Western 
democratic institutions. Not surprisingly, it was therefore to the 
West that India looked for inspiration in her adoption of a democratic 
political system.
In the West, most democratic movements had arisen historically in 
reaction to the absolutism of the monarch and as such, the democratic 
constitutions these movements inspired provided for limitations on the 
arbitrary exercise of executive power. The Indian Constitution too pro­
vided for similar restraints against unlimited state power. Of these 
the most important were the constitutional guarantee of certain rights 
of the individual, the protection of the rights by an independent judi­
ciary and the accountability of the rulers to the ruled. In short, it 
was a system of constitutionalism or limited government that was em­
bodied in the Indian Constitution at the time of its adoption and that 
which Mrs. Gandhi sought to transform.
Stanley de Smith, the English scholar in his work on the constitu­
tions of the new states within the Commonwealth, has aptly described
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constitutionalism thus:
"A contemporary liberal democrat, if asked to lay down 
a set of minimum standards, may be very willing to 
concede that constitutionalism is practised in a country 
where the government is genuinely accountable to an en­
tity or organ distinct from itself, where elections are 
freely held on a wide franchise at frequent intervals, 
where political groups are free to organize in opposition 
to the government in office, and where there are effective 
legal guarantees of fundamental civil liberties enforced 
by an independent judiciary; and he may not easily be 
persuaded to identify constitutionalism in a country 
where any of these conditions is lacking." 21
The political system India adopted in 1947 possessed all the dis­
tinguishing characteristics of constitutional democracy that de Smith 
enumerates. The government was accountable to the governed; there was 
provision for free, fair and periodic elections based on universal adult 
franchise; political opposition was allowed to exist and to function 
freely; there was constitutional recognition and guarantee of the funda­
mental rights of the citizen; and finally there was an independent judi­
ciary that safeguarded these rights.
Since the essence of constitutional democracy was the creation of 
bulwarks against tyranny, only under extreme conditions of crisis were 
the restraints on state power allowed to be suspended under such a 
system —  and then, only for the duration of the crisis.
It has been contended, particularly by authoritarian rulers in 
developing nations, that the task of national integration and economic 
modernization constitutes a continuing crisis warranting suspension of 
limitations on executive power and the assumption of dictatorial powers
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by the government. The resulting regimes are justified as "basic 
democracies," "tutelary democracies," "guided democracies" etc., on the 
grounds that they help create conditions conducive to the evolution of 
full and genuine democracy. These conditions have been cited as higher 
standard of living, mass education, substantial middle class, industriali­
zation and urbanization.
The problems that India faced at independence were enormous. None 
of the conditions considered necessary for the successful functioning of 
democracy prevailed. To start with, the geographic entity that was to 
be the Indian Union had never in its history been unified under a common 
sovereignty nor did it share a common history. The sole common factor, 
in the past, had been the Hindu religion of the majority of the people 
and in later years the British administrative system that spanned the land. 
At the time of India’s transition from "Empire to Nation," there were, 
in the subcontinent that was to be partitioned into India and Pakistan,
562 Princely States that acknowledged British Paramountcy but were not 
subject to British rule. Only the nine Governor’s Provinces, covering 
fifty-six percent of the total land area was directly under the British 
crown. Understandably, the very first task the Indian nation faced was, 
to put it tritely, to create the Indian nation. This task was not made 
any easier by the partition of the subcontinent into India and Pakistan 
on communal grounds. The partition unleashed a tragedy of immeasurable 
proportions. Up to a million are estimated to have lost their lives 
and at least another ten million been made homeless as Hindus and Muslims 
fled across the borders to escape the terrible massacre —  the Hindus to 
India and the Muslims to Pakistan.
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The other demons attending the birth of democracy in India may be 
summarized as follows: widespread poverty with one of the lowest per
capita incomes in the world; illiteracy rate of 84% for the total popu­
lation; barely viable agriculture and industry; a rigidly stratified 
social structure with hundreds of castes, and some fifty-five million 
"untouchables"; great diversity of ethnic and cultural types of people 
speaking fifteen different major languages and some 800 other languages 
or dialects; inadequate transportation and communication systems; inex­
perienced political leadership; an administrative structure oriented to 
tax collection, police and other regulatory tasks and a rapidly increasing 
birth rate.
In light of the conditions that prevailed in India at the time of 
Independence, the problems she faced in her choice of a democratic path 
towards development were many. She had to find ways and means to achieve 
rapid economic and social progress without sacrificing democratic insti­
tutions and processes; to promote national integrity without having to 
create an allpowerful center; and to preserve social and cultural diversity
O Owhile encouraging political unity.
As the process of "modernization" proceeded, India, like other dev- 
loping nations, was exposed to what Eqbal Ahmad has referred to as "a 
triple dislocation - political, social and economic - in telescoped time. "
Politically, this dislocation is marked by the erosion 
of traditional authority, an increasing search for freedom 
from domination...by the gradual rise to political conscious­
ness of a hitherto complacement and atomized peasantry, by 
their hook-up with modern, ideological counter elites.
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and their growing, collective expectation of justice, 
opportunity, and participation in national life. 
Socially, it is characterized by the emergence of 
new classes...and by cleavages of world views....
Among its economic manifestations is the demand not 
only for rapid, balanced economic development, but 
also for the equal distribution of wealth; and for 
the distribution of austerity where there is not 
enough wealth to distribute.
In ideological terms, the triangular character of this 
revolution is indicated by simultaneous appeal of na­
tionalism, populism and socialism - movements which 
were historically separate and, at first, even mutually 
exclusive in Europe. 30
The Constitutional Framework
The subject of what features are basic to the Indian constitutional
system was raised and argued extensively in 1973, in the landmark case,
31H. H. Kesavananda Bharati vs. State of Kerala. The central issue in 
this case was the scope of Parliament’s power to amend the constitution, 
particularly as it pertained to the amendment of the provisions of 
Fundamental Rights. The case was a sequel to an earlier case, I. C.
Golaknath and others vs. the State of Punjab. In the Golaknath case the 
Supreme Court had, in 196%, denied Parliament the right to amend Funda­
mental Rights except within the limits established by the Constitution. 
Thereupon, Parliament, in an attempt to reverse the effects of the Golaknath 
decision enacted certain amendments to the constitution which had the 
effect of curtailing judicial review, reducing the scope of Fundamental 
Rights and of declaring that "notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, 
Parliament may in exercise of its constituent power amend by way of addition, 
variation or repeal, any provision of this Constitution..." During 
the Bharati hearings which took up 68 days, the major themes of Indian
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democracy were all explored: the limitations on Parliament; the scope
of judicial review; the amendability of the constitution and the nature 
of Fundamental Rights. The judges unanimously conceded to the Parliament 
the right it claimed to amend any article of the Constitution. However, 
a narrow majority qualified this general power of the Parliament to amend 
the Constitution by holding that such amendment may not affect the "basic 
structure" of the Constitutional framework.
There was no unanimity as to what this "basic structure" was.
However, a majority of justices were willing to acknowledge the primacy 
of certain features over others even when they differed on the extent 
of Parliament's power to modify those features. Among the features con­
sidered most distinctive were: supremacy of the constitution; republican
and democratic form of government ; secular and federal character of the 
government; separation of powers between the legislature, the executive 
and the judiciary; and the fundamental rights and directive principles
O Oof state policy directed towards the attainment of a welfare state.
The Indian political system was, under the Constitution, a secular 
republic,' The government, itself a creature of the Constitution, was 
made representative and responsible. Representatives to the Union parlia­
ment and the state legislatures were expected to be elected in free and 
fair elections based on the principles of proportional representation 
and universal adult franchise, to be held at intervals not to exceed five 
years. The three major limitations on powers of the government were: 
(1) division of power between the centre and the states and between the 
executive, the legislature and the judiciary; (2) guarantee of the funda-
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mental rights of the citizens; and (3) judicial review. As this study 
discusses in detail, in a later section, there was, during Mrs. Gandhi's 
tenure as Prime Minister and in particular during the 1975 Emergency, a 
systematic denigration of many features of Indian democracy, especially 
the limitations imposed by the Constitution on the arbitrary and un­
accountable exercise of power by the Government.
The principle of federalism governed the relations between the Union 
and the States and it mandated the allocation of law making powers among 
them. Three lists of subjects spelt out such division of power: The
Union List contained entries with respect to which the Center was granted 
exclusive power to legislate; the States List enumerated the subjects for 
exclusive legislation by the states, and the concurrent List identified 
subjects marked for legislation by both the Center and the States.
Union power of legislation extended over such matters as defence, 
foreign affairs, currency, taxation, foreign and interstate trade and 
commerce, incorporation of trading companies, banking and insurance, 
mines, industries and major sections of the communications industry, 
certain aspects of national health and education, and a limited number 
of educational institutions. The states legislated exclusively in certain 
vital areas such as agriculture and irrigation, maintenance of law and 
order, most aspects of health and education and with respect to roads, 
waterways and intrastate trade and commerce. The concurrent List con­
tained subj ects such as general laws, public welfare, labor matters, 
trade monopolies, regulation of essential commodities and economic and
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social planning. These were areas in which states could legislate to 
the extent the Center had not enacted statutes in the interest of uni­
formity.
Over the years, the powers at the disposal of the states had shrunk 
vis-a-vis the center as the roles of the central administrative services, 
the Planning Commission and the Finance Commission had expanded and taken 
over responsibilities formerly theirs.
In addition to the division of powers between the center and the 
states, a further separation of powers existed between the three branches 
of government —  the legislature, the executive and the judiciary, en­
trusted, respectively, with the task of enacting, implementing and in­
terpreting the law of the land. A system of checks and balances was 
formulated with the objective of preventing any one branch from becoming 
too powerful. Under this system, the President was the constitutional 
head of state and as such, enjoyed executive immunity and was not answer- 
able to any court. In the exercise of his functions, he was aided 
and advised by a Council of Ministers, headed by the Prime Minister,
As the head of state, the President possessed in theory vast powers, 
since all actions by the executive were performed in his name. In reality, 
however, executive power was wielded by the Prime Minister who was the 
head of government and the Council of Ministers. Only under conditions 
of extreme crisis when normal functioning of government was impossible 
did there exist the possibility of the President exercising real as 
against merely ceremonial power. Legislative control over the executive
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39even extended to impeachment of the President for abuse of office.
The Prime Minister and the cabinet were collectively responsible to the 
legislature which was ultimately responsible to the people who were 
expected to exercise control over their representatives through their 
ballot power. Legislative actions, however, were subject to judicial 
review when their constitutionality was challenged. But though the 
judiciary could void legislative and even executive acts for violating 
constitutional provisions. Parliament possessed under Article 368 the 
power to amend the constitution itself. Through such amendments, judicial 
verdicts could be effectively nullified. The power of amendment of the 
Constitution was one of the most grossly abused powers during the Emerg­
ency and Mrs. Gandhi resorted to it frequently to circumvent and even 
curb the power of the judiciary. The judiciary, as established by the 
Constitution, was fully independent and even though the justices of the 
Supreme Court and the high courts were appointed by the president, until
Mrs. Gandhi's time there had been no attempt to politicize the selection 
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The Indian Constitution recognized the exercise of extraordinary 
powers by the executive under the following circumstances: emergency
due to war, external aggression or internal disturbances; emergency due 
to the failure of constitutional machinery in the states; and financial 
emergency whereby the financial stability of India is threatened.
Article 352 of the Constitution empowers the President to proclaim 
a state of emergency if he is satisfied that a grave emergency exists
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whereby the security of India is threatened by war, external aggression 
or internal disturbance (clause 1). He may do so even before acts of 
aggression or disturbance occur if he is satisfied there is imminent 
danger of such occurences (clause 3). A proclamation of emergency may 
be revoked by a subsequent proclamation, and, unless it is laid before 
and approved by both Houses of Parliament within two months, it ceases 
to be effective (clause 2).
A declaration of emergency in India removes the checks and balances 
of the federal system of limited government and virtually transforms it 
into a unitary one. The expansion of Union power may occur in several 
ways :
(a) The Union Executive may give directions to any state as 
to the manner in which the executive power of that state is to be 
exercised (Article 353 (a)).
(b) The Union Parliament may legislate on subjects which in 
normal times are the exclusive domain of the states (Article 353 (b)).
(c) The Parliament may through legislation confer upon the 
Union Executive such power and impose upon it such duties as it deems 
essential to carry out the extended Union responsibilities vis-a-vis 
the states (Article 353 (b)).
(d) The President may modify the constitutional provisions
governing the allocation of revenues between the Union and the states
(Article 354).
(e) The Parliament may prolong its normal life for a period not
exceeding one year at a time and not extending in any case beyond a
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period of six months after the proclamation has ceased to operate 
(Article 83 (2)).
(f) The constitutional guarantees of individual rights of freedom 
of speech, association, assembly, rights of property, etc., are with­
drawn and the State, including legislative, executive and local authori­
ties, may while the emergency lasts abrogate or impair these rights 
(Article 358).
(g) The President may suspend by executive order the rights of 
citizens to move the courts for the enforcement of the Fundamental 
Rights enumerated in Part III of the Constitution (Article 359 (1)).
Any such Presidential order would have to be placed "as soon as may be, 
after it is made" before each House of Parliament for approval (Article 
359 (3)).
What constitutes an emergency is left undefined. All the Constitu­
tion says is that the President must be satisfied that such a situation 
exists. This is a peculiarly subjective criterion, and even if it is 
conceded that no constitution can anticipate the various kinds of crises 
that may beset a nation, it still needs to be emphasized that the broad 
discretion granted to the Executive under the Indian Constitution in 
determining when an emergency exists leaves great scope for abuse. Presi­
dential satisfaction had hitherto been treated in practice as final on 
the point. But a Constitutional amendment passed during the Emergency 
now lends legal sanction to this practice by placing the subject of 
presidential satisfaction beyond judicial scrutiny once and for all.
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It is true that all executive ordinances have to be approved by 
the Parliament and that a proclamation of emergency becomes ineffective 
unless ratified by Parliament within two months, but even this require­
ment affords little protection if the ruling party enjoys a dominant 
majority in the Parliament, as the Congress Party did in India.
The Constitution also says little about the termination of a state 
of emergency beyond that it may be revoked or that it might become in­
operative unless approved by Parliament. Presumably there is nothing in 
the Constitution barring a ruling party from prolonging an emergency in­
definitely. The attractiveness of this disturbing possibility to the 
ruling party is enhanced by the power granted to Parliament to extend 
its life throughout a declared emergency; thus elections could be post­
poned indefinitely —  or avoided entirely. The two previous emergencies 
together lasted for over nine years. The first emergency was declared 
October 10, 1962, in the wake of the Chinese attack on India, and not 
lifted until January 6, 1968. The second one, declared December 3, 1971, 
during the Indo-Pakistan hostilities over the Bangladesh war of secession 
was operative along with the third one, declared on June 26, 1975. While 
it is to the credit of the Indian leaders and the Congress Party that 
the exercise of extraordinary emergency powers by the Union Executive had 
been kept to a minimum, at least until the latest emergency, the danger 
nonetheless persists that under different leaders such powers could be 
grossly abused.
It is almost unprecedented in more established democracies for the 
constitution to grant, even in times of war, such extensive powers to
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the Union government. The Indian Constitution, though inspired by the 
western liberal democratic principle of limited government, does demon­
strate, as do those of most other developing democracies, a marked 
authoritarian bias, especially in times of emergency.
The declaration and guarantee of certain Fundamental Rights provided 
the citizens their greatest protection against arbitrary exercise of 
state power. These rights were by no means absolute: express limitations
were placed on their exercise by the Constitution itself. The Legislature 
was enjoined from enacting laws which would transgress the limitations 
set by the Constitution. The executive, in its dealings with the citizens 
was required to observe the procedures and formalities set forth under 
the Constitution.
The Fundamental Rights of the citizens were classified under seven 
categories: (1) Right to Equality (2) Right to Freedom
(3) Right against Exploitation ; (4) Right to Freedom of Religion 
(5) Cultural and Educational Rights (6) Right to Property and 
(7) Right to Constitutional Remedies.
The following section will focus on the Right to Freedom and the 
Right to Constitutional Remedies since these were the two fundamental 
rights most severely affected under the Emergency.
Articles 19-22 guarantee the right to freedom of the individual.
In all. Article 19 confers seven freedoms on all Indian citizens: 
freedom of speech and expression freedom of assembly; freedom to 
form associations or unions; freedom of movement throughout the terri-
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tory of India; freedom of residence and settlement in any part of India; 
freedom to acquire, hold and dispose of property; and the freedom to 
practice any profession or to carry on any occupation trade or business.
Clauses 2-6 of Article 19 also empowered the state to impose reason­
able restraints on certain specified grounds in respect of each freedom 
provided for by the Article. Thus, for example, the right to freedom 
of speech and expression may be subject to reasonable restrictions in 
the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of the nation, the security 
of the state, friendly relations with foreign states, public order, de­
cency or morality and as it relates to contempt of court, defamation or 
incitement to an offence. All the other freedoms were similarly hedged 
with a host of qualifications. Within the established limits, the state 
was empowered to enact legislation derogating from the rights of the in­
dividual. The point which is emphasized here is that the Constitution, 
in its attempt to balance the claims of the individual to freedom with 
the interests of the community already provided the state considerable 
latitude to restrict the freedoms of the citizen.
Article 20 afforded the citizen convicted of an offence, protection
against arbitrary and excessive punishment by explicitly providing against 
ex-post facto laws, double jeopardy, and self incrimination.
Article 21 provided that "no person shall be deprived of his life
or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law.
Within months of the adoption of the Constitution in 1950, the scope of 
this article came up for interpretation before the Supreme Court, in
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A. K. Gopalan vs. State of Madras. Gopalan, the leader of the oppo­
sition in the Lok Sabha was detained by the government of Madras under 
a provision of the Preventive Detention Act of 1950 enacted by Parlia­
ment, in accordance with Article 22 of the Constitution. He applied 
for a writ of habeas corpus contending that the Act violated certain 
of his Fundamental Rights, including his right, under Article 19 to move 
freely throughout the territory of India. The two major issues the 
court was called upon to decide were (a) the meaning and scope of the 
term "personal liberty" used in Article 21 as against the term "freedom" 
in Article 19 and (b) the meaning and scope of the phrase "procedure 
established by law."
A majority of the judges held that Article 19 did not apply in the 
case of an individual detained under Article 21 since the two articles 
deal with two separate aspects of liberty —  Article 19 with the enjoy­
ment of liberty within the limits laid down by the law and Article 21 
with the deprivation of liberty according to established legal procedures. 
According to the Court, Article 21 dealt with the rights of a person 
who had already been deprived of his liberty or life since it merely 
laid down that such deprivation shall conform to law. The right to 
freedom of movement, guaranteed under Article 19, on the other hand, 
was a right, the court held, that belonged to a free individual. There­
fore, even though the rights under Article 19 may be lost in the process 
of deprivation of liberty recognized by Article 21, no challenge to 
Article 21 solely on that ground could be entertained.
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On the second question relating to the meaning of "procedure estab­
lished by law," it was contended on behalf of Gopalan that the phrase 
was more than a mere procedural provision and that it implied principles 
of natural justice. The court, however, did not concur with this argu­
ment either.
"Normally read, and without thinking of other 
Constitutions, the expression "procedure established 
by law" must mean procedure prescribed by the law of 
the State... To read the word "law" as meaning rules 
of natural justice will land one in difficulties 
because the roles of natural justice as regards pro­
cedure, are nowhere defined.... 53
and again.
...I am unable to agree that the term law in Art. 21 
means the immutable and universal principles of natural 
justice. "Procedure established by law" must be taken 
to refer to a procedure which has a statutory origin, 
for no procedure is known or can be said to have been 
established by such vague and uncertain concepts as im­
mutable and universal principles of natural justice.
In my opinion, "law" in Article 21 means "positive or 
State-made law."
The Gopalan decision set the precedent of judging violations of liberty 
based not on the merits of the impugned law or act but based on their 
adherence to constitutional proprieties. One critic has complained:
Almost at the inception of the Constitution, 
at the very threshold of its life, one of the 
main articles declaring life and liberty as 
fundamental rights became still-born .... Life 
and liberty have no effective protection against 
legislation in India. 55
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Article 22 guaranteed three rights —  the right of every person 
arrested to be informed as soon as may be of the grounds of arrest; his 
right to consult and to be defended by counsel of his choice and his 
right to be produced before a magistrate within twenty-four hours and 
to be remanded to custody beyond that period only by order of the 
magistrate.
These rights, which are in the nature of constitutional safeguards 
against arbitrary arrest, were denied only to two categories of those 
arrested: enemy aliens and those detained under a law providing for
preventive detention for reasons enumerated under the Constitution.
Endeavoring to cope with the perennial problems of assuring the 
security of the nation and of preserving law and order within a society 
not habituated to the precepts or practice of democracy, the Indian 
government was compelled at the time of independence to incorporate res­
trictive provisions to the grant of individual rights. The period between 
August 5, 1947 when independence was achieved and January 26, 1950 when 
the Constitution was formally adopted was one of intense turmoil in India. 
The communal riots and bloodshed that accompanied the partition of the 
subcontinent into India and Pakistan, the war with Pakistan over the status 
of Kashmir, a communist-led insurgency in the state of Hyderabad, a 
severe famine and a host of other administrative difficulties that con­
fronted the nation appear to have compelled the constitution-makers to 
qualify the grant of rights more than is customary under democratic 
constitutions.
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The right of the individual to personal liberty was circumscribed, 
under the Constitution, by the provision for preventive detention, even 
during times of peace. Preventive detention sanctioned the loss of per­
sonal liberty of an individual through executive action if law enforce­
ment authorities were satisfied that, if not detained, such individual 
would engage in activity that was Considered prejudicial to the interests 
of the community. The statute authorizing such detention specified the 
grounds which justified preventive detention. These included the defense 
of India, the relations of India with foreign powers, the security of 
India, the security of the state, the maintenance of public order, and 
the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community.
An individual confined under a preventive measure was denied the 
constitutional safeguards accorded those detained under ordinary law.
These safeguards, provided under Article 22, ensured the rights of the 
detainee to be informed "as soon as may be" of the grounds of arrest, 
the right to consult and to be defended by legal counsel of his choice, 
the right to be produced before a magistrate within twenty-four hours 
of such detention and the right not to be detained beyond the twenty-four 
hour period except by order of the magistrate. Compared to this, the 
protection afforded the preventive detenu was meagre at best. Every 
case of preventive detention had to be authorized by law. The detenu 
was to be informed of the grounds of his detention "as soon as may be," 
and was to be afforded the "earliest opportunity" to make representation 
against the detention order. The Constitution, however, made a distinction
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between the right to be informed of the grounds for the detention and 
the right to information about the facts behind the grounds since the 
authorities were granted the right to withhold facts if they were con­
vinced that the disclosure of such facts would not be in the public in­
terest. Whether the detenu could make an effective representation 
against the detention order without being informed of the facts of the 
case was an issue that obviously did not deter the inclusion of this 
provision.
The major safeguard against the arbitrary exercise of the power of 
preventive detention by the executive was the provision that ordinarily 
no preventive detention may extend beyond three months unless an advisory 
board, consisting of members qualified for appointment as judges of a 
high court, found sufficient cause for detention beyond that period.
The executive authorities were required to refer to the advisory board 
within 10 weeks of a detention all cases in which they sought detention 
of the individual beyond the three months. Unless, before the expiration 
of the three months, the board rendered an opinion favoring such an ex­
tension the detenu had to be set free at the end of the period. The ex­
ception to this requirement was spelt out in clause 7 (A) of Article 22 
under which Parliament may by law prescribe the "circumstances" under 
which and the "class or classes of cases" in which detention over three 
months may be authorized without reference to an advisory board.
Government rationale for the need for preventive detention in India 
was that popular opinion in India being as yet uninformed in the advantages
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of democracy, the government had to act with severity against malefactors 
since the example of successful defiance of law would be more damaging 
to the development of a democratic political culture than it would be 
in the West. In case after case, the courts while upholding the 
authority of the state to pass legislation authorizing preventive deten­
tion cautioned against the invasion of personal liberty that such detea- 
tion represented. Typical are the following statements on preventive 
detention by Supreme Court Justices Mukherji and Patanjali Sastri.
"...This is undoubtedly unfortunate but it is not our 
business to speculate on questions of policy or to 
attempt to explore the reasons which led the representa­
tives of our people to make such a drastic provision in 
the Constitution itself which cannot but be regarded 
as a most unwholesome encroachment upon personal liberties."
and
"Preventive detention is a serious invasion of personal 
liberty and such meagre safeguards as the constitution 
has provided against the improper exercise of the power 
must be jealously watched and enforced by the court." 58
Such hopes were soon belied, and the Preventive Detention Act became the 
most familiar weapon with which government sought to suppress public dis­
order. Worse still, similar legislation, but without even those slender 
safeguards that the Preventive Detention Act provided, were subsequently 
enacted that substantially expanded the scope for abuse of state power 
to curtail the liberty of the individual.
Following the declaration of the emergency during the Sino-Indian 
War in 1962, the Defence of India Act, was passed which conferred on
42
the Executive sweeping powers that further reduced the scope of individual 
rights. Section 45 of the Act provided for the preclusion of judicial 
review of the orders or acts by the government in exercise of the powers 
conferred by the Act. The Defence of India Rules (DIR) framed under the 
Act consisted of 156 rules that provided for the regulation of virtually 
all aspects of life —  travel, trade, communication, publication, occu­
pation, finance, etc. Rule 30 of the DIR expanded the scope of prevent­
ive detention by empowering the central and state governments to detain 
an individual to prevent him from engaging in acts prejudicial to the 
defence of India, civil defence or public safety.
In 1967, the Defence of India Act was withdrawn and two years later 
the Preventive Detention Act lapsed. Both had been enacted as statutes 
of limited duration and therefore required legislative sanction for peri­
odic extensions. In 1969, when the Preventive Detention Act was due to 
expire, the Administration, enjoying as it did only a plurality in Parlia­
ment, was in no position to extend its life. For a brief period there 
was no all-India preventive detention law, though several state govern­
ments soon enacted such legislation. After the 1971 General Elections 
when the Congress Party once again commanded an overwhelming parliamentary 
majority, preventive detention was reintroduced at the all-India level.
Not only was the Defence of India Act reinstated that year but another 
statute, of a permanent nature, was also enacted. This was the Mainten­
ance of Internal Security Act. As discussed in Chapters Two and Three 
of this study both these Acts were employed widely, especially during 
the Emergency, to curtail the rights of the individual.
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Another right that needs to be specially mentioned here is the 
right recognized by the Constitution to constitutional remedy for the 
enforcement of Fundamental Rights. Article 32 recognized the right of 
the citizen to move the Supreme Court by "appropriate proceedings" for 
the enforcement of an individual's Fundamental Rights. The Court possess­
ed wide jurisdiction, being empowered by the Constitution to issue di­
rections, or orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas
corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari for the en-
5 9forcement of the right infringed. Under this provision the Supreme 
Court was
"... constituted the protector and guarantor of 
Fundamental Rights, and it cannot, consistent 
with the responsibility so laid upon it, refuse 
to entertain applications seeking protection 
against infringement of such rights." 60
Article 226 granted the High Courts similar powers to issue direction, 
orders and writs for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights or "for any 
other purpose." Parliament was also authorized to empower subordinate 
courts to exercise, within the local limits of their jurisdiction all 
or any of the powers exercisable by the Supreme Court.
The constitutional right to move the courts for enforcement of the 
other Fundamental Rights was allowed to be suspended only during an 
emergency. During the Constituent Assembly debates Dr. Ambedkar, the 
Chairman of the Drafting Committee, underscored the significance of 
this Article thus :
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"If I was asked to name the particular article 
in this Constitution as the most important with­
out which this Constitution would be a nullity 
I could not refer to any other article except 
this one. It is the very soul of the Constitu­
tion and the very heart of it." 61
Where the courts were called upon to decide on the "reasonableness" of 
the restrictions imposed on the Right to Freedom under Article 19 
they were expected to adjudge it for each case on its own merits; no 
abstract standards were provided by the Constitution. The factors the 
courts were to consider in arriving at a decision were stated thus:
"The nature of the right alleged to have been 
infringed, the underlying purpose of the re­
striction imposed, the extent and urgency of 
the evil sought to be remedied thereby, the 
disp portion of the imposition, the prevail­
ing conditions at the time should all enter 
into the judicial verdict." 62
In respect of the constitutional provision on individual's rights, 
under the Indian Constitution, there are then three features not common­
ly found in advanced democracies. Firstly, there is an elaborate enu­
meration of limitation of these rights, in an attempt to strike a balance 
between individual’s rights and social needs of the community, between 
freedom and control. Secondly, the Constitution recognizes preventive 
detention as a legitimate curb on the individual’s right to liberty, even 
in times of peace. Finally, the right to constitutional remedy against 
violation of Fundamental Rights was itself a Fundamental Right.
In the Bharati case, commonly referred to as the fundamental rights 
case, the Court was unclear on its stand on Fundamental Rights. From
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a reading of the eleven separate judgements of the thirteen-member Bench 
one gathers the impression that the Court believed that while Parliament 
could abridge all of the Fundamental Rights, they may do so only in such 
a manner that the basic structure of the constitutional system was not 
affected. The right to property, a fundamental right and the right at 
issue in the case was not considered by the court as an essential ele­
ment of the Constitution. Therefore Parliament in its plenary capacity 
could, the Court held, alter the nature of this right. Following the 
verdict there was considerable confusion as to which of the rights were 
fundamental and which not. But while constitutional scholars argued 
the finer points of the verdict, the belief that the Court had conceded 
to the State unlimited power to amend and abridge or even abolish Funda­
mental Rights gained wide currency among the public. In a sense, such 
a belief contributed substantially to the meek acceptance by the inform­
ed public at large of the wide ranging attack on citizen's rights during 
the Emergency.
The Fundamental Rights were complemented by a set of "Directive 
Principles of State Policy." These were in the nature of directives to 
central and state governments and to all governmental agencies to consider 
the principles set forth in this section of the-constitution, in the en­
actment and implementation of laws. Sixteen principles were enumerated 
which embraced a broad spectrum of state activity. During the drafting 
of the Constitution Dr. Ambedkar spoke of the purpose of this provision.
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"In enacting this part of the Constitution, 
the Assembly is giving certain directions 
to the future legislature and the future 
executive to show in what manner they are 
to exercise the...power they will have.
...(T)hey should be made the basis of all 
legislative and executive action that may 
be taking hereafter in the matter of the 
governance of the country." 63
The principles, though they were considered vital in providing direction 
to the governance of the nation, were made expressly non-justiciable.
In the Bharati case the importance of both the Fundamental Rights 
and the Directive Principles were emphasized:
The Fundamental Rights and the Directive Prin­
ciples constitute the "conscience" of our Con­
stitution. The purpose of the Fundamental 
Rights is to create an egalitarian society, 
to free all citizens from coercion or re­
striction by society and to make liberty 
available for all. The purpose of the Directive 
Principles is to fix certain social and economic 
goals for immediate attainment for bringing about 
a non-violent social revolution. . . . Without 
faithfully implementing the Directive Principles, 
it is not possible to achieve the Welfare state 
contemplated by the Constitution. 64
Over the years the Indian political system was subjected to many 
radical changes. Its constitutional framework was amended time and again 
and in the process the checks it provided against abuse of power were 
whittled away. The very first amendment to the Constitution, in 1950, 
was passed with the objective of restricting the scope of two Fundamental 
Rights —  the right to freedom of speech and expression and the right to 
property. It also created the IX Schedule to the Constitution which pro-
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vided absolute protection from judicial scrutiny to the statutes in­
cluded therein, even those acts and statutes already declared by the 
courts as constitutionally objectionable.
When Mrs. Gandhi became Prime Minister in 1966, the Constitution 
had been amended on seventeen occasions. Most of these amendments were, 
however, minor ones relating to matters such as the reorganization of 
territorial units, the recognition of official language, the redefinition 
of former foreign enclaves like Goa and Pondicherry and other similar 
organizational and administrative issues. Only four of these amendments 
affected the democratic character of the Constitution. The First Amend­
ment imposed three additional restraints on the freedom of speech and 
expression^relating to friendly relations with foreign states, public 
order and incitement to an offence. It also provided more comprehensive 
protection to land reforms and created the IX Schedule. The Fourth Amend­
ment precluded judicial review of the adequacy of compensation for pro­
perty compulsorily acquired for a public purpose. The Sixteenth Amend­
ment curtailed further the freedom of speech and expression, in the in­
terests of the sovereignty and integrity of India. The Seventeenth 
Amendment redefined the term "estate" to include certain types of land 
holdings which the Supreme Court had ruled were outside the scope of the 
term. Interestingly, the Amendment also provided that cultivating land­
owners would be compensated at full market value for loss of land incurred 
through all future land legislation.
During Mrs. Gandhi's term as Prime Minister the Constitution was 
amended a total of twenty five times. The political institutions and
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processes underwent major changes and the system that emerged was vastly 
different from that which is described in this chapter. The manner in 
which the transformation of the Indian political system was accomplished 
is discussed in the chapters that follow.
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CHAPTER II
INDIAN DEMOCRACY AFTER 1966: PATTERNS OF DECLINE
As stated earlier, a major assumption underlying this study is that 
the Emergency was not an isolated act precipitated by any one event im­
mediately preceding it but that it was the logical culmination of an 
authoritarian trend in Indian politics which had developed under 
Mrs. Gandhi.
Mrs. Gandhi's predecessors as Prime Minister, Pandit Jawaharlal 
Nehru and Lai Bahadur Shastri had also enjoyed and exercised immense 
power and authority. But, they were both scrupulously democratic in 
their approach to government and not even during the worst days of the 
wars with Pakistan and China fought during their administrations was 
there an emergency of the kind Mrs. Gandhi imposed in 1975, under which 
the guarantee of citizens' rights, the commitment to the rule of law 
and principle of due process were all abandoned. Pandit Nehru, who was 
Prime Minister from 1947 until his death in 1963 was so revered and 
loved by the masses that had he not been the committed democrat that he 
was, he too could have usurped early all power and transformed the Indian 
political order into an authoritarian one in the manner that Sukarno of 
Indonesia or Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana did in their respective nations. 
Instead, the Indian democratic experiment appears to have succeeded on 
the whole when Mrs. Gandhi succeeded to power as Prime Minister of India 
in 1966, almost twenty years after independence.
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Ifhat happened between then and 1975 when she imposed a full fledged 
authoritarianism under the guise of an emergency forms the subject matter 
of this chapter. Only through an examination of the major events that 
preceded it can the Emergency be understood as a deliberate attempt at 
institutionalization of an authoritarian system of rule. Many of the 
changes instituted under Mrs. Gandhi, especially after she had established 
her preeminence on the political scene following an unprecedented elec­
toral victory in 1971 reveal an unmistakeable trend away from democratic 
norms and practices and a corresponding predilection for authoritarianism. 
The Emergency of 1975 was the end product of a cumulative process of 
political change under Mrs. Gandhi which witnessed the vitiation of the 
rules by which Indian politics until then had been played.
Among the earliest changes to Indian politics under Mrs. Gandhi was 
the radicalization of the political idiom, brought about by her adoption 
of a seemingly populist ideology. In reality, the espousal of a radical 
platform was primarily a tactical ploy on her part to wrest power away 
from the Congress party elders who had elevated her to power and had then 
sought to control her. By skillfully portraying herself as a radical re­
former thwarted in her attempts by these "reactionary" Congress elders, 
she succeeded in discrediting them and in eliminating their influence in 
party affairs.
The ideological polarization within the Congress which resulted in 
a split within the party and in her rise to prominence also signified 
the demise of the politics of consensus which for years had kept the
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various factions within the party at peace. The new political process, 
furthermore, represented a marked departure from the principles of collec­
tive leadership that had been an important feature of Congress Party 
politics until then. The character of the Party leadership also under­
went a major change. Both at the national and state levels party lead­
ers were nominated not for the strength of their political bases but on 
the degree of their loyalty to the Prime Minister. Since they were be­
holden to her for their elevation to power (and even more importantly, 
for continuance in office), they acquiesced in her efforts to aggrandize 
power, beyond that envisioned in the Constitution. The presence of these 
weak and inexperienced leaders on the political scene, especially at the 
State levels, bred instability which in turn contributed to the wide­
spread political and economic malaise preceding the Emergency.
Despite her willingness to depart from established policies and 
practices to restructure the party and government process, there was, 
as is discussed in this chapter, a singular reluctance on her part to 
undertake meaningful economic reforms. The section on the economy dis­
cusses briefly her so-called populist economic reforms such as the 
nationalization of the banks, the abolition of privy purses to princes, 
the nationalization of wholesale wheat trade, etc., none of which touched 
in a meaningful manner the causes of rural poverty.
This chapter chronicles the spread of economic malaise and political 
unrest as the gap between Mrs. Gandhi's promise of economic progress and 
its fulfillment widened and served to heighten popular opposition to her.
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It also reviews the growth of repressive legislation which served as 
precursors to the notorious Constitutional Amendments enacted during the 
Emergency. Finally, it discusses the emergence of a unified opposition 
in India in the months preceding the Emergency, the series of scandals 
that plagued the Administration and undermined faith in it, and 
Mrs. Gandhi’s conviction for electoral offenses and opposition demands 
for her resignation which provided the immediate cause for the Emergency 
of June 1975.
The Early Days
At the time of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru's death in May 1964, 
there was considerable apprehension of a battle for succession. Such a 
crisis, it was widely recognized, could lead to a split within the Congress 
Party (which had ruled India since independence) and even spell the end 
of democracy. The Congress Working Committee, commonly referred to as 
the "High Command", not unaware of the dangers posed by an all out 
scramble for power by the contenders, agreed in principle to avert such 
a crisis by choosing the successor to Nehru through a method of consensus. 
Kamraj, the influential President of the All India Congress Committee 
(AICC) played a major role in persuading the Party to settle on Lai 
Bahadur Shastri, a former Home Minister and a close associate of Nehru 
as its choice to succeed Nehru. ^
Shastri's tenure as Prime Minister was brief, lasting only 19 months. 
With his untimely death in January 1966, the whole issue of succession
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was reopened. Kamraj again played a decisive role in the selection of 
a candidate. This time, he favored Mrs. Indira Gandhi over Mr. Morarji 
Desai, the other leading aspirant for the position. In the contest for 
leadership of the Congress Parliamentary Party, with the help of Kamraj 
and the regional leaders of the Party, Mrs. Gandhi secured 355 votes 
to Desai's 169 and thereby became the Prime Minister of India.
In her rise to the leadership of the nation, Mrs. Gandhi had enjoy­
ed a unique position. She was the daughter and the closest confidante 
of Pandit Nehru, who had been an authentic hero to most Indians. She 
had, like the rest of the family, been deeply involved in the nationalist 
movement for independence. She had even undergone at a young age the 
imprisonment by the British required of all national heroes. Since 1955, 
when she was named to the High Command, she had been actively involved 
in party politics and had even served as the President of the AICC in
O1959. When Mr. Shastri became the Prime Minister, he felt the compul­
sion to include her in his cabinet despite his conviction that Mrs. Gandhi 
did not care for him; ^ to keep alive the link with the Nehru legend 
Shastri made her his Minister for Information and Broadcasting. At a 
time when regionaJj linguistic, and communal hostilities were still much 
in evidence, Mrs. Gandhi was seen as a truly progressive democrat commit­
ted to secular values and acceptable to all minorities and all regions 
of India. Further, the Congress Party leadership saw in her not only a 
nationally viable candidate, but one whom they believed they could control, 
at least until the next General Elections, scheduled for 1967. For, though
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she had begun to develop, within the party, her own coterie of loyalists, 
they were as yet neither numerous nor influential enough to pose a threat 
to the continuing influence of the High Command on the national scene —  
or so, the High Command believed.
From the start, however, Mrs. Gandhi exhibited a degree of independ­
ence that surprised the party leaders who had expected her to be a willing 
instrument of their influence. The instances described below offer some 
idea about Mrs. Gandhi's method of leadership even in the early days of 
her rise to power.
Within weeks of becoming the Prime Minister, Mrs. Gandhi sanctioned 
the bifurcation of the northern state of Punjab into Hindi speaking 
Haryana and Punjabi speaking Punjab. What is interesting about this 
decision is that it reflected a clear departure from the policies of her 
predecessors who had both insisted on preserving the unity of Punjab even 
though most other Indian states had been reorganized, in 1956, along 
linguistic lines. ^ For over a decade, the coercive politics engaged in 
by the proponents of a divided Punjab had been denounced and denied.
But Mrs. Gandhi acceeded to the demands with an alacrity that showed 
little respect for past policies or practices.
Then in June 1966, without consulting either the Cabinet or the 
Party leadership, at the urgings of the U.S. Government, the World Bank, 
and the leading members of the Aid India Consortium, she made the de­
cision to devalue the rupee - by 57.5 per cent. ^
Her next show of independence occurred when she took on a party 
stalwart, Atulya Ghosh, Chairman of the State Congress Committee in
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West Bengal. Under his leadership, the Congress party had declined in 
strength in West Bengal as the National Congress had stood by helplessly, 
reluctant to interfere. Soon after Mrs. Gandhi was made the Prime Minister, 
several members of the West Bengal Congress Party, claiming Mrs. Gandhi's 
support, split away from the Party to form a rebel group —  The Bangla 
Congress; the Central party leadership, however, continued to support 
Ghosh. In the 1967 elections in West Bengal, because of the divisions 
within the Congress ranks, the Congress lost its majority. A United 
Front ministry comprising the Bangla Congress, the Communists and other 
splinter groups was formed, with Ajoy Mukherji, the Bangla Congress 
leader, as the Chief Minister. ^
As the foregoing events make abundantly clear Mrs. Gandhi obviously 
did not concur with the party's belief in the need for collective lead­
ership nor for the need to act within the constraints imposed by the 
policies and practices of the past.
Politics of Ideology
The IV General Elections was the first major test of strength for 
Mrs. Gandhi since she had become leader of the Congress Party and the 
Prime Minister of the nation. By then. Congress dominance of Indian 
politics seemed so pronounced that it was as if the Indian political 
system had evolved into a one party democracy. The Congress monopoly of 
power at the Center was affirmed during the very first General Election 
itself, held in 1952. In that Election, Congress captured 74 per cent 
of the seats in the Lok Sabha and about 45 per cent of the popular vote. ^
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The II General Elections, in 1957, reaffirmed Congress popularity, with 
the Party winning 75 per cent of the seats and 47 per cent of the vote. ^ 
The figures for the 1962 Election show no major change in Congress' 
strength; the Party again won 73 per cent of the seats in the Lok Sabha 
and polled 45 per cent of the votes cast. Though the Congress did 
not capture a majority of the popular vote in these elections it was, 
nonetheless, able to muster substantial parliamentary majorities, pri-
t
marily because the opposition vote was fragmented among a large number 
of parties. For example, in the 1962 General Elections there were about 
a dozen parties competing for power agaiqst the Congress; the party 
second in strength to Congress in the 494 member House was the Communist 
Party with only 29 seats, to the Congress Party's 361.
But in 1967 the Congress monolith showed signs of strain. In the 
518 member Lok Sabha, Congress won only 282 seats, far fewer than it had 
before. Many of the top leaders of the party suffered severe losses.
The inner circle of the Congress Party bosses, who were collectively re­
ferred to as the "Syndicate" fared badly as their regional bases collap­
sed. In Tamilnadu, the home base of Kamraj the "kingmaker", the Congress 
managed to win only 49 out of 234 seats and in the process lost out to 
a regional force, the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK). In Uttar Pradesh 
(U.P.), C.B. Gupta's forces lost control, in West Bengal, Atulya Ghosh 
and his faction were routed, S.K. Patil lost out in Bombay and Jag Jivan 
Ram's home state, Bihar, also did not return a Congress majority. Of the 
leading Syndicate members, Mr. Morarji Desai alone came out unscathed
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in Gujerat. In all, eight states and two Union territories refused to 
return the Congress to power. These were Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Orissa, 
Punjab, Rajasthan, W. Bengal, Kerala and Tamilnadu and the centrally 
administered territories of Delhi and Manipur. It was a period of dis­
array within the Congress. As the party dominance waned nationally,
Mrs. Gandhi was prevailed upon, in the interests of party unity, to
accept Mr. Morarji Desai in her cabinet and to offer him the position of
1 ?Deputy Prime Minister.
Over the next two years, relations between Mrs. Gandhi and the 
party leadership or the Syndicate worsened as she began to chafe at 
their efforts to direct national policies. As Kuldip Nayar, the prominent 
Indian journalist has written:
"Mrs. Gandhi felt ... confined. Though after 
the debacle of many of the elders in the elec­
tions she was in a stronger position, it was 
not easy to resist the pressure of the old 
guard. She sensed that there would be an open 
clash one day. The elders controlled the party, 
but she held the reins of government.." 13
In May 1969, Zakir Hussain, the President of India died and the 
intra-party crisis that had somehow been contained until then finally 
erupted. The party's choice to succeed Dr. Hussain was Neelam Sanjeeva 
Reddy, a prominent Congressman, who was a former Chief Minister of Andhra 
Pradesh and, at the time of Hussain's death, the Speaker of the Lok Sabha. 
Mrs. Gandhi appears to have been convinced that the Syndicate, in a last 
ditch effort to reassert its authority, was mounting a conspiracy to
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engineer her downfall by naming Reddy as President. Fearing desertion 
from her ranks should the Syndicate reestablish its dominance and sus­
pecting that Mr. Reddy might then call upon Desai to form the central 
ministry, Mrs. Gandhi set about preparing the defeat of Mr. Reddy’s 
candidacy, and with it, the destruction of the Congress’ old guard.
In July 1969, at the All India Congress Committee (AICC) session in 
Bangalore, Mrs. Gandhi appears to have made her first major move to put 
distance between her and the Party leadership through ideological polari­
zation of the party membership. She placed before the Congress Working 
Committee what she described as "just some stray thoughts hurriedly 
dictated" but which was in effect a comprehensive economic policy paper 
largely modelled after the programs of the leftists in the party. It 
proposed (1) a ceiling on unproductive expenditure; (2) nationalization 
of banks; (3) special efforts to develop backward areas; (4) appointment 
of a monopolies commission; (5) greater autonomy for public sector under­
takings; (6) the building of a corps of professionals to manage the 
public sector; (7) the reservation of most consumer industries for the 
small scale sector; (8) the exclusion of foreign capital from fields in 
which Indian technological knowhow was available; (9) special assistance 
to rural cooperatives; (10) a ceiling on incomes and on urban property; 
(11) nationalization of the import of raw materials; (12) special rural 
programs; (13) agrarian land reforms ; and (14) a minimum wage for agri­
cultural labor. Mrs. Gandhi’s "stray thoughts" are significant in 
that they constituted the first public declaration of her affiliation 
with the leftists within the Congress. As Masani has commented, for the
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first time in her career she had staked her political future on an 
ideological issue. Despite reservations by some of the Working 
Committee membership, the "stray thoughts" however, were unanimously 
adopted as a statement of economic policy of the Congress party and a 
confrontation was avoided for the time being.
Mrs. Gandhi next tried to counter the Syndicate's choice of 
Mr. Sanjeeva Reddy as successor to the late Dr. Zakir Hussain, by pro­
posing the name of Jagjivan Ram, a member of her cabinet. As she ex­
plained it to the Congress Parliamentary Board, she felt that the nomi­
nation of Ram, a Harijan (untouchable) would be most appropriate during 
Mahatma Gandhi's birth centenary year, since Gandhi had led the fight 
for the uplift of the untouchables in India. Her arguments did not pre­
vail, however, and when the vote was taken by the Board on July 12, 1969, 
Reddy won over Ram by a 5 to 2 majority with Ram, a board member, abstain­
ing.
When Mr. Desai voted with the majority of the Parliamentary Board 
in favor of Mr. Sanjeeva Reddy, Mrs. Gandhi acted against him. Claiming 
that he had come to be identified with "certain basic approaches and 
attitudes" not in consonance with the national mood, she relieved him of 
his Finance portfolio thereby precipitating his resignation from the 
deputy prime ministership as well. Within an hour of Mrs. Gandhi's take­
over of the Finance portfolio she asked the Ministry to draft a bank 
nationalization ordinance in a day's time. Both the Finance Secretary 
as well as the Governor of Reserve Bank were of the opinion that 
nationalization of banks at that time was neither "feasible" nor "desirable."
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The Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission D.R. Gadgil was not even
consulted. The Cabinet itself was consulted only perfunctorily. Its
19members did not take even five minutes to give their approval. In 
less than a week’s time after Mr. Desai's removal as the Finance Minister, 
fourteen of the largest national banks which together accounted for more 
than half of the total deposits and credits in the economy were nation­
alized. Bank nationalization was projected by the administration as evi­
dence of Mrs. Gandhi's commitment to the common man against monied in­
terests. The strain of stridency that has characterized all recent 
Indian politics at the national level can be traced to this period. As 
Nayar states:
A new insidious kind of campaign to judge 
people’s commitment started those days 
Everywhere, more so in Mrs. Gandhi’s camp 
the question asked often ... was "what is 
your commitment?
What was vaguely meant was that those who 
were with Mrs. Gandhi were "progressive, 
pure and purposeful" and those who were 
on the other side were "rightists, reac­
tionaries and retrograde." 20
As the date for the presidential election drew nearer, Mrs. Gandhi
decided to break with party discipline and not support Mr. Reddy. She
refused the Congress President Mr. Nijalingappa’s request to issue an
appeal to party members on behalf of the official Congress nominee,
Mr. Reddy. Instead, she paved the way for a so-called "vote of conscience."
Citing "deep anguish" at the alleged electoral arrangements being made
by the Congress with the Jan Sangh and the Swatantra Party which she
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declared amounted to compromise with political parties totally opposed 
to Congress principles and programs, she declined to issue the whips 
that would have devoted party discipline and support. Next, she and 
her supporters got behind the opposing candidacy of Mr. V. V. Giri, 
the acting President, who had earlier announced his candidacy as an 
independent. Mr. Giri won a narrow victory with the help of several 
opposition parties and Mrs. Gandhi too won yet another victory over 
the Syndicate.
In her battle with the party leadership, the mainstay of Mrs. Gandhi’s 
support within the party during this period came from the Socialist 
faction within the Congress, the Congress Forum for Socialist Action (CFSA).
Founded in 1962 following the Third General Elections, as the 
Congress Socialist Forum, its initial membership was confined to seventeen 
members of the Parliament whose mission was "to bring about greater
21ideological awareness and homogenity in the ranks of the Congress."
Despite some success in organzing units at the State and local levels, 
until the Fourth General Elections of 1967, it remained essentially a 
discussion and study group with little influence over the party leader­
ship. In 1967, a large number of younger and more radical Congress candi­
dates were returned to Parliament and the Socialist group within the 
Congress, now strengthened, reorganized itself as the CFSA.
The new leaders of the CFSA, among whom were many former Communists, 
were markedly more radical than their predecessors. They not only intro­
duced new organizational, procedural and membership rules but also
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brought with them a firmer ideological commitment to socialism. In her 
search for political allies against the Syndicate, Mrs. Gandhi found the 
CFSA a convenient base of support, and some of their populist programs 
found their way into her "stray thoughts" and helped foster her image as 
a radical reformer. The Forum, for its part, expecting to benefit from 
her dependence on them, extended full support to her. This support, 
which she eagerly accepted, had the effect of pushing her, despite her 
naturally pragmatic bent, into grand radical posturings which fostered 
and exacerbated ideological tensions. Her populist platform succeeded 
in discrediting the Syndicate as reactionaries, and to that extent, bene- 
fitted her initially. However, since she herself possessed neither the 
will nor the commitment to carry out the meaningful radical reforms which 
her rhetoric implied, it ultimately was damaging to her because it re­
sulted in the public's loss of faith in her.
Mrs. Gandhi's alliance with the CFSA is important only in that by 
her espousal of their radical programs and even more so, their rhetoric, 
she raised public expectations beyond the system's ability to provide.
It bred cynicism and public frustration which found its expression in 
agitational politics directed against her government. And, therefore, 
even though, after she had established her preeminent position in Indian 
politics she brought about the disbandment of the Forum, her alliance 
with it and her adoption of their radical style of politics had an ad­
verse effect on Indian politics.
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The rift between the two factions within the Congress Party - 
Mrs. Gandhi's and the Syndicate's - simmered until November 1969, 
when the Party leadership expelled Mrs. Gandhi for indiscipline and 
called on the Congress Parliamentary Party to elect another leader.
They had sorely underestimated her strength and when the leadership issue 
was put to the vote Mrs. Gandhi won 220 out of 282 votes of the Congress 
members in Parliament. The 62 members who had voted against her 
split away to form their own parliamentary party. The two wings came 
to be referred to popularly as Congress (0) for old or organizational 
and Congress (R) or (N) for ruling or new. The victory assured the Prime
Minister control of the legislative wing of the party though the organi­
zational element of the party still remained under Syndicate control.
The battle for control of the Congress Party signified a major
transformation of the party idiom from one of conciliation to that of 
conflict. Instead of the principles of consensus, compromise and accomo­
dation that had characterized government policies and actions until then 
the politics of confrontation dominated the government approach there­
after. The element of hysteria that entered the Indian political scene 
at this time through the populist demagoguery of Mrs. Gandhi made rational 
action on enduring problems most difficult. The result was a series of 
political and economic crises which had become all pervasive by the eve 
of the Emergency.
Though she had won a conclusive victory over the Congress Party hier­
archy and established her authority over its parliamentary wing, Mrs. Gandhi
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was cognizant of the fact that the party machinery at the state and local 
levels was still outside of her control. To remain in power after the 
next elections, scheduled for 1972, she would have to either wrest con­
trol of the party apparatus from these party bosses or bypass the regu­
lar party channels and build up her own. She chose the latter path.
In order to establish her appeal among the masses she adopted populist 
themes, and articulated them in radical rhetoric. She succeeded in por­
traying her battle for the control of the Congress machinery as the con­
flict between progressives and reactionaries, between Left and Right. As 
Kuldip Nayar has remarked:
Between the Right and the Left once stood 
the massive Congress Party, in which were 
men of every political hue except the dark­
est. Then came the split and there was no 
longer a giant at the center. 23
Both factions, in their search for electoral allies, moved away from the 
center, Mrs. Gandhi toward the Left to stay in power and the old guard 
Congress party to the Right in an effort to pull her down. Moderation, 
the imperative of Indian democracy lost ground as Mrs. Gandhi, in her 
quest for power, endowed radicalism with respectability.
The role that the Congress Party had performed since independence 
also underwent a change. In 1961, Rajni Kothari, a leading Indian poli­
tical scientist, had described the Congress Party thus:
The Congress is more than a party, it con­
stitutes an entire party system. The con­
flicts and alignments within the Congress
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are of greater political import than its 
conflicts with the opposition groups. The 
operative political categories in India 
are factions within the ruling party or­
ganized on different lines and interacting 
in a continuous process of pressure, adjust­
ment, and accomodation...
... It is at the level of factions that the 
true nature of the Congress and its distinc­
tiveness from other parties is also revealed. 
For it is at this level that one can see how 
close the Congress is to society: it reflects
all the major social divisions and interest 
groups. It is also at this level that tradi­
tional institutions find entry into the poli­
tical process. 24
So long as there was collective leadership within the Congress, it allow­
ed representation within it of a broad range of interests and viewpoints. 
Within the councils of Congress there were consultations and discussions 
among members in which differing viewpoints were represented, prior to 
formulation of policies. Such a system, as critics have pointed out, 
did tend to frustrate all attempts at effective implementation of poli­
cies that were opposed by important elements within the party. But at 
the same time it also managed to provide the diverse interests represented 
within the party with a sense of participation in the political process 
and thereby obligated them to work within the political framework for 
the furtherance of their interests and objectives.
New Followers for Old Leaders
In furtherance of her quest for increased power, Mrs. Gandhi carried 
out a major restructuring of the government. The ministry most radically
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reorganized was the Home Ministry. Sixty of the 100 sections within
the ministry, including those that had responsibility for the All India
Administrative Services, the Central Bureau of Investigation and the
Intelligence Bureau were transferred to the Cabinet Secretariat under
Mrs. Gandhi's immediate and direct control. Not satisfied with this
limited transfer of authority over Home Affairs to her Secretariat she
took charge of the entire ministry, adding the Home portfolio to her
other responsibilities and giving her direct authority over all police
and security matters as well. The reorganization of the Home Ministry
succeeded in bringing under her personal control all major administrative,
police and intelligence services. The aggrandizement of power by
Mrs. Gandhi was already under way.
Mrs. Gandhi was also determined to dominate the Congress party
apparatus. To achieve this she realized that she would have to assume
control over the appointment of members of the Congress High Command,
consisting of three major organs: the Working Committee, the Congress
25Parliamentary Board and the Central Elections Committee.
The control of the party presidency was the first and most crucial 
step in asserting control over the party since the Congress Party presi­
dent enjoyed enormous powers to appoint members to the major Party organs. 
Of the 20 members of the Working Committee, 10 were appointed by the 
Congress president. All eight members of the Parliamentary Board were 
selected by him upon authorization of the Working Committee, the members 
being generally selected from among the Working Committee members. The
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Elections Committee which was the ultimate authority in the selection of 
Congress candidates to contest the elections to the Center and the States 
consisted of 15 members, eight of whom were the members of the Parliament­
ary Board picked out by the party president. Since the split of 1969,
Mrs. Gandhi was careful to choose as presidents of the party only the 
most loyal to her. And through them she succeeded in influencing the 
composition of the important party organs. These organs were then used 
far more aggressively than at any time in the past, to assert central
control over party affairs at all levels, "over the mass organizations,
the legislative parties in the states, and national and state legislative 
elites."
No amount of centralization of power within her own party or within 
her administration could by itself bestow on her the undisputed leader­
ship of the party, the government and the nation that she sought. She 
knew that she had to first overcome her reduced majority in Parliament 
and the Congress' weakness in the States. To this end, in December 1970,
she announced her decision to hold elections a year earlier than the
scheduled expiration of the five year term of the legislature. Ignoring 
regular party machinery especially at the state and local levels, she 
embarked on a campaign which was intensely personal in nature. Flying 
all over the country in Air Force planes and helicopters she electrified 
the nation with her campaign slogan of "garibi hatao" (abolish poverty).
In the six weeks the campaign lasted she addressed over 250 large public
27gatherings and hundreds more of smaller roadside audiences.
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The election was an unequivocal victory for Mrs. Gandhi. Her party 
won 350 seats in Parliament out of a total of 521 providing her with 
the two-thirds majority with which she could change even the most major 
constitutional provision. The magnitude of her victory was such that 
the Communist Party of India (Marxist) which was second won only 25 seats 
and the pro-Moscow Communist Party of India, her allies, were next with 
only 23 seats.
The elections had established Mrs. Gandhi’s preeminent position in 
Indian politics. It was a peculiarly personal victory for her and it 
represented the demise of party politics in India as it had functioned 
until then. Mrs. Gandhi perceived her support in that election as de­
riving directly from the masses to her personally and not to the party 
as such. She therefore no longer considered herself beholden to the party 
or its traditional practices. Whereas in the past, the Prime Minister 
had derived strength and support from the party and considered himself 
responsible to it, following this election Congress Party politics was 
thoroughly transformed. Soon, for all intents and purposes the Party 
behaved as the creature of the Prime Minister, prompting Morarji Desai’s
remark, "Step by step (Mrs. Gandhi) has reduced her party to an assembly
29of imbeciles without courage."
Her choice of Congress Party presidents and other functionaries, 
the Union Cabinet Ministers, the Chief Ministers of States and even her 
choice, in 1976, of Fakhruddin Ali Ahmad to be President of India all 
evidenced a departure from Congress party politics of earlier days,
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when only leaders with strong bases of political support rose to the 
top. Under Mrs. Gandhi’s new politics the reverse occurred as she 
tended to favor and elevate to positions of leadership those who had 
no independent political bases of their own and therefore would be be­
holden solely to her for their continuance in power.
Aside from old party stalwarts like Chavan, Swaran Singh and
Jagjivan Ram at the center, whose political bases were so secure that
their claims to power could not be overlooked, most of the newer leaders
at the center and the states were those whose base of support was
Mrs. Gandhi herself. Whereas in the past, the Chief Ministers of States
were chosen by the state legislative party concerned, Mrs. Gandhi adopted
the method of nominating the candidates for Chief Minister for each state
where the Congress Party had a legislative majority. Her choice was then
formally ratified by the Congress legislative party of that state. Her
nominees were frequently former members of the Union Cabinet, who were
personally loyal to her but had only limited bases of power in their 
30home states. Their credibility and authority was so weak that they 
constantly had to turn to New Delhi for political support to continue in 
office. Veteran state congressmen who had resented the imposition of 
leadership from above managed, in due course, to mount challenges to the 
incumbents. As factionalism increased in almost every state,many of 
Mrs. Gandhi’s nominees with no strong local support of their own could 
not survive the challenge to their power. Of greater significance to 
the Emergency itself is that as Stanley Kochanek has written
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"inept Chief Ministers had to spend all their 
time trying to stay in power and were unable 
to cope with the problems generated by thirty 
months of economic crises, food shortages and 
uncontrolled inflation. Agitations that ori­
ginated as localized expressions of grievance 
against incompetent leaders blosommed into 
large movements, which ultimately came to 
challenge the political power of the Congress 
at the center." 31
The size of her 1971 election victory carried certain dangers as 
well. More than at any other time in the recent past the victory id­
entified Mrs. Gandhi closely with India's future. No longer would she 
or her party be able to blame the opposition for obstructing reforms. 
Henceforth, they alone would be held responsible for solving the nation's 
myriad ills since only they possessed the needed power.
Mrs. Gandhi's aggrandizement of power which the new "leaders" did 
not oppose meanwhile continued as she assumed responsibility for the 
Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, bringing the list of ministries 
she now headed to four - Home, Planning, Atomic Energy and Space, and 
Information and Broadcasting.
Growth of Nondemocratic Legislation
Mrs. Gandhi's election manifesto had declared.
It will be our endeavor to seek such further 
constitutional remedies and amendments as are 
necessary to overcome impediments in the path 
of social justice. 32
And in the interests of what she deemed social justice she pushed through 
parliament three major amendments to the constitution.
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The Constitution (24th Amendment) Act 1971 was enacted to accord 
parliament aboslute power to amend the constitution. The purpose was to 
counter the effect of the Supreme Court verdict in the Golaknath case 
which had categorically denied to Parliament the power to amend Part III 
of the constitution relating to Fundamental Rights.
The 25th Amendment was an attempt to remove the effects of the 
Supreme Court verdict on the Bank nationalization case. The court had 
struck down the initial measure authorizing the nationalization on the 
ground that it made hostile discrimination against the banks and violated 
certain features relating to their fundamental right to property and the 
adequacy of compensation to them. The amendment omitted the word "com­
pensation" from the constitutional provision dealing with the compulsory 
acquisition of property for public purposes and replaced it with the 
word "amount" to eliminate the normative implications of the former.
Another provision had the result of denying the right to property 
the status of a fundamental right entitled to special protection, by 
declaring that no law giving effect to the Directive Principles of State 
Policy relating to the "proper distribution of material resources."
O C
and "the prevention of concentration of wealth" shall be voided on 
the ground that they violated the fundamental rights of equality, and 
of property. And finally, the amendment also provided that if a law 
contained the declaration that it was in furtherance of the Directive 
Principles concerned, it may not be impugned on grounds that it does not 
give effect to such policy. The amendment thus sought to bar judicial
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review of any legislation purporting to further property related 
directive principles.
The 26th Amendment terminated the privy purses and privileges of 
the ex-rulers of the former Indian states. The princes were derecognized 
by the expedient of deleting all constitutional provisions according 
them, the purses and the privileges.
As proof of her commitment to the common man, the elimination of 
princely privileges had been included in Mrs. Gandhi's election plat­
form even though a similar measure had failed in the previous parliament­
ary session. As a radical populist measure it was largely symbolic but 
it is nonetheless illustrative of Mrs. Gandhi's approach to legal and 
constitutional obligations.
At the time of Indian independence over 550 princely rulers had 
been prevailed upon to merge their principalities into the Indian Union 
under an agreement whereby they and their heirs were guaranteed under 
the Constitution certain privileges in return for the sovereignty they 
forswore. These included the annual payment of privy purses in varying 
amounts, the recognition of their titles, immunity from prosecution, ex­
emption from all taxes, and from requisition of their properties by the 
State, free medical care, free driving licenses and personal license 
plates for their vehicles, postal and telegraph concessions, public holi­
days on their birthdays (within the borders of their former kingdoms), 
the right to display their flags and the right to military honours, to 
gun salutes and to armed escorts and guards. Over the years there was
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increasing popular criticism of such generous accomodation of royal 
privileges within a supposedly democratic system. In response to such 
criticism, the Congress Party had set for itself the objective of abolish­
ing the privileges. None of the previous attempts by the government to 
renegotiate the terms had succeeded, however, and it was Mrs. Gandhi 
who, after her break with the Syndicate settled on the solution of 
amending the Constitution to deny the princes their Constitutional 
guarantees. The Bill she had introduced in the previous session recog­
nizing the princes received more than the two-thirds majority in the 
Lok Sabha but failed by one vote in the Rajya Sabha. An executive order 
was then promulgated which derecognized them and nullified all the 
constitutional guarantees which had earlier been extended to them. It 
was this executive order that the 26th Amendment replaced.
The battle cry of the Emergency that the Constitution should not be 
allowed to stand in the way of "progress" was fashioned here in the early 
days of Mrs. Gandhi's rise to absolute power.
Of the various pieces of legislation enacted during this period the 
one that abridged individual freedom the most was the Maintenance of 
Internal Security Act (MISA). It was passed in 1971, and of all the 
excesses of the Government under the Emergency the most oppressive was 
the indiscriminate employment of MISA to intimidate and punish opponents 
of the regime. The original justification for the passage of the MISA 
legislation was that the Government required special authority to deal 
with the extraordinary situation created by the influx of millions of 
refugees from Bangladesh among whom were believed to be numerous agents
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of Pakistan. The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Bill, as set 
forth before the Lok Sabha on June 3, 1971 by K. C. Pant, the Minister 
for Home Affairs, read as follows:
In view of the prevailing situation in the 
country and developments across the border 
there is need for urgent and effective pre­
ventive action in the interest of national 
security. It is therefore considered essen­
tial to deal effectively with the threats 
to the defence of India and to the security 
of India, especially from external sources, 
espionage activities of foreign agents.
Since existing laws available to deal with 
security have not been found to be adequate, 
the Maintenance of Internal Security Ordin­
ance, 1971, has been promulgated. It is 
now proposed to replace the Ordinance by 
an Act. 36
The final language of the Act, however, did not confine its applicability 
to aliens indulging in anti-national activity. Instead, the Act was 
rendered comprehensive in scope and, in practice, it was mostly employed 
for tackling ordinary law and order problems for which no special legis­
lation should have been required and for silencing political opposition. 
The MISA gave additional powers of preventive detention to the Executive. 
Central and state governments were empowered under the Act, to issue 
detention orders for a period up to one year to prevent an individual 
from acting in a manner prejudicial to the defence of India, the security 
of the state, the maintenance of public order or the maintenance of 
essential supplies and public services.
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The principal safeguards against the enhanced powers of preventive 
detention conferred on the Executive were as follows: First, the detenu
was to be informed of the full grounds of detention, normally within 
five days and in exceptional cases within 15 days. Second, the Govern­
ment was required to place before a three man advisory board whose members 
qualified as judges of High Court, within 30 days of a detention order, 
the grounds for the detention, and the Board was obligated to render 
within 10 weeks of the detention order its opinion as to whether there 
was sufficient grounds for continued detention. Third, in all cases of 
detention by a subordinate authority, lower than the State government, 
the period of all such detention was limited to 12 days unless confirmed 
by the Advisory Board, Finally, the detenu retained his right under
natural or common law to move the High Court, in a writ of habeas corpus,
37for relief against the detention order passed against him.
Despite these safeguards which were incorporated into the provisions 
on preventive detention in the Act there was considerable opposition to 
the passage of the Act from the opposition parties. Atal Bahari Vajpayee, 
the Jan Sangh leader, protested; "This is the beginning of a police 
state and a blot on democracy. It is the first step towards dictatorship 
... these provisions will not be used against foreign spies but against 
political opponents." N. K. Krishnan, a Communist Party member also 
clearly foresaw what would ensue:
"...experience has amply proved that such 
sweeping draconian powers in the hands of 
the bureaucracy have been used for 20 years
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and naturally, will be used, not against 
anti-national elements... but against 
political workers, against trade union 
workers... We say that these powers are 
going to be used not against people who 
endanger the security of this country 
but against political workers, against 
trade union leaders." 39
The Home Minister sought to allay such fears with repeated assurances 
that MISA would not be used for purposes other than what it was intended 
for —  to deal effectively with threats to the defence and security of 
India. "It is a serious assurance" he declared, "that this bill will not 
be used against legitimate trade union activities or legitimate political 
activity." The Emergency belied these assurances, as detailed in 
the next chapter.
At about the same time, the Defence of India Act of 1963 which was 
withdrawn in 1967, was reinstated as the Defence of India Act of 1971, 
again, in the wake of the Bangladesh crisis. It was so frequently re­
sorted to by Mrs. Gandhi since then that on June 24, 1974 an editorial 
in the Overseas Hindustan Times titles, "Dangerous Addiction to DIR" 
caustically observed that it was being used for "wholly unintended and 
even miscellaneous purposes," even "to raise the price of bread."
In December 1974, by which time Mrs. Gandhi had become habituated 
to the use of preventive legislation to resolve law and order issues, a 
new measure, the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of 
Smuggling Act (COFEPOSA) was enacted to extend the scope of MISA and 
enable the Government to carry out raids against and authorize detention
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of suspected smugglers and hoarders. At the time of its passage, the 
Act provided for similar safeguards as were included in the MISA.
The Economic Stalemate
1970-71 was an excellent year for agriculture. A record harvest 
provided a sizeable reserve of food grains and kept food prices reason­
ably stable. Industrial production had also begun to pick up after two 
relatively stagnant years and foreign exchange reserves remained favor­
able. As the year progressed, Mrs. Gandhi's popularity was further en­
hanced as a result of the decisive Indian victory over Pakistan in the 
Bangladesh war of national liberation. She enjoyed more power and 
prestige than even her father, Pandit Nehru had. She had both the country 
and the parliament on her side. The time was propitious to implement 
all those measures of basic reform of the economy that either had not 
been enacted or if enacted had only lain in books and gathered dust.
But, strangely, in place of the dynamic action the masses had a right 
to expect of her, an inexplicable paralysis seemed to afflict Mrs. Gandhi 
and her government.
The Congress under Mrs. Gandhi had a mandate, but apparently no 
programme. As J. D. Sethi, an Indian economist, has explained, the 
Congress would appear to have mastered the technique of winning elections, 
while losing the technique of governing the country. Commenting on 
the situation, B. G. Verghese, a prominent Indian newspaper editor, 
wrote that Mrs. Gandhi seemed
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unwilling to lead, afraid of her own major­
ity... If the country is adrift and the 
government rudderless it is because there 
has been a failure of leadership. The Prime 
Minister has no program, no world view, no 
grand design. Thus bereft of a frame she 
has merely reacted to events and failed to 
shape them. This has been her tragedy. 42
There was no coherent public program, no attempt to bring about 
quick and lasting reforms to effect social and economic progress.
Mrs. Gandhi's preoccupation seemed to be purely political. With great 
deftness she had destroyed the faction within the Congress that posed 
a challenge to her power and had become the undisputed leader of the 
Party. Her appointments within it tended to create a group of Congress 
leaders who had no independent popular bases of their own, whose fortunes 
were very much tied to her own and whose loyalties to her consequently 
bordered on sycophancy. And, while there were still a few leaders with 
independent support of their own, their influence within the government 
steadily diminished, and if they had reservations about government policy 
they were astute enough to keep these to themselves. One-party dominance 
had led to one-person dominance over the Party, and as a result both 
cabinet and Parliament had lost much of their vitality and independence.
It was also difficult for the Government to take badly needed action 
on land reform, debt liquidation, bonded labor, food procurement and 
distribution and agricultural taxation, since the Congress Party derived 
substantial political support from the rural elite who would be most 
adversely affected by such measures. The official ideology of the Party
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being socialism, a great many agrarian reforms were legislated amidst 
radical rhetoric, but they were unaccompanied by any determined action ^ 
to enforce them. For years there had been no need to even try to act on 
controversial issues since whatever their own predicament, the rural 
poor seemed not to question the Congress' right to rule. The Party, 
symbolized by Mrs. Gandhi, represented authority to them, and the authori­
tarian character of the Indian political and social tradition did not 
encourage protest against authority.
But the middle classes, whose expectations were higher and whose 
values were less traditional, became progressively more restive. For 
them, Congress had made too many promises and raised too many hopes, 
and when economic stagnation set in Congress found itself the focus of 
their discontent.
The Indian approach to economic planning lay in the adoption of a 
"mixed economy" by which the government hoped to avoid the totalitarian­
ism associated with complete state control of all phases of economic 
activity, as well as the social injustices related to total laissez-faire. 
Ever since independence, in pursuit of a policy of economic self-suffici­
ency, the economic plans had always been biased in favor of heavy indus­
tries. Import substitution rather than export orientation underlay the 
emphasis on heavy industries and the large capital investments it mandated. 
The emphasis on heavy industry resulted in the neglect of agriculture 
which in turn had serious consequences for a nation in which over eighty 
per cent depended on agriculture for their livelihood. Even after more
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than two decades of independence, the problem of mass poverty persisted. 
Elimination of abject poverty was the cry to which the electorate had 
responded and given Mrs. Gandhi her overwhelming victory. Momentous 
economic reforms were therefore expected since Mrs. Gandhi now possessed 
all the strength in Parliament that she needed to push her programs 
through.
The Union budget for 1971-1972 presented shortly after the elections, 
offered a partial fulfillment of the promises Mrs. Gandhi had made during 
her campaign. The budget provided for a number of special schemes for 
the benefit of the poor and the unemployed. A crach scheme for rural 
employment with a cost of half a billion rupees, a number of special em­
ployment schemes for the educated unemployed, costing a quarter of a 
billion rupees and other similar projects were allocated for in the bud­
get outside of the provisions already made in the current five year plan. 
To deal with the ever-present problem of land reforms, a Central Land 
Reforms Committee was set up and this committee established new guide­
lines on ceilings on landholdings. Many states followed with legislation 
incorporating the new guidelines. But again, as always before, little 
was done to implement the enactments. It produced very little surplus 
land that could be distributed among the landless and small peasants.
As the realization sunk in that effective reforms still would not be 
forthcoming, the mood of buoyant optimism that had accompanied the elec­
tions of 1971 was replaced by a sense of despair. Of course, some of 
the causes of the economic malaise that set in before the Emergency
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were not of Mrs. Gandhi's making. Ten million refugees had poured into 
India during the Bangladesh crisis and India had provided for them, de­
pleting her slender food reserves. The OPEC oil price increase had 
crippled the foreign exchange reserves; three successive years of drought 
and the high price of grain in the world markets also exacerbated the 
economic situation.
When the need of the hour was the effective implementation of 
meaningful economic reforms, especially agrarian reforms, Mrs. Gandhi's 
efforts were directed towards the expansion of the public sector through 
the acquisition of ownership and control of vital segments of industry 
still in private hands. During this period she nationalized the general 
insurance companies, the entire coal mining industry and even the wheat 
trade.
The nationalization of the wheat trade was an out and out economic 
disaster. In April 1973, the government took over the procurement and 
distribution of wheat, thereby eliminating the role of the private traders 
in an effort to cut out middle men, insure fair prices and end speculation 
and hoarding. The measure caused angry resentment among farmers and 
traders, a breakdown in supply and a booming black market. Within a year 
the price of wheat had risen 36% and severe shortages had developed to 
the point where, in March 1974, government was compelled to end its take­
over of the wheat distribution and release it to private hands. In 
the meanwhile, large amounts of wheat had to be bought on the world market 
at the prohibitive prices then prevailing, and this worsened further the
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already precarious foreign reserve situation. Between 1972 and 1973 
the cost of food grain rose nearly 13%; during the following year prices 
rose another 29%, compared to only moderate increases in preceding years.
As the economic situation worsened, the Government resorted with 
ever-increasing frequency to deficit financing. As B. S. Minhas, a lead­
ing Indian economist has pointed out, political and financial discipline 
was permitted to sag:
The old procedure of fixing ceilings on 
drought assistance to the States was dis­
pensed with ... Billions of rupees were 
pushed out in drought relief. Money did 
not seem to matter. Promises for finan­
cing all "worthwhile" schemes were freely 
distributed. 46
By the Fall of 1974 the economic scene was dismal on all fronts.
There was runaway inflation, widespread unemployment and severe short­
ages of essential commodities. Labor unrest was pervasive. According 
to the Ministry of Finance, Economic Survey. 1975-76, six million man- 
days were lost just between July and September, 1974. Industrial pro­
duction declined as a result of power cuts, drops in productivity, under­
utilization of capacity and labor unrest. The balance of trade deficits 
continued to deteriorate. A drought of calamitous proportions continued 
into a third straight year. In West Bengal alone, according to the Relief 
Minister of the state, Mr. Santosh Roy, 15 million people in the rural 
areas were reported to be "either starving or living on one meal a day.
In Bihar about six and a half million tribals were said to be living on
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the starvation line. There were similar conditions in other states as 
well. In all, eight states out of the 22 states of the Union reported 
famine conditions. Reports such as the one below were not uncommon in 
the Fall of 1974:
In Assam, famine had affected about 92 per 
cent of the rural population in Goalpara 
District alone. About 300,000 people in 
Dhubri were subsisting on wild roots and 
leaves. In addition, cholera had broken 
out and an unaccounted number had perished. 
The Sub-divisional relief committee was 
looking after hardly 4,000 people on 200 
grams of rice and 100 grams of atta (wheat 
flour) per head per week. This lasted 
barely two days. For the other days of 
the week, the people had to fend for them­
selves. 48
Large scale violence sparked by high food prices and severe food short­
ages occurred in state after state. Under the circumstances, it is not 
surprising that the violent political agitations in Gujerat and Bihar, 
on the eve of the Emergency, started out as protests against the intoler­
able economic conditions within those states, before they expanded in 
scope to cover political issues as well.
The Economic Survey presented to the Parliament by the Finance 
Ministry in early 1975 underlined the extent of economic stagnation. 
Whereas the growth of national income at constant 1960-61 prices was 
estimated at having increased from the previous year by less than one 
percent in 1974-75, the rise in wholesale prices between April and 
December of 1974 was 27.2 percent.
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To comprehend the magnitude of the economic despair prevailing in 
the country, one needs only to look at the figures on the devastating 
economic performance of the nation under Mrs. Gandhi as compiled by 
Ashok Mitra, a distinguished Indian economist and former chief economic 
adviser to the Government of India. His figures show that between mid 
1972 and mid 1975 consumer prices in India rose by 80% and that in the 
decade since 1966 the compound rate of growth of farm output was barely 
1% a year, industrial growth actually declined by two-thirds compared 
to the growth rate registered in the preceding decade.
A Problem of Integrity
While confidence in Mrs. Gandhi's administrative ability began to 
wane, scandals began to plague the Administration and even her personal 
integrity came under question. The major scandals of this period are 
treated below since they contributed to the decline in the public esteem 
which Mrs. Gandhi and her Administration had hitherto enjoyed:
The still unresolved "Nagarwala affairs" was the first major 
public scandal that affected Mrs. Gandhi personally and it set the stage 
for the fading of her charisma. According to the charges, 1971, during
the Indo-Pakistan war, Nagarwala had imitated the voices of Mrs. Gandhi
and the head of her Secretariat, P. N. Haksar over the telephone and
persuaded Ved Prakash Malhotra, the chief cashier of a New Delhi branch
of the state-owned State Bank of India to take out six million Rupees 
from the bank valuts and hand it over to him "for Bangladesh". He was
91
arrested and within five days was sentenced to four years rigorous im­
prisonment on charges of impersonation and cheating.
The unheard of speed with which the case was disposed of aroused 
immediate suspicion which only increased when, while still in custody 
and awaiting a retrial that had been granted to him, Nagarwala died of 
an apparent hear attack. A physician present at the post mortem let 
it be known to newsmen that he had his suspicions about the fatal heart 
attack. Shortly thereafter, two police officers who were actively in­
volved in the Nagarwala investigation also met with untimely deaths —  
one, also of a heart attack, and the other when run over by an automobile.
Ugly rumors soon began to circulate as the public wondered if chief 
cashier Malhotra may not have acceeded to Nagarwala’s request for the 
money only because he was used to such requests from Mrs. Gandhi. With 
the death of the principal, the case was dismissed and no further dis­
closures ensued. However, Mr. Malhotra, the errant cashier subsequently 
became an active Congress worker and this rise to prominence within the 
party gave currency to the belief that he had been rewarded for his 
silence and loyalty.
A more damaging scandal involved the murder in January 1975 of the
5 2Railways Minister L. N. Mishra, in Samastipur, in Bihar. While he 
was inaugurating a new railway link between Samastipur and Muzzafarpur, 
a bomb exploded under the rostrum of which Mishra and the other dignitaries 
were seated injuring about twenty people including Mishra and his brother 
J. N. Mishra, who was also a leading Bihari politician. A most confusing
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sequence of events ensued, culminating in the death some hours later of 
L. N. Mishra, who thereby became the first public figure to be assassinated 
sine Mahatma Gandhi in 1948.
While both the Mishra brothers had been hurt in the explosion, J. N. 
Mishra had been treated at the hearby hospital in Samastipur, whereas 
the Railway Minister had been taken by train to Patna 150 kilometers 
away and from there by car to Dinapur several more kilometers distant.
On arrival in Dinapur he was operated on for the internal injuries, 
allegedly sustained during the explosion. He did not survive the surgery.
Questions on everyone's lips related to why he had not been taken 
to the local hospital as his brother had been and how he could have died 
only hours after a doctor in attendance at the Samastipur railway sta­
tion, where the explosion ahd occurred, had pronounced that the Minister 
had suffered only minor skin abrasions. Also, a team of surgeons who 
had arrived in Samastipur from the medical college at neighboring 
Darbhanga had been prevented from examining Mishra, allegedly by his 
staff members, whose identities remained unrevealed. Questions were also 
raised over the laxity of security arrangements, particularly in view of 
repeated forewarnings the police had received that certain persons were 
conspiring to harm Mishra, possibly in Samastipur itself. The mysterious 
circumstances surrounding his death prompted a leading newspaper to edi­
torialize on the event thus : "But if it turns out that it is not the act
of some senseless maniac, or even a disgruntled individual, then it has
53the most disturbing implications for the state of health of the polity."
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The major reason why government complicity was suspected in Mishra's 
death was that Mishra by then had become a source of deep embarrassment 
to the Administration. He had been implicated in an earlier well publi­
cized scandal, the so-called "Licence scandal" that had dominated the 
previous parliamentary session. It was discovered at that time that 21 
members of Parliament had signed and sent a memorandum to the Ministry 
of Commerce recommending the issue of import licenses to several private 
firms in Pondicherry. Except for the signature of one member, Tul Mohan 
Ram, all the other signatures were discovered to be forgeries.
The licences covered items like automobile engines and parts, 
scientific, medical and surgical equipment, film and studio equipment, 
whisky, brandy, and gin —  some of these items carrying 200 to 300 
percent markup in the open market. Mishra, who at that time was the 
Foreign Trade Minister, was alleged to have taken a close and continuous 
interest in the grant of the licences and according to a Central Bureau 
of Investigations report on the matter, Mishra had demanded of the Commerce 
Ministry officer in charge a "quick finalization" of the issue of the 
licences.
When the winter session of the Parliament had adjourned in December, 
less than a month before Mishra's death, opposition leaders had presented 
a memo to Mrs. Gandhi asking for a fuller inquiry into the matter, by a 
parliamentary committee. In addition, there were other charges of cor­
ruption and highhandedness against him. In fact, at the time of his 
death, he was under investigation by a commission of inquiry, headed by 
a former Chief Justice of India, K. Subba Rao. The commission was
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sponsored by the widely respected public interest group, Citizens for 
Democracy, founded by Jaya Prakash Narayan, who was a leading opponent 
of Mrs. Gandhi.
There appeared to be little that Mrs. Gandhi could do to remove 
him from office. For one thing, as the chief fund raiser for the Congress 
he had knowledge of all the illegal contributions to the party coffers. 
Much of it came from large corporations in return for licences, exemp­
tions, price increases and the like. According to some reports, in­
dustrialists were even forced to finance the Congress, under threat of 
nationalization. J. R. D. Tata, one of the top industrialists of 
the country, had openly accused the party of collecting funds illegally: 
"Has not the ruling party" he had asked publicly, "condoned economic mis­
deeds and corruption by openly collecting illegal contributions, mostly 
in black money, for its election funds?"
Furthermore, Mishra had been the Minister for Railways when a major 
railwayman's strike, which will be discussed later in this chapter, was 
broken a year earlier, through the use of extraordinary force by the 
Administration. He was perhaps the most controversial figure in 
Mrs. Gandhi's cabinet and many perceived that Mrs. Gandhi stood to bene­
fit the most from his death.
Mishra was the most vivid symbol of corruption in the Gandhi admin­
istration. However, of the charges of corruption levelled against pro­
minent figures associated with her, the one that affected her most per­
sonally centered around her son Sanjay's attempt to build a "people's
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car." In 1969, the Government of India decided to proceed with the 
manufacture of a low priced car Maruti, named for the son of the Hindu 
Wind God.. The Government received 18 applications, including many from 
established industrial and engineering groups. The licence was awarded 
to Mrs. Gandhi’s then 22-year old son Sanjay, whose only qualification 
for the undertaking was a brief apprenticeship in a Rolls Royce plant 
in Great Britain. From its inception, the project was embroiled in 
controversy as charges of nepotism, and highly questionable business 
and financial dealings were repeatedly raised. At one time a fifth of 
the membership in Parliament had demanded an inquiry into the Maruti 
affairs, but the demand had been dismissed outright by Mrs. Gandhi.
The project was an unmitigated disaster. Only a few prototypes —  
faulty at that —  were ever manufactured. Frequent infusions of credit 
from nationalized banks however kept it afloat. Despite its sorry record, 
Maruti subsidiaries were allowed to be set up and they received lucrative 
government contracts for "consulting services" and for the manufacture 
of roadrollers. The people never did get to see, let alone own, a 
people’s car, though Sanjay reportedly managed to amass a large personal 
fortune through his Maruti dealings.
Ordinarily, a scholarly work on political change would not have to 
concern itself with scandals or rumors such as described above. However, in 
the highly charged Indian political climate preceding the Emergency, all 
these scandals —  the Nagarwala affair, the licence scandal, the Maruti 
project and the Mishra assassination —  took on major significance. To
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the public, they reflected pervasive corruption in high places and 
cumulatively they resulted in a steep erosion of faith in government 
integrity. Most importantly, for the first time in Indian politics, 
the issue of corruption acquired a political dimension, offering the 
basis for a new mass movement.
This movement started out in Bihar, under the leadership of Jaya 
Prakash Narayan, as a protest against corruption and incompetence against 
Congress leaders but soon spread to other states and eventually became 
a catalyst of forces opposed to Mrs. Gandhi. By June 1975, the word 
corruption had taken on such emotive content that when Mrs. Gandhi was 
found guilty of "corrupt" electoral practices and her election set aside, 
the opposition received overwhelming public support when it demanded her 
resignation from office.
Mrs. Gandhi had contributed much to the loss of trust in the Govern­
ment through her frequent flouting of conventions and norms that had 
grown up within the democratic process of India. Of her transgressions 
in this area, the one that aroused the most opposition was her appoint­
ment in April 1973, of a Chief Justice of the Supreme Court to succeed
C O
the retiring Chief Justice S. M. Sikri.
Since independence, it had become customary for the senior most 
judge of the Court to be nominated as the successor to the retiring 
Chief Justice. Had convention been followed. Justice S. M. Shelat would 
have been the choice. But in an unprecedented departure from accepted
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practice Mrs. Gandhi nominated Justice A. N. Ray, who was junior not only 
to Justice Shelat but to two other Judges as well, K. S. Hegde and A. N. 
Grover. What made this nomination even more controversial was that only 
a day earlier the Supreme Court had handed down the verdict in the fam­
ous Kesavananda Bharati case - the Fundamental Rights case. The super­
seded Justices had all held that Parliament did not have the right to 
amend the basic features of the constitution while the newly nominated 
Chief Justice had sided with the government position on each and every 
issue —  and there were many of them —  that had been raised by the case. 
Mrs. Gandhi's decision was widely condemned as an attempt to politicize 
the judicial process. Mohan Kumaramangalam, her Minister for Steel and 
Heavy Engineering, but more importantly the chief leftist theoretician 
of the Party defended the choice thus:
Certainly, we as a government have a duty to 
take the philosophy and outlook of the Judge 
in coming to the conclusion whether he should 
or should not lead the Supreme Court at this 
time. It is our duty in the Government hon­
estly and fairly to come to the conclusion 
whether a particular person is fit to be ap­
pointed the Chief Justice of the Court be­
cause of his outlook, because of his philo­
sophy as expressed in his expressed opinions, 
whether he is a more suitable or a more com­
petent judge. This is our prerogative... 59
The Supreme Court Bar Association chose to view the incident as a 
purely political act that was "a blatant and outrageous attempt at un­
dermining the independence and impartiality of the judiciary" and to 
make it "subservient to the executive and subject to political pressures
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and dependent on Government patronage and influence."
Others, including one of the superseded justices, K. S. Hegde, saw 
behind the act a more sinister motive by the Communists "to capture 
Congress from within and pervert the Constitution." Citing the entry 
of several former Communists into the Congress Party since the 1969 
split, Hegde cautioned that the supersession of the judges was not an 
isolated act:
The various steps taken by our Government 
since the 1971 elections bear witness to 
the enormous influence wielded by the Com­
munists. . . . The people are being system­
atically cheated of their rights. They are 
deprived of their freedoms one by one. The 
destruction of the independence of the judi­
ciary is an act of treachery and a fraud on 
our Constitution . . . Unless the people 
shake off their lethargy and find out the 
realpolitik behind the recent developments 
they will soon find themselves deprived of 
all their rights. We are on the way to 
dictatorship. 61
The three superseded justices resigned in protest and they and the 
outgoing Chief Justice S. M. Sikri boycotted the swearingin ceremony of 
the new Chief Justice. The issue of supersession, as Kuldip Nayar had 
succinctly stated, came down to the basic issue of should the judge up- 
hold the laws or the social philosophy of the ruling party?
The Ascendancy of Agitational Politics
The politicization of the judicial process was an issue that aroused 
public ire, especially among the better educated Indians. They were
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already restive as the Congress appeared utterly incapable of anything 
but intrigue and petty manipulative politicking. For them, the Congress 
had made too many promises and raised too many hopes. As economic stag­
nation set in, the ruling party found itself the focus of their dis­
content. There was more frequent resort to civil disobedience, a legacy 
of the Indian independence struggle and therefore sanctified by it. The 
belief that government would respond only to violent agitations gained 
greater currency as strikes, protests, demonstrations, etc., often ending 
in violence, increased. As public protests increased, so did the fre­
quency with which government resorted to restrictive legislations in­
fringing on the right to personal liberty. There was also a buildup of 
paramilitary forces which were widely deployed to quell disturbances.
Few educated Indians would have denied on the eve of the Emergency that 
Indian society was near-anarchical and in need of discipline and order 
or that government was becoming ever more repressive.
The opposition, meanwhile, was able to capitalize on the popular 
groundwell of discontent and gain in strength. For years opposition to 
Congress had come from a motley assortment of parties ranging in ideo­
logy from the reactionary right to the extremist left, without coherent 
programs or popular leaders. Over the previous year, however, this 
opposition succeeded more than at any time previously in forging a coa­
lition against the Congress. The leading force behind this development 
was Jaya Prakash Narayan, an aging idealist who in 1974, after an absence 
of nearly 20 years, returned to active politics in his home state of
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Bihar to denounce the inefficiency and corruption of the ruling Congress 
Party and to press for its removal.
The 72 year old Narayan, or "J. P." as he was more commonly referred 
to, was a veteran of the nationalist struggle, an authentic hero in the 
eyes of many. Long a crusader for morality in politics, he inspired the 
special kind of respect Indians bestow on unconventional political figu­
res who work outside the mainstream of partisan politics. His status as 
a Gandhian without party affiliation and his reputation for integrity 
and selflessness gave his "People's Movement" tremendous respectability. 
The response to it was overwhelming and it soon became a catalyst of 
forces arraigned against the Congress. Opposition parties as diverse 
as the right-wing Jan Sangh and the leftist communists extended their 
support to his movement. With "J. P." at its helm, the opposition now 
appeared to achieve what it had hitherto lacked —  political legitimacy. 
The importance of Narayan, Verghese has stated, is that he emerged when
the people decided that the time had come to rethink where India was
63going. He dared to ask the question, "Where are we going?"
The opposition coalition had no more concrete program than the 
Congress Party, but it seemed not to matter as its campaigns against 
corruption and misgovernment echoed popular sentiment. It scored im­
pressive victories in the states of Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and Gujerat 
and through massive public protests and hunger strikes forced the govern­
ment to concede to many of its demands.
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The political agitation that enveloped Gujerat for almost a year 
and a half is of crucial significance for an understanding of the political 
forces that resulted in the Emergency. As Francine Frankel has remarked, 
"The Gujerat uprising can be considered a political watershed. It mark­
ed the collapse of shared consensus on legitimate methods of conflict 
resolution between the government and opposition groups."
The trouble in Gujerat began in January 1974, when students at the 
L. D. Engineering College in Ahmedabad, the state Capital, rioted 
against a fifty per cent increase in their mess bills. During the 
protest, they set fire to the college mess hall and attacked the rector’s
house. The Chief Minister of the state, Chiman Patel, ordered riot
police to the campus to quell the riot. In the action that ensued, many
students were severely beaten by the police and over a third of the
student body was arrested. This in turn led to the formation of a city 
wide students strike association, the Vidyarthi Lagni Parishad.
The Parishad called for a shutdown of all colleges and schools until 
the authorities met its demands relating to the release of the arrested 
students, the resignation of the education minister and relief from the 
high mess bills. Confrontation between the student forces and police 
followed. Meanwhile, large segments of the urban middle class, driven 
to despair by high food prices and shortages of essential commodities, 
which they blamed on the policies of the Congress administration in 
power joined forces with the students and issued a call to Chiman Patel 
to deal severely with the profiteers, hoarders and black marketers 
responsible for the dismal food situation within the state. Large
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scale rioting followed and violence spread to other cities. What had 
started out as a student protest against higher prices soon took on 
political overtones as organized interest groups and political parties 
entered the fray determined to bring about the resignation of the Chief 
Minister and the dissolution of the state Assembly.
As violence escalated, elements of the Border Security Force and 
the Central Reserve Policy were rushed in by the central government to 
augment the state police, but to no avail. Even the Indian Army units 
which had been sent in at the request of the state government could not 
restore order immediately. Meanwhile, the Chief Minister whose resig­
nation had by now become a non-negotiable demand by the protestors began 
to lose ground within his party and his own cabinet. On February 9 
after four members of the cabinet had joined in the demand for Patel's 
resignation and still with no end in sight to the violence, Mrs. Gandhi 
prevailed upon the Chief Minister to resign. The State Assembly was 
dissolved and President's rule imposed on the state.
The resignation of the state Chief Minister only hardened the pro­
testor's determination to press for their demands for the dissolution 
of the Assembly and for fresh elections to it. The agitation turned 
increasingly ugly, but Mrs. Gandhi was determined not to capitulate to 
the protestors' demands. However, when 95 of the 168 members of the 
Assembly resigned, the central government had no choice left, and dis­
solved the Assembly on March 15.
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While the Gujerat political agitation was gathering momentum, another 
protest movement was gathering force in Bihar. Here again, the protest 
was initially spearheaded by the students and centered around the generally 
depressing economic situation that prevailed in Bihar the second most 
populous state in the nation. By any standards, the Bihar economy was 
one of the most backward in the country, as evidenced by the per capita 
income which was about 35 percent below the national average of Rs. 645 
per year. Two-thirds of the state population lived below the national 
poverty line defined at Rupees 20 per month at 1960 constant rupee.
The student forces led by the student wing of Jan Sangh, in coopera­
tion with that of the Samyukta Socialist Party demanded the resignation 
of the Ministry and the dissolution of the Assembly for their responsi­
bility for the high inflation, food shortages and unemployment within 
the state. As in Gujerat, the students soon attracted the support of 
much of the non-Congress opposition ranging from the right wing Jan 
Sangh to the Congress (0) and the Communist Party of India (Marxists).
More importantly, the movement attracted the support of Jayaprakash 
Narayan, who announced his decision to reenter active political life 
after an absence from it of nearly twenty years. He soon became the un­
contested leader of the people's movement in Bihar with his call for a 
"total revolution" —  political, economic, educational, cultural and 
moral —  to cleanse the body politic of corruption. The Bihar agitation 
was in many respects even more damaging to the Congress Party than the 
Gujerat movement, since J. P.'s leadership lent it a respectability it 
would otherwise have lacked.
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The Jan Sangh, in particular, benefitted immensely from its associa­
tion with J. P. Within the non-Communist opposition, the Jan Sangh had 
the largest cadre and the most effective organizational apparatus. But 
although it had managed to extend its influence in the northern states, 
among the urban middle class, the trading community and the comparatively 
affluent portions of the peasantry, it still was viewed by many as merely 
a front for its militant wing —  the Rashtriya Swayam Sevak Sangh.
Being associated in the public mind with economic conservatism and 
Hindu chauvinism it had, until the Bihar agitation, failed to acquire a 
positive national image. Now, however, with their participation in the 
coalition headed by J. P., the Jan Sangh began to attain the national 
respectability they needed to become a viable opposition force to the 
ruling Congress.
As the Gujerat and Bihar protests intensified, another potentially 
more damaging crisis threatened the Gandhi Administration. In April 1974, 
the National Coordination Committee for Railway Unions, the official 
spokesman for over one and a half million railway workers announced its 
decision to launch an indefinite strike from May 8. The workers' de­
mands were embodied in a nine point charter of demands that included 
parity in wages with workers in public sector undertakings (entailing 
a doubling of wages) increased dearness allowance, eight hour work days, 
and supply of subsidized food grains. In his efforts to pressure the 
Government to concede to the demands, George Fernandez, the then President 
of the All India Railwayman's Federation and the convenor of the
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Coordination Committee, had received the support of most of the non-Congress 
opposition, including the Jan Sangh. This appears to have convinced 
Mrs. Gandhi that the proposed strike was politically motivated aimed at 
aggravating the prevailing political and economic chaos in the country.
She therefore decided on preemptive measures to deal with it.
In the early hours of May 2, a week before the strike was to have 
commenced, she invoked the Defence of India rules (1971) and the Mainten­
ance of Internal Security Act to declare the strike illegal and to take 
into custody Mr. Fernandez and other members of the Coordination Committee 
and about 600 railway employees. The Government alerted the Army, the 
Territorial Army and the Border Security Forces for deployment in the 
running of the railways. In the confrontation that followed extraordinary 
police force was brought to bear to break up the strike. In all, over 
20,000 striking railwaymen were arrested under DIR and MISA, thousands
of families were forcibly evicted from their quarters and hundreds of
68thousands more lost their old age pensions and other privileges.
To the opposition, the fierceness of Mrs. Gandhi's response to the 
railway strike presented clearest proof yet that she would not abide by 
the rules and conventions that had governed Indian democracy. So the 
opposition pressed harder and Mrs. Gandhi responded with increasing 
harshness. By early 1975, the J. P. movement, as the opposition move­
ment by now was being referred to, began spreading to other states —  
Haryana, West Bengal, Uttar Pradesh and Andhra Pradesh. Within her own 
party itself, a group of about forty members of parliament began pushing
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for a meaningful dialogue between J. P. and her over the basic problems 
of corruption, unemployment and inflation —  all problems which the J. P. 
movement emphasized in its struggle.
Election Verdicts —  Gujerat and Allahabad
In Gujerat where President’s rule had continued since it was imposed 
in March 1974, the Opposition reintensified when Morarji Desai announced 
an indefinite fast from April 7, 1975 "for restoring the people’s right 
of electing their representatives before the end of May.’’ On April 13, 
after Morarji had been on fast for almost a week, Mrs. Gandhi announced 
that elections to the Gujerat legislature would be conducted by June 10.
For the elections the opposition decided to join forces and present 
a united front against the Congress Party. The Janata (People’s) Front, 
under Morarji’s leadership and with J. P.’s support was formed and it 
consisted of the Old Congress, whom Mrs. Gandhi had regularly attacked 
for spreading violence and disorder in the country, the Jan Sangh, the 
Socialist Party, and the Bharatiya Lok Dal. The Front succeeded in 
arriving at a common strategy and under its unified leadership decided 
to field, in almost each constituency, only a single candidate so as not 
to fragment the opposition vote. The dispersion of votes among myriad 
opposition parties which in the past had benefitted the ruling Congress 
did not occur this time, and the opposition coalition inflicted an 
astounding defeat on the Congress. Despite an intensive campaign 
by Mrs. Gandhi, which featured 90 speeches by her across the state, the 
Congress won only 75 seats in the 182 member Assembly, a sharp drop from
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the 140 seats it had won in the then 168 member House, that the party 
had won barely three years ago. The Janata Front did not win an absolute 
majority either, winning a total of only 86 seats. However, with the 
help of another opposition party, outside of the Front, which had 12 
seats the Front was able to form a government.
The Gujerat elections had two major implications. First, a unified
opposition succeeded in wresting supremacy from the Congress thereby
strengthening the possibility of similar united opposition fronts against
the Congress in other elections as well. Secondly, and equally important,
it was an omen to the Congress Party that Mrs. Gandhi's charisma was on
the wane. She had staked all her power, prestige and popularity in the
election campaign; in an effort to identify with the local populace she
had even worn her sari in the traditional Gujerati style. But for
once, it seems, the people were not taken in by the promises she held
out and they turned their backs against her and her party. Under the
changed political conditions, it appeared that the Congress could no
longer count on her to inspire the public support which it needed. In
the absence of strong organizational machinery at the state and local
levels it had been Mrs. Gandhi's personal popularity which had won for
the Congress much of its recent electoral successes. Now, as J. P. put
it, the Gujerat election appeared to prove that the "Indira wave" was 
72over.
As the Congress loss in the elections in Gujerat became apparent, 
another event occurred which ultimately proved to be the catalyst to
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the situation that resulted in the Emergency. On June 12, 1975, in a 
momentous judgement, Mr. Justice Jag Mohan Lai Singh of the Allahabad 
High Court set aside Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's election in 1971 
to the Lok Sabha holding her guilty of corrupt election practices under 
the Representation of the People Act. He debarred her from contesting 
any election under the Act for a period of six years, but, on the plea
7 0of her counsel, stayed the operation of the judgement for 20 days.
The verdict climaxed one of the most protracted election cases, lasting 
over four years. The petition filed by her leading opponent Raj Narain, 
in April 1971, a few days after the mid term poll, challenged Mrs. Gandhi's 
election from Rae Bareli constituency, in Uttar Pradesh. In that elec­
tion, Mrs. Gandhi had won handily having received 183,309 votes; Raj 
Narain of the Samyukta Socialist Party had polled only 71,499 and the
74remaining two candidates together had received barely over 21,000 votes.
The five major charges out of the 14 that Raj Narain had listed in 
his petition were that:
1. Mrs. Gandhi had secured the services of a gazetted officer of 
the Government of India for election purposes;
2. She and her election agent had incurred or authorized expenses 
beyond the limit permitted by law;
3. She had used a religious symbol, the cow and calf, for the 
election;
4. She had procured the assistance of Government officials of 
Uttar Pradesh (UP) for making arrangements for her election 
meetings ; and
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5. She had procured the services of the members of the Indian 
Air Force to fly around for campaign purposes.
Of these five charges, Mrs. Gandhi was found guilty of charges one 
and four. The Court held that she had committed corrupt practices as 
defined in Section 123 (7) of the Representation of the People Act.
She had obtained the assistance of Yash Pal Kapoor during the period of 
January 7-24, at a time when he was still an employee of the Central 
Government on special duty in the Prime Minister's Secretariat. She 
had also, the Court found, procured the assistance of UP Government 
officials such as the District Magistrate, the Superintendent of Police, 
the Public Works Department Engineers and other officers to build ros­
trums and make other arrangements at her election meetings in Rae Bareli 
during the campaign.
Immediately following the verdict, Mrs. Gandhi's counsel sought and 
obtained an order from the Court staying the operation of the verdict 
for 20 days. In that application it was stressed that the stay was needed 
to avoid a vacum in leadership and a new leader of the Congress Parlia­
mentary Party had to be elected before Mrs. Gandhi ceased to be a member 
of the Parliament and the leader of the Congress Party in Parliament.
When the stay was granted it was at first perceived by the public 
as well as the opposition as merely an enabling measure to facilitate 
a smooth transition of Congress Party leadership and the filing of an 
appeal to the Supreme Court by Mrs. Gandhi. The stay was used, however, 
for vastly different purposes. When the Congress Parliamentary Party
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met after the verdict it was not to elect a new leader but rather to pass 
a unanimous resolution proclaiming the party’s confidence in Mrs. Gandhi. 
"This meeting," the resolution stated "reiterates its fullest faith and 
confidence in her and firmly believes that her continued leadership as 
Prime Minister is indispensable." The resolution made no reference 
to the Allahabad High Court judgement or any of the issues raised by it.
A series of similar statements and resolutions issued forth from 
Ministers, Members of Parliament, Chief Ministers and other Congress 
leaders praising her progressive, dynamic and indispensable leadership 
and imploring her to stay on as the nation's leader. In a memorandum 
to the President of India 16 Chief Ministers of States noted
"This is not just a legal matter. Mrs. Gandhi 
is not only the Prime Minister, but she also 
symbolises in herself the resurgent India of 
today and the aspirations of the people, 
particularly the poor masses and the minorities.
Now, more than ever, when the country is passing 
through severe economic strain, when communal 
subversive and divisive forces are out to create 
conditions of chaos and confusion and when 
there are still threats of external aggression 
by forces hostile to us, the nation needs her 
leadership and guidance. Under the circumstances, 
it would be a tragedy of great national magnitude 
if she has to lay down her office of Prime Minister­
ship at this juncture. This would bring about 
conditions of instability not only at the national 
level but also in various states.
In our view, therefore, Mrs. Gandhi must and 
should continue as the Prime Minister of India, 
in the overall national interest." 77
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In another outpouring D. K. Barooah, the Congress Party President, coined
the new slogan "India is Indira, Indira is India" highly reminiscent
of the Nazi slogan about Hitler and Germany. But, as effusive expressions
of support were voiced by her backers, equally loud calls from her critics
for her resignation were also heard.
There were mammoth shows especially in New Delhi of "public" support
for Mrs. Gandhi where a rash of "solidarity rallies" were staged in front
of the Prime Ministers residence. The Shah Commission, which looked into
the abuses of the Emergency, later found overwhelming evidence that the
supposedly spontaneous rallies and demonstrations in support of the Prime
Minister had been carefully stagemanaged with the full cooperation of
70the Delhi Administration and various municipal agencies. ° On the day 
after the verdict, for instance, the entire fleet of Delhi Transport 
Corporation buses were taken off the road to ferry supporters back and 
forth from the Prime Minister's residence. Some buses were even sent 
to neighboring states of Haryana, Uttar Pradesh and Punjab to bring in 
the supporters as thousands of commuters were stranded in the city at 
busjstands waiting for buses that never came. The Delhi Electric Supply 
Undertaking and the Delhi Municipal Committee were likewise coopted for
79the task of keeping Mrs. Gandhi in power through popular supplication.
As the opposition leaders charged at the time and the Shah Commission 
later concluded, there seemed to have been not the slightest regard for 
the inconvenience caused to the citizens or for the blatant misuse of 
official machinery to drum up crowds to display faith in the Prime Minister.
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For their part, the opposition was equally determined to bring
about Mrs. Gandhi's removal from office. Their protests in the beginning
were confined to a 12 hour sit-in by a small but prominent group of
leaders in front of the President's house, the Rashtrapathi Bhavan, and
statements in the national press and in their respective party organs
denouncing Mrs. Gandhi's continuance in office. The opposition leaders
directed their efforts at this time to prevail upon the President to
dismiss the Prime Minister and install a new government. Such efforts
were strictly within constitutional bounds and, contrary to Mrs. Gandhi's
later assertions it was not the opposition but the Congress Party which
dragged the issues arising from the Allahabad verdict into the streets
and masked it, as an editorial pointed out at the time, in partisan
80rhetoric and ideological passion. Some of the supporters of the
Prime Minister were reported to have burnt an effigy of Justice Sinha
81for having caused "so much trouble to the Congress by his verdict." 
Posters castigating the judiciary and Justice Sinha surfaced on city 
walls, especially in Delhi. One even went so far as to inquire:
"Is Mr. Sinha a CIA agent?"
The issue of the Prime Minister's political future was without 
doubt rapidly being moved out of the court system and into the streets. 
On June 20, Congress organized the biggest ever solidarity rally of 
people from all over India pledging support to Mrs. Gandhi and urging 
her to continue in office. The All India Congress Committee (AICC) 
which organized the rally set the attendance at one and a half million
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and even the more conservative police estimates set it at 800,000 to a 
83million. Rhetoric at the rally was by no means designed to cool 
political passions. Declaring that a well organized and calculated 
conspiracy of "big interests" was at work to force her removal from the 
political scene, Mrs. Gandhi hinted darkly that these forces would not 
limit their attacks to character assassination but would even go to the 
extent of making attacks on her life.
Then on June 24 the eagerly awaited order on Mrs. Gandhi's appli­
cation to the Supreme Court for an "absolute and unconditional stay," 
during the pendency of her appeals to the Supreme Court, was given. 
Describing his own order as "provisional," Justice V. R. Krishna Iyer, 
the vacation judge during the summer recess, ruled that Mrs. Gandhi could 
not draw any remuneration or participate or vote as a member of the House 
but would be entitled to sign the register kept in the House and address 
both Houses of Parliament and discharge other parliamentary functions in 
her capacity as the Prime Minister. In effect, he made a distinction 
between her two roles, as a member of the Parliament elected from Rae 
Bareli constituency and as the Prime Minister. While suspending her pri­
vileges as a member of the House, since her election to the House had 
been set aside, he nonetheless allowed her to exercise her privileges 
and function in her role as Prime Minister during the pendency of her 
appeal.
The opposition, however, was not content to draw so fine and subtle 
a distinction as the one Justice Iyer had. Instead, in view of
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Mrs. Gandhi's failure to receive the "absolute" stay she had sought, the 
opposition decided to intensify its efforts to bring about her removal 
from office. The very same means Mrs. Gandhi had employed to generate 
support for her continuance as Prime Minister was what the opposition, 
too, settled upon to bring about her removal. The Indian political scene 
at this time provided an observer with continuous drama, though none 
knew then whether it was mere farce, theater of the absurd or the tragedy 
it turned out to be in the end.
Events followed in rapid succession, seemingly inexorably, and yet 
toward a conclusion no one at the time sensed in full. It came as no
surprise to the public, conditioned by recent events to tumultous poli­
tical agitations, when the opposition, buoyed by its Gujerat electoral
victory, announced on June 25 its decision to launch a nationwide
struggle, from June 29, to press for Mrs. Gandhi's resignation. It 
seemed then that the general political unrest had characterized much 
of Indian politics in the preceding months would intensify in the coming 
months unless Mrs. Gandhi submitted to the demands for her removal 
from office.
What no one foresaw was that on the night of June 25 and 26 she 
would declare an end to the democracy which permitted the public, the 




1. The manoeuvres behind Shastri's succession as Prime Minister is 
recounted in Kuldip Nayar, India after Nehru (Delhi: Vikas
Publishing, 1975). Chapter I and in Chapter 3 of Michael Brecher, 
Nehru's Mantle: The Politics of Succession in India (New York:
Fredrick A. Praeger, 1966).
2. See Michael Brecher, Nehru's Mantle, Chapter 8 for a detailed 
account of Mrs. Gandhi's elevation as Prime Minister.
3. Both Desai and Shastri believed that Pandit Nehru intended for his 
daughter to succeed him and that in order to groom her he had 
arranged for the outgoing AICC President, U. N. Dhebar to name
her as the next AICC President. See Kuldip Nayar, India, the Critical 
Years, rev., and enlarged ed. (Delhi: Vikas Publishing, 1973)
pp. 24-25.
4. Nayar, India after Nehru, p. 9.
5. India, Ministry of Home Affairs, Report of the States Reorganization 
Commission (New Delhi, 1955). Eleven unilingual states were created 
by the States Reorganization Act. These were Andhra Pradesh 
(Telugh), Assam (Assamese); Kerala (Malayalam); Madras (Tamil);
Mysore (Kannada); Orissa (Oriya); West Bengal (Bengali); and 
Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Bihar and Uttar Pradesh (Hindi). Bombay 
and Punjab were retained as bilingual states at the time, though
in 1959, during Mrs. Gandhi's tenure as AICC President, Bombay 
was divided into two states, Maharashtra (Marathi) and Gujerat 
(Guj erati).
6. Nayar, India after Nehru, p. 75 and Critical Years, pp. 112-16.
7. The events surrounding the West Bengal Congress Party election
debacle is recounted in Atulya Ghosh, Split in the National 
Congress (Calcutta: Jayanti Publications, 1970).
8. Two excellent works on the Congress Party are Stanley Kochanek,
The Congress Party in India (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press,
1968) and Myron Weiner, Party Building in a New Nation: The
Indian National Congress (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1967).
9. See Indian Election Commission's Report on the General Elections 
in India and the All India Congress Committee's General Election 
surveys for statistical information.
116
10. For a summary of results see Myron Weiner, "India's Third Annual 
General Elections" Asian Survey 2 (May 1962) p. 3-18. Also 
Report on the III General Elections in India 1962.
11. "India's voters throw out old timers" Statesman, Feb. 24, 1967.
12. According to Zareer Masani, the Chief Ministers of Madhya 
Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh and Mysore, who together 
controlled over half of the votes in the Congress Parliamentary
Party threatened not to support Mrs. Gandhi's candidacy unless
she appointed Desai as her Deputy. Indira Gandhi : A Biography
(New York; Thomas Y. Crowell, 1975) p. 174.
13. Nayar, India after Nehru, p. 93.
14. The best account of the split in the Congress ranks is in A. M.
Zaidi, The Great Upheaval (New Delhi: Orientalia, 1972).
15. T. V. Kunhikrishnan, Chavan and the Troubled Decade (Bombay: 
Somaiya Publications, 1971) p. 303.
16. Masani, Indira Gandhi, pp. 197-198
17. Ibid., p. 198.
18. Nayar, Critical Years, p. 40.
19. Ibid., p. 82.
20. Ibid., p. 51.
21. For an appraisal of the political influence of the CFSA see 
Francine Frankel, India's Political Economy, 1947-1977: The
Gradual Revolution (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1978)
pp. 462-65.
22. Nayar, India after Nehru, p. 154.
23. Nayar, Critical Years, p. 329.
24. Rajni Kothari, "The Party System" The Economic Weekly 13
(June 31, 1961) p. 849. This was the fifth in a series of
6 articles titled Form and Substance in Indian Politics 
which appeared in the Economic Weekly between April 29 
and June 10, 1961. Also see his "The Congress System in 
India" Asian Survey 4 (December 1964); pp. 1161-73.
117
25. An excellent account of the organizational structure and the 
distribution of power within the Congress Party is given by 
Kochanek in The Congress Party of India, especially chapters 
9, 10 and 11 dealing with the Working Committee, Congress 
Parliamentary Board and the Central Elections Committee 
respectively.
26. Stanley Kochanek "Mrs. Gandhi’s Pyramid : The New Congress"
in Henry C. Hart, ed., Indira Gandhi’s India; A Political 
System Reappraised. (Boulder, Colo.; Westview Press, 1976)
p. 100.
27. Figures cited in Francine Frankel, India’s Political Economy, 
p. 454.
28. For an account of the Fifth General Elections see People’s 
Victory: An Analysis of the 1971 Elections (New Delhi:
Indian National Congress, 1971).
29. Oriana Fallaci "Mrs. Gandhi’s Opposition: Morarji Desai"
New Republic (August 2 and 9, 1975) p. 14.
30. This newly adopted system and its effects are described by 
J. C. Johari in Reflections on Indian Politics (New Delhi:
S. Chand 1974) pp. 243-311.
31. Kochanek "Mrs. Gandhi’s Pyramid" p. 111-12. In the space of
less than two years Mrs. Gandhi’s nominees in Andhra Pradesh,
Bihar, Gujerat, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh were all embroiled 
in bitter political infighting and had to be replaced. See 
Kochanek "
32. Quoted in Nayar, Critical Years, p. 375.
33. In interpreting article 31 on the fundamental right to property, 
the Supreme Court held in Bela Banerji vs West Bengal Settlement 
Kanungo Cooperative Credit Society Ltd. (AIR 1954, sc 119) that 
compensation meant "just equivalent". The Fourth Amendment enacted 
after this verdict had sought to render the adequacy of compensation 
nonjusticiable. However, later verdicts, often contradictory
as to scope of the meaning of the term compensation, increased 
the confusion and at the time of the Amendment there was still 
no authoritative opinion.
34. Constitution of India, art. 39 (b).
35. Ibid., art. 39 (c).
36. The Statesman, June 4, 1971.
118
37. Details of the bill in Ibid., May 8, 1971.
38. Ibid., June 17, 1971.
39. Ibid., June 26, 1971.
40. Ibid., June 27, 1974.
41. J. D. Sethi, India in Crisis (Delhi: Vikas, 1975). pp. 55-6.
42. B. G. Verghese, "The Hour of Decision" Hindustan Times,
Sunday World, March 24, 1974.
43. Even though about eighty percent of the population lived off 
the land the allocations for agriculture in the three most 
recent five-year plans were 12.7 percent for agriculture 
and 7.7 percent for medium and major irrigation, in the
III 5-year plan; 17.1 and 6.8 percent respectively in the
IV plan, and 12.7 and 7.3 percent respectively in the V and 
current 5-year plan. A probing series of three articles on 
the deficiencies of Indian economic planning appeared in the 
Hindustan Times in 1974. See B. S. Minhas, "Where Planning 
Went Wrong"; "Radicalism and Demagogy"; and "Mistaken Priori­
ties; Some Remedies", Overseas Hindustan Times, May 23, May 30 
and June 6, 1974.
44. New York Times, 29 March 1974.
45. Government of India, Ministry of Finance Economic Survey 1975, 
p. 92.
46. Minhas "Radicalism and Demagogy".
47. Overseas Hindustan Times, 3 October 1974.
48. Ibid.
49. Ministry of Finance Economic Survey, 1975-76.
50. Ashok Mitra "Gandhi Decade" Economist (London), 24 January 1976, 
p. 32.
51. The accounts that follow are pieced together primarily from 
contemporary newspaper accounts. A work that deals solely 
with the decline in public morality is G. S. Bhargava’s 
India's Watergate: A Study of Political Corruption (New Delhi:
Arnold Heinemann Publishers, 197 4).
119
52. Hindustan Times, 10 January 1975.
53. Overseas Hindustan Times, 16 January 1975.
54. Ibid., 5 December 1974.
55. Oriana Fallaci "Indira’s Coup", New York Review (September 
18, 1975) pp. 14-21.
56. Overseas Hindustan Times, 17 April 1975.
57. For details of the Maruti Venture, see Kuldip Nayar, The Judgement:
Inside Story of the Emergency (Delhi: Vikas, 1977) pp. 195-203.
58. The Indian newspapers carried lengthy reports on the event along
with analysis of its implications. See Statesman 25 April 1973.
Also N. A. Palkhivala, A Judiciary Made to Measure: A Collection
Of Nationwide Protests against Supersession of Justices Shelat,
Hegde and Grover (Bombay: M. R. Pai, 1973); Rajeev Dhavan and
Alice Jacob, eds., Selection and Appointment of Supreme Court 
Judges: A Case Study (Bombay: N. M. Tripathi, 1978) and Kuldip Nayar
Supersession of Judges (Delhi: Vikas, 1973).
59. Nayar, Supersession of Judges, p. 78-92.
60. Ibid., p. 28.
61. Ibid., pp. 52-53.
62. Ibid., p. 37.
63. Mrs. Gandhi is reported to have been so incensed by the continuing 
criticism of Verghese, her former Press Secretary, that she is 
known to have pressured K. K. Birla, the Hindustan Times owner,
to dismiss Verghese as the editor of the paper.
64. Frankel, India’s Political Economy, p. 527.
65. For detailed account of the Gujerat agitation see Dawn E. Jones and
Rodney W. Jones "Urban Upheaval in India: The 1974 Nav Nirman Riots
in Gujerat," Asian Survey 16 (November 1976) pp. 1012-33 and John
R. Wood "Extra Parliamentary Opposition in India: An Analysis of
Populist Agitations in Gujerat and Bihar" Pacific Affairs 48 
(Fall 1975).
66. The Bihar agitational movement is the focus of "India's Opposition 
Parties Find a Leader" South Asian Review 8 (January 1975) p. 91-96.
120
Also see K. Singh, "New Wave from Old India: Opposition Movement
of J. P. Narayan" New York Times Magazine 30 March 1975, and V. S. 
Nargolkar, Crusade for Revolution (New Delhi: S. Chand 1975).
67. Fernandez later became the Minister for Labor in the post- 
Emergency Janata government.
68. Overseas Hindustan Times, 30 May 1974.
69. Ibid., 17 April 1975.
70. For details of the Gujerat elections see Marcus Franda "The
Gujerat Election 1975" (Hanover, N. H.: American Universities
Field Staff Reports, September 1975) and Ghanshyam Shah "The 
1975 Gujerat Assembly Elections in India," Asian Survey 16 
(March 1976) pp. 270-82.
71. Overseas Hindustan Times 29 May 1975.
72. Deccan Chronicle, 14 June 1975.
73. The verdict was extensively covered in the Indian Press on 13 June
1975.
74. The case is reviewed in detail in Shivlal ed., The Prime Minister's 
Poll Case and other Judgements (New Delhi: Election Archives, 1975).
75. Overseas Hindustan Times, 19 June 1975.
76. Deccan Chronicle, 20 June 1975.
77. Ibid., 21 June 1975. The memo itself was signed by 13 Chief
Ministers, while three others, the Chief Ministers of West 
Bengal, Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra, concurred with the 
sentiments expressed but were unable to sign it since they 
were not present at the meeting where the statement was signed.
78. The Shah Commission of Inquiry has documented the abuse of Central
and Delhi Municipal agencies to organize rallies in support of the 
Prime Minister. See Shah Commission of Inquiry, Interim Report 1
(Delhi: Ministry of Home Affairs, 1978), p. 17-20.
79. Ibid.
80. Overseas Hindustan Times, 26 June 1975.
121
81. Deccan Chronicle, 15 June 1975. Mrs. Gandhi's remarks on it, 
as reported in the same news story is a classic expression
of the conspiracy theory: "If anything of this type has been
done, it must have been engineered by my opposition to give 
me a bad name."
82. Overseas Hindustan Times, 26 June 1975.
83. Deccan Chronicle, 21 June 1975.
84. Ibid.
85. The Hindu, 25 June 1975.
CHAPTER III
DEMOCRACY REVERSED: JUNE 25, 1975 - MARCH 21, 1977
The proclamation of Emergency issued by the President of India on
the night of June 25, 1975 declared the existence of "a grave Emergency
. . . whereby the security of India is threatened by internal disturb- 
1
ances." In her address to the nation the following morning, the Prime 
Minister, Mrs. Gandhi also stressed the threat to internal stability to 
justify the imposition of the Emergency. She also referred to the effects 
of internal disorder on the economy and remarked:
"The threat to internal stability also affects production 
and prospects of economic development. In the last few 
months the determined action we have taken has succeeded 
in largely checking the price rise. We have been actively 
considering further measures to strengthen the economy and 
to relieve the hardship of various sections, including 
the poor and vulnerable and those with fixed incomes. I 
shall announce these soon." 2
Though the threat to internal stability had been profferred as justifi­
cation for the declaration of the Emergency, it was the opportunity for 
economic progress under the Emergency that was emphasized more during 
its early stages. As mentioned before, there was on the eve of the 
Emergency, widespread anger, discontent and cynicism at the Government's 
failure to bring about social and economic justice. Rising prices, short­
ages, black marketing and corruption were symptomatic of the economic 
blight that had set in, and, contrary to the official line, the acts 
of public protest that threatened law and order were not the result of
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any widespread opposition conspiracy but were rather the explosive ex­
pressions of deep economic discontent. Obviously aware of this, in the 
days that immediately followed the declaration, Mrs. Gandhi directed much 
of her energy toward tackling basic economic problems that the Congress 
had complacently left unresolved. Significantly, her first major act 
of the Emergency period was the announcement of a comprehensive eco­
nomic program designed to give some immediate relief to all sectors of 
society, but particularly to the poor.
Her new program, comprising 20 points, was promulgated by presi­
dential ordinance on July 1. ^ It looked most impressive in print, 
promising something to almost everyone. The poor were promised land 
reform, abolition of bonded labor, liquidation of rural debts, extension 
of credit and review of laws on minimum agricultural wages. The middle 
class received income tax relief and stood to benefit from ceilings on 
urban property which, if properly implemented, would have released much 
of such property which the wealthy now held. The rich were promised 
liberalized investment procedures and received disavowals of higher 
taxes and further nationalizations. Finally, since it was student pro­
tests which had sparked the wider opposition movements in both Gujerat 
and Bihar, students received the promise of books, stationery and essen­
tial commodities at controlled prices.
Other measures authorized the confiscation of smuggler's properties, 
the appointment of special squads for evaluating conspicuous urban con­
struction and for preventing tax evasion with summary trials and deterrent
124
punishment for those found guilty of economic offenses. The new measures 
aimed at ending the scourge of "black money" (undeclared income) and 
corruption and thereby attempted to reverse the popular image of govern­
ment as both incompetent and corrupt. To reinforce the new image,
Mrs. Gandhi initiated a crackdown on corruption and inefficiency among 
public servants, resulting in forced retirements and in dismissals of 
some. The crackdown was seen as evidence of the Government's determina­
tion to improve the performance of the large government bureaucracy and 
in the beginning it fetched impressive results; government servants 
reported to work on time, and absenteeism declined so sharply that it 
was reported that in many offices there were not enough chairs to accomo­
date what had become a superfluous work force. ^
What was significant about the new measures was they took into 
account the major grievances of all sectors of society, and in particular 
those of the rural poor, who had supported the Congress Party in the past 
but had abandoned it in large numbers during the Gujerat elections. Also, 
in contrast to similar programs in the past, there was on this occasion 
a determined effort, at least in the early stages, to implement the 
proposals.
Meanwhile, inflation which was well under control even prior to the 
Emergency, was by the year's end near zero compared to the 30 percent 
rate of the previous year. ^ Not only did consumer prices fall but 
shortages of essential commodities also eased throughout the country, 
partly by decree and partly because many would-be hoarders and profit­
eers, frightened by the summary punishment meted out to a few of their
125
kind, released their stocks to the market. The country had a record 
harvest that year, and this too assisted in keeping the prices of essen­
tials in check and their supply assured. Industrial production also 
picked up since strikes and all other forms of labor unrest had been 
prohibited. Finally, shielded from all public criticism and political 
opposition, the Government appeared to function more smoothly and more 
aggresively than at any time in the recent past. As a worried democrat 
put it "if she keeps this up, we might have a dictatorship by popular 
will." ^
In sum, there was in the early days of the Emergency definite 
economic improvement and in combination with the political calm, albeit 
spurious, that had descended over the country, it seemed then that despite 
her assault on democracy, Mrs. Gandhi might yet come out of it all unscathed. 
The reversal of her conviction by the Supreme Court in the meanwhile, 
legitimized her continuance in office once again. Parliament, dominated 
by her party, maintained the rubber stamp character it had acquired under 
her leadership and seemed willing to endorse and enact whatever reforms 
she sought. So long as the Government could keep alive the public hope 
that the Emergency would accomplish fundamental reforms no popular 
opposition towards her or the Emergency seemed likely to emerge.
Over the months, however, old habits returned. The new discipline 
slackened, and as with the-programs in the past, the much heralded 20 
point program, too, remained for the most part unexecuted. At the same 
time, the Administration appeared more interested in institutionalizing 
authoritarian political rule through political and constitutional changes
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than through meaningful economic reforms whose success probably would 
have assured popular support for authoritarianism. Worst of all, in 
the absence of any check on the use of Government’s power, the nature 
of authoritarianism practiced under the Emergency turned increasingly 
despotic.
The actions of the Emergency which reflect the institutionalization 
of authoritarianism are grouped under three sections. The first section 
approaches the question of constitutional development that occurred 
during this period. It examines the major constitutional and statutory 
amendments enacted under the Emergency which violated basic democratic 
concepts. Of these, the most notable was the 42nd Amendment to the 
Constitution, enacted in December 1976. This amendment is discussed in 
detail because, with its fifty-nine amending clauses, it transformed 
virtually all the basic features of Indian democracy discussed in 
Chapter 1. It also provided that no amendment of the constitution could
Q
be challenged before a court of law in the future.
The second section deals with the denial of citizens’ liberty 
through restrictive legislation such as the MISA and the DIR and through 
various administrative abuses. The manner in which preventive detention 
was employed and the family planning program was administered represented 
not only a violation of the citizens’ rights but of their human dignity 
as well. This section is a study in the abuse of power and offers a 
critical evaluation of the ways in which the powers of State were used 
to harrass and intimidate the citizens and to deny them the protection 
guaranteed under the Constitution.
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The third and final section of this chapter deals with the des­
truction of the freedom of the press in India under the Emergency.
Strictly speaking, it is an extension of the earlier section since this 
section is also concerned with the violation of a citizen's right, the 
right to freedom of speech and expression. As exemplified in the free­
dom of the press, it is, however, more than the right of an individual; 
it is the right of a democratic society because without this right there 
can be no articulation of public opinion to inform and guide the actions 
of the government. The existence of this right is acknowledged by all 
democrats to be crucial to a functioning democracy; the thoroughness 
with which it was sought to be destroyed during the Emergency offers 
irrefutable proof of the Administration's intent to subvert basic demo­
cratic principles. Consequently, the subject of the destruction of the 
freedom of the press is treated separately.
Emergency and the Law
During the eleven years that Mrs. Gandhi served as Prime Minister,
25 Amendments to the Constitution were passed, some of which radically 
transformed the nature of the Indian political system. Of these amend­
ments the one that represented the most dangerous assault on the Indian 
constitutional democracy was the 42nd Amendment enacted during the Emergency.
Passed in November 1976 by the Parliament with an overwhelming 
majority, it introduced changes of such far reaching implications that 
H. V. Kamath, a member of the Parliament who had also been a member of 
the Constituent Assembly that drew up the Indian Constitution, was
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impelled to describe it "as neither amending nor mending, but simply 
ending the Constitution." ^ It sought to make fundamental alterations 
to the legal and political order, amending existing provisions that 
dealt with judicial review, fundamental rights and directive principles 
of state policy, powers of the president, the courts and the adminis­
trative agencies, and the amendability of the Constitution. It also 
introduced a new concept, that of fundamental duties, and provided 
for the creation of administrative tribunals for the adjudication of 
various disputes. It even modified the preamble to the Constitution to 
include the terms "socialist" and "secular" in the description of the 
Indian republic. The changes proposed by the Amendment, especially the 
major ones, merit a detailed examination since the cumulative effect of 
these changes was the attempted institutionalization of an authoritarian 
regime characterized by legislative supremacy and executive unaccountability.
Art. 368 of the Constitution, which dealt with the amendment of the 
Constitution, was modified so as to preclude judicial review of amend­
ments except on purely procedural grounds. The provision sought to 
overcome the restraint on the amending power of the legislature, arising 
out of the Bharati case. In that case, the Supreme Court had ruled that 
Parliament did not possess the power to alter the "basic structure" of 
the Constitution. Consequently, amendments which the courts felt vio­
lated this stricture could have been declared invalid under existing 
provisions.
The 42nd amendment explicitly declared Parliament's prerogative to 
amend any part of the Constitution including Part III which dealt with
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the fundamental rights of the citizen. The new addition to Art. 368 
said in part: "No amendment of this Constitution (including the
provisions of Part III) . . .shall be called in question in any court 
except upon the ground that it has not been made in accordance with the 
procedure laid down by this Article." By this provision, the 42nd 
Amendment virtually eliminated whatever feeble limitations had existed 
in respect of the Amendment of the Constitution by Parliament. With 
the Bharati verdict thus effectively overturned, many of the changes 
that the 42nd Amendment proposed did indeed affect the "basic structure" 
of the Indian Constitution.
The guarantee of fundamental rights, the essence of constitutional 
democracy, was altered in scope and effect. A new provision elevated 
directive principles over fundamental rights by providing that legis­
lation purporting to further the former could no longer be challenged 
on the ground that it violated the latter. Thereby, the directive prin­
ciples, which at the time of the adoption of the Constitution were en­
visioned as embodying the ideals of socio-economic justice to guide 
legislation, but were nonetheless made expressly nonjusticiable under 
the Constitution, were given precedence over those rights designated as 
fundamental and extended special protection. Henceforth, the aspirations 
of the community, as embodied in these directives would prevail over 
even the right to life and liberty.
Interestingly, the courts had already begun, in recent times, to 
recognize the superiority of these principles over fundamental rights; 
this was a clear departure from earlier judicial rulings which favored
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fundamental rights in cases involving conflicts between the two. In 
1952, Justice S. R. Das, speaking for aunanimous court, in Champakam 
Dorairajan's case had said
The Directive Principles of State Policy which by Art. 37 
are expressly made nonenforceable by a court cannot over­
ride the provisions found in Part III which, not withstanding 
other provisions, are expressly made enforceable by writs, 
orders or directions under Article 32. The chapter on 
Fundamental Rights is sacrosanct and not liable to be 
abridged by any legislative or executive act or oder except 
to the extent provided in the particular Article in Part III. 
The Directive Principles of State Policy have to conform 
to and run subsidiary to the chapter on Fundamental Rights.
In our opinion, that is the correct way in which the pro­
visions found in Part III and Part IV have to be under­
stood. 12
But successive constitutional amendments protecting from judicial 
review legislation designed to secure the public good and to implement 
the directive principles had resulted in an altered approach by the 
courts, especially the Supreme Court, to the question of conflict between 
rights and directives. This was best reflected in the Bharati case, in 
Justice Mathew's statement:
...The Fundamental Rights themselves have no fixed 
content; most of them are mere empty vessels into which 
each generation must pour its content in the light of 
its experience. Restrictions, abridgement, curtailment, 
and even abrogation of these rights in circumstances 
not visualized by the Constitution makers might become 
necessary, their claim to supremacy or priority is liable 
to be overborne at particular stages in the history of 
the nation by the moral claims embodied in Part IV.
Whether at a particular moment in the history of the 
nation, a particular Fundamental Right should have pri­
ority over the moral claim embodied in Part IV or must 
yield to them is a matter which must be left to be decided 
by each generation in the light of its experience and its 
values. 13
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In that case, the Court upheld the validity of Article 31c en­
acted by the 25th Amendment which altered the nature of the directive 
principles embodied in clauses b and c of Article 39. These directives 
were distinctly property-related laying down the principles that the 
ownership and control of material resources of the community must be dis­
tributed as to best serve the common good and that the operation of the 
economic system must not result in concentration of wealth and means of 
production, to the common detriment. Laws to further these directives 
had remained, until the 25th Amendment, open to judicial challenge on 
grounds of their inconsistency with fundamental rights. Article 31c 
ruled out any challenge to such laws on grounds that they violated the 
rights to equality, freedom and property guaranteed by articles 14, 19 
and 31 respectively.
In the Bharati verdict, the Supreme Court sanctioned the elevation 
of the two property-related directive principles the fundamental rights. 
Not content with this, Mrs. Gandhi now acted to extend the same degree 
of protection from judicial review to all the directive principles under 
the Constitution. The amended Article 31c of the 42nd Amendment declared 
that no law giving effect to the policy of the State toward securing all 
or any of the directive principles shall be voided on the ground that it 
is inconsistent with or takes away or abridges any of the rights con­
ferred by Articles 14, 19 or 31. It further declared that no law con­
taining a declaration that it is for giving effect to such policy shall 
be called in question in any court on the ground that it does not give
132
effect to such policy. The only safeguard, if needed it may be referred 
to as such, was that where legislation embodying the directives is passed 
by a State Legislature it was to receive the assent of the President of 
India before becoming the law.
The citizen's freedom was further circumscribed by the Amendment 
by the introduction of a new provision relating to so called "anti­
national activities" and "anti-national associations." All legisla­
tion enacted for the purpose of preventing and prohibiting such activity 
or association was placed beyond judicial review on grounds of conflict 
with the three fundamental rights . "Anti-national" activity was defined 
very broadly to cover any activity (1) which was intended towards or in 
support of cession or secession of part of the territory of India;
(2) which threatens or disrupts the sovereignty and integrity of India, 
or security of the State or unity of the nation; (3) which is aimed at 
the overthrow of the State by force; (4) which seeks to create internal 
disturbance or the disruption of public services; and (5) which disrupts 
or threatens harmony between different religions, racial, language, or 
regional groups, or castes or communities. The power to make laws 
banning "anti-nationalism" was vested exclusively in the Parliament.
State legislatures which had shared with the center the right to impose 
reasonable restrictions on the freedom of association in the interests 
of public order and morality and the sovereignty and integrity of India 
were barred from enacting anti-national legislation; only the Center 
was allowed to determine the measures required to combat anti-national­
ism in India.
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There was very little protection against abuse of the extended 
powers that the Center assumed through the Amendment. Judicial review 
was severely curtailed by a series of amending provisions, as was the 
right of the citizen to constitutional remedies. Furthermore, the judi­
cial system suffered a reduction in power at all levels.
The Amendment altered the existing pattern of judicial review where­
by the constitutionality of central and state laws could be challenged 
in either the Supreme Court or the High Courts. The direct access to 
the Supreme Court that the citizen enjoyed whenever his fundamental 
rights were affected was limited. A new provision stated that where 
such violation occurred as a result of state laws the citizen may move 
only the High Courts in the first instance "unless the Constitutional 
validity of any central law is also in issue in such proceedings."
Until now, the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court had extended 
to all cases of violations of fundamental rights whether from central 
or state laws. The effect of this measure was to reduce the scope of 
the citizen’s right to constitutional remedies for the enforcement of 
fundamental rights guaranteed by Art. 32.
At the same time, the new provision also took away the power of the 
High Courts to rule upon the validity of central laws by mandating that, 
in the future, only the Supreme Court may decide questions of the 
constitutionality of legislation by the Center. Since, under the 
Indian political system, central legislation extended over far more fields 
than did legislation by the states the effect of this particular provision
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would have been to make justice more remote and expensive for the average 
citizen. Additionally, the increased work-load for the Supreme Court 
that this measure was bound to create and the inevitable delays in judi­
cial determination of cases resulting from it would no doubt have inhibi­
ted the citizen further from seeking judicial enforcement of his rights.
The writ powers of the High Courts were severely curtailed by the 
substitution of a new Article 226 in place of the existing one. The 
former Article 226 conferred broad powers to the High Courts to issue 
writs "in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo 
warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of 
the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose." The Amend­
ment deleted the phrase "for any other purpose" from the Article and 
thereby confined the writ jurisdiction of the High Courts to issues 
affecting fundamental rights; the courts would no longer be allowed to 
grant writ remedy to the citizen for invasion of other legal rights.
The new Article 226 also specified that the grounds for the issue of a 
writ must be "injury of a substantial nature" or a "substantial fail­
ure of justice." No longer would violation of the citizen’s rights 
constitute, by itself, grounds justifying the issue of writs by the 
High Courts. There would also have to be proof of the "substantial" 
nature of the injury resulting from it, with the burden of such proof 
presumably resting on the citizen protesting the invasion of his funda­
mental rights.
The Amendment curbed judicial review in other respects as well.
It altered the existing provision on the requirements of majority needed
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to resolve challenges in court to the validity of central and state laws. 
First, it provided for a minimum of seven judges at the Supreme Court and
five at the High Court levels to determine the constitutionality of all
20impugned statutes. Secondly, and more importantly, the Amendment 
laid down that a two-thirds majority of the bench would be needed to 
strike down as invalid any legislation. Assuming benches of seven in 
the Supreme Court and five in High Courts, the judicial majority required 
to rule against existing statutes would be five to two and four to one, 
respectively. In effect, it granted a judge deciding in favor of the 
government twice as much judicial power as one ruling against the govern­
ment.
The powers of the judiciary were further circumscribed by the pro­
vision for the establishment of administrative tribunals to adjudicate 
disputes relating to the recruitment and conditions of service of persons 
appointed to administrative services, and with respect to matters such 
as tax, foreign exchange, land reforms, industrial or labor disputes,
parliamentary and state legislature elections, and the production, pro-
22curement, supply and distribution of essential goods. Follow up legis­
lation was expected to establish the precise jurisdiction, power and 
authority of the tribunals and the rules of procedure for them to follow. 
The tribunals, once set up, would enjoy exclusive adjudicatory authority 
to the exclusion of the High Courts with respect to matters under their 
jurisdiction.
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The powers of the presidency too were affected. The new amendment 
eliminated whatever discretionary powers may have been vested in Presi­
dent, as the constitutional head of state, under the earlier provisions. 
Whereas the existing provision had merely stated that there would be Council 
of Ministers to aid and advise the President, without specifying whether 
he was bound by such advice or not, the 42nd Amendment explicitly de­
clared that the President could act only in accordance with the advice 
nroffered by the cabinet. ^4
Several other changes were proposed by the Amendment which also 
effectively expanded the powers of the Center. The center-states power 
relationship was revised with the Center assuming legislative responsibi­
lity for areas which had hitherto been within the states’ domain. Entries 
1, 2 and 3 of the State List were amended so as to deprive the states in 
large measure of their power relating to the maintenance of public order,
O Cthe police and the administration of justice within the states.
Prior to this Amendment, except during times of Emergency public order 
within the state was the sole responsibility of the state (except for 
the use of the armed forces within the state). Also, in general, deploy­
ment of Union forces by the center was undertaken only after consultation 
with the states and with their consent. The new measure empowered Par­
liament to decide regarding the
"Deployment of any armed force of the Union or any other 
force subject to the control of the Union or any contin­
gent or unit thereof in any State in and of the civil 
power ; powers, jurisdiction, privileges and liabilities 
of the members of such forces while on such deployment." 26
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Parliament could henceforth determine unilaterally whether, when 
and how to deploy Union forces "in aid of the civil power" in any state.
While such deployment lasted, state control over the state police, which 
until now had been complete, would be curtailed so as to make it subject 
to the presence of the Union forces within the state.
Entry 3 of the State List was also amended and the states were de­
prived of the exclusive power they had possessed until now to legislate 
with respect to the administration of justice and the constitution of all 
courts except the Supreme Court and the High Court; the new measure granted 
Parliament concurrent powers to enact legislation dealing with such matters. ^7 
Parliament could hereafter participate in the constitution of the dis­
trict courts and even the subordinate civil and criminal laws and also 
enact laws with respect to administration of justice at any level. Where 
central legislation conflicted with state laws, as spelt out under Clause 
(1) Art. 254, the former was to prevail.
Four other exclusive state subjects were transferred to the concurrent
List. These were education, forests, protection of wild animals and birds
28and weights and measures, except establishment of standards. Finally,
a new concurrent power, reflecting the regime’s newest priority was
2Qcreated with respect to "population control and family planning."
The commitment to population control was evident in another, rather 
strange measure under which the Lok Sabha strength was frozen, until 
2001, as not to exceed the maximum allowed under existing provisions.
The strength of the House and the allocation of seats to the states and
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Union Territories would "be based on 1971 figures until the relevant 
figures for the first census taken after the year 2000 have been publish­
ed." The Indian scheme of proportional representation which took in­
to account the demographic changes as reflected in the census compiled 
each ten years was thereby arbitrarily modified and the Parliament 
barred from recognizing such changes for thirty years.
The life of the Parliament was extended from five to six years.
This measure seems to have had no immediate purpose since the Consti­
tution already provided for the indefinite prolongation of the life of 
the Parliament, during times of emergency. In fact, the Parliament that 
enacted the 42nd Amendment was already in its sixth year; it is probable 
that this new provision was adopted to foreclose future legal challenges 
to recent parliamentary activity on grounds that the mandate of this 
Parliament to conduct normal legislation had expired.
The 42nd Amendment also eliminated all quorum requirements for the 
passage of laws. In the past, at least one-tenth of the total number 
of members of each House was required to constitute a meeting of that 
House; in the absence of a proper quorum the Chairman or Speaker or per­
son acting as such was obligated to adjourn the House or to suspend the
3 3meetings until there was a quorum. The amending feature by deleting 
these two requirements relating to quorum for the conduct of parliament­
ary business paved the way for substantial mischief in the field of law­
making. The passage of legislation considered by no more than a handful 
of legislators was a distinct possibility in the future.
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The 42nd Amendment^ as the foregoing account suggests^, represented 
without doubt the Institutionalization of authoritarian rule in India.
The Emergency also introduced certain statutory changes which were 
designed solely to protect Mrs. Gandhi from the threats arising out of 
her conviction for electoral offences as well as from any litigation in 
the future. These changes included the amendment to the Election Laws 
and the 38th, 39th and 40th Amendments to the Constitution in August 
1975.
The Election Laws Amendment Act of 1975 provided that the case of 
every person found guilty of a corrupt practice shall be submitted to the 
President for final determination as to whether such person shall be dis­
qualified and if so for what period. The President thereby was em­
powered not only to reduce the period of disqualification, but even to 
remove it altogether. This provision, the Law Minister, H. R. Gokhale, 
informed the Parliament, was an attempt "to make the provisions of the 
Representation of the People Act, 1951, relating to disqualifications 
on ground of corrupt practice more equitable."
The amendment also altered with retrospective effect the definition 
of candidate, since the existing provisions, Mr. Gokhale explained, were 
"ridiculous and anomalous." The new provision defined a candidate as 
a person who had been or claims to have been duly nominated as a candi-
0 7date at any election. The point of time at which a person was to be 
regarded as a candidate at an election, for purposes of election laws, 
was thereby specified as being the date of his nomination. Under the
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earlier provision a candidate could be viewed as such even as early as 
the date of the publication of the notification calling the election if 
he had held himself out as a prospective candiate. The new provision had 
the result of altering the effective date of Mrs. Gandhi’s candidacy in 
the disputed elections of 1971 to February 1 and not December 29, as the 
Court had held. Yashpal Kapoor's activities in her behalf which the Court 
had ruled to be a corrupt electoral practice no longer could be deemed 
as such, since, as per the amendment Mrs. Gandhi was not a candidate at 
the time of the act and consequently he could not have acted in further­
ance of the candidacy.
Other sections of the amending bill altered, also with retrospective 
effect, earlier provisions relating to corrupt practices with reference 
to the use of and appeal to religious and national symbols and to the 
assistance by government officers for the furtherance of a candidate's 
election. Mrs. Gandhi of course, had been absolved of the charge direct­
ed at her by her opponent, Raj Narain, that she had indulged in the 
corrupt practice of making a religious appeal to the electorate by the 
use of the Congress Party symbol of "cow and calf." So as to avoid 
similar challenges in the future the new provision asserted that "no 
symbol alloted uner the Representation Act shall be deemed to be a 
national or religious symbol."
In respect of the corrupt practice of assistance by government offi­
cials the relevant section in the amending bill read
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"provided that where any person, in the Service of 
Government . . . .  in the discharge or purported 
discharge of his official duty, makes any arrange­
ment or provides any facilities or does any other 
act or thing, for, to, or in relation to any candi­
date or his agent or any other person acting with the 
consent of the candidate or his election agent (whether 
by reason of the office held by the candidate or for 
any other reason, such arrangement facilities or act 
or thing shall not be deemed to be assistance for the 
furtherance of the prospects of that candidate's 
election." 39
With the law changed, the offenses for which Mrs. Gandhi was convicted, 
that of having obtained the assistance of gazetted officers of the State 
Government of Uttar Pradesh and the assistance of Yash Pal Kapoor, a 
gazetted officer in the Government of India, for the furtherance of her 
election prospects, no longer existed. Consequently, her conviction could 
not be sustained if the legality of these retrospective alterations were 
upheld. Should it not be upheld, she could still escape the stiff 
penalty of six years ' debarment from contesting any election as the Presi­
dent could now reduce or remove the disqualification imposed by the 
courts. Since the then President Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed was widely recog­
nized as a man of no independent stature but merely her "candidate," the 
changes to the election laws virtually assured her continuance in office 
as Prime Minister. Despite the Law Minister’s assertion that "it was not 
the case of an individual but of preserving an institution and function­
ing of democracy," the changes left no room for doubt that the main . 
beneficiary of these changes was Mrs. Gandhi herself.
More changes to the law of the land followed, once again benefitting 
Mrs. Gandhi the most. A day before her election appeals case came up for
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hearing before the Supreme Court, the 39th Amendment to the Indian Consti­
tution was passed which introduced two new provisions that had a direct 
bearing on her legal problems. Clauses 4 and 5 of the new Article 329A 
read as follows
(4) No law made by Parliament before the commencement 
of the Constitution (Thirty-sixth Amendment) Act, 1975,
in so far as it relates to election petitions and matters 
connected therewith, shall apply or shall be deemed over 
to have applied to or in relation to the election of any 
such person as is referred to in clause (1) to either 
House of Parliament and such election shall not be deemed 
to be void or ever to have become void on any ground on 
which such election could be declared to be void or has 
before such commencement, been declared to be void under 
any such law and notwithstanding any order made by any 
court, before such commencement, declaring such election 
to be void, such election shall continue to be valid in 
all respects and any such order and any finding on which 
order is based shall be and shall be deemed always to have 
been void and of no effect.
(5) Any appeal or cross appeal against any such order 
of any court as is referred to in clause (4) pending im­
mediately before the commencement of the Constitution 
(Thirty-ninth Amendment) Act, 1975, before the Supreme 
Court shall be disposed of in conformity with the provi­
sions of clause (4).
The new article also provided that the election of a person who held 
the office of Prime Minister or Speaker at the time of election or that 
of a person who was subsequently appointed to such office could not be 
called
"in question except before such authority . . .  or body 
and in such manner as may be provided for by or under 
any law made by Parliament and any such law may provide 
for all other matters relating to doubts and disputes 
in relation to such election including the grounds on 
which such election may be questioned."
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The effect, of course, was the creation of a new forum, under par­
liamentary law, for dealing with election disputes relating to the Prime 
Minister and the Speaker. The amending bill likewise placed election 
disputes arising out of the election of the President and Vice President 
of India above the law courts through the new Art. 71. Until now elec­
tion matters concerning these high officials had remained within the pur­
view of the High Courts and the Supreme Court, as in the case of other 
legislators. But with the newly adopted electoral law changes judicial 
scrutiny of the fairness of the elections of these four officials was 
totally eliminated. Provision was made in the bill to the effect that 
the validity of any law creating the new forum to decide upon the matter 
could not be called in question in any court of law. Further, even 
where an election petition had been filed against a candidate who was 
not at the time of the petition either the Prime Minister or the Speaker 
should he be subsequently appointed to one of these posts, under the 
amended act, the pending petition would automatically abate even if the 
Supreme Court had the petition under advisement. Piloting the Bill
through Parliament, the Law Minister had declared that it was not only
morally justified but had the strongest legal foundation. It was im­
proper, he explained, that the election of these high authorities should
be the subject matter of dispute before an "outside authority." By 
"outside authority" he presumably meant the Courts. The measures being 
proposed, he emphasized, were "to protect this great democracy. It was 
a timely action to foil the attempts of the anti-democratic forces to 
destroy democracy."
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Finally, the 39th Amendment also amended the IXth Schedule so as 
to bring within its scope 38 Acts (entries 87-124) which by virtue of 
their inclusion in the Schedule would be extended protection from judi­
cial scrutiny. These Acts which the Administration referred to as 
"progressive legislation conceived in the interests of the public" and, 
"imperiled by litigation" included the Representation of the People 
Act and other electoral laws, the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 
the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Act, 
and several State and Central laws dealing with social and economic issues.
The 40th Amendment gave further protection to the Prime Minister 
who, the Law Minister took pains to point out, held "a pivotal position 
under our democratic and republican form of government." It gave 
the Prime Minister legal immunity in respect of the exercise of her 
powers and duties, a protection hitherto available only to the President 
and State Governors. The legislation amended Article 361 of the Consti­
tution to the effect that no criminal proceedings may be instituted 
against the President, the Governors or the Prime Minister, even after 
they left office, for acts done before entering the office or during 
their term of office. Only their actions after they left office would 
not enjoy this protection.
In regard to protection from civil action, they would enjoy immu­
nity from litigation while they remained in office. There would be no 
bar, however, to the institution of proceedings against them after they 
left office, even in respect of any of their acts while in office. Until
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now, not even the President and the Governors had enjoyed immunity from 
civil proceedings. The only special consideration they had enjoyed in 
this regard was that a two month notice period was required to be given 
before instituting civil proceedings against them. Though the Amend­
ment, which too was made retrospective in effect, did extend the immunity 
enjoyed by the President and the Governors, the major beneficiary here 
again was Mrs. Gandhi, who as Prime Minister was given extended immunity 
from all criminal proceeding and limited immunity from civil actions, 
protections she had not enjoyed previously.
An earlier Amendment had already succeeded in denying the judiciary 
the power to adjudicate an emergency declaration. The 38th Amendment 
now made "nonjusticiable" the "satisfaction" of the President before his 
declaration of an emergency. The Law Minister justified the measure 
on the grounds that there were matters which could not be subjected to 
judicial scrutiny and were for political judgement only. Referring 
to the Articles 352, 356 and 360 which dealt respectively with the Presi­
dent's powers to proclaim an emergency on account of external aggression 
or threat to internal security; to take over a state administration on 
the breakdown of the constitutional machinery in the state; and to de­
clare a financial emergency if the financial stability of the nation 
was threatened, Mr. Gokhale, the Law Minister, said that the "satisfact­
ion" of the President "is, on the face of it not justiciable." However, 
he proceeded, because the validity of a proclamation under Art. 352 had 
been challenged on prior occassions and because "litigation of this 
nature involves a waste of public time and money it is proposed to
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amend these three articles so as to make the satisfaction final, conclu­
sive and not justiciable on any ground.” Henceforth even a patently 
mala fide declaration would enjoy full protection from judicial review. 
Art. 123 under which the President could promulgate ordinances when 
Parliament was not in session as well as Articles 213 and 239(B) under 
which the Governors of States and administrators of Union territories 
enjoyed their powers to issue ordinances were also amended to place 
beyond the purview of the courts the "satisfaction” of these officials 
before they issued ordinances.
Another change that this bill introduced enabled the President to 
issue concurrent proclamations of emergency, thus eliminating any future 
challenge to the 1975 Emergency on grounds that it was superimposed over 
another emergency and hence illegal.
The 38th Amendment also sought to expand the power of the Executive 
to derogate from the citizens’ fundamental rights, during times of emer­
gency. The earlier provisions had merely granted the President the 
power to suspend the right of the citizen to move courts during an 
emergency for the enforcement of his fundamental rights and to suspend 
all pending proceedings for the period during which the proclamation was 
in force or for such shorter period as specified in the order. An addi­
tion to Article 359, that pertained to the status of fundamental rights 
during an emergency, barred the citizen, for all times, from challenging
any executive measure taken during an emergency that may have violated
53his fundamental rights, even his right to life and personal liberty.
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This provision accordingly assured that there would be no need for the 
executive to ever account for even mala fide violations of the citizens' 
rights committed during the period that the emergency lasts.
The sweep of these retroactive amendments effected several changes, 
altered the notion of executive accountability, and exhibited total 
contempt for the rule of law in a democracy. First, an election that a 
High Court had voided was retroactively validated. Second, lifelong 
immunity from criminal prosecution was granted to certain high officials, 
including the Prime Minister, for all acts committed, not only while in 
office but even before. Third, all possible legal challenges to the 
declaration of Emergency was ruled out. Fourth, judicial review of sev­
eral laws, including the MISA, the COFEPOSA and the Representation of 
the People Act was eliminated. And, finally, the citizen was deprived 
of all redress against the violation of his fundamental rights during 
an Emergency by any law or executive action no matter how oppressive.
Emergency and the Citizen
Following the proclamation of the Emergency the Maintenance of 
Internal Security Act (MISA) was amended on three separate occasions by 
the Government and the few safeguards that the detenu retained under it 
were all virtually eliminated. The MISA (Amendment) Act of August 5, 
1975, which replaced earlier presidential ordinances issued on June 29, 
1975 and July 16, 1975, provided for a new category of detentions —
"for dealing effectively with the emergency," Provided the detaining 
authority made a declaration that the detention was necessary for this
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purpose^ the detenu could be held for a maximum of one year without being 
informed of the grounds for the detention order. Detention may ex­
tend even beyond that period, but only after pursuing the normal course 
such as supplying him with the grounds for the detention and refer the 
detention to advisory boards etc. The amendment also provided that 
the revocation of a detention order shall not constitute a bar against 
the issue of another detention order against the same person. Further, 
no MISA detenu was allowed to be released on bail, bail bond or otherwise; 
nor could they seek relief under "rules of natural justice" nor claim a 
"right to personal liberty by virtue of natural law or common law." 
Another major provision authorized the attachment of properties of a per­
son against whom a detention order had been made and who had failed to 
surrender himself, or had absconded or was in hiding. As a result of 
these amendments MISA detenus were effectively prevented from approach­
ing the courts for relief either because no grounds had been given to 
them or because the detention order had violated "canons of natural jus­
tice" or "natural or common law."
The only safeguards against the wholesale abuse of the powers of 
preventive detention by authorities at all levels of government were 
(a) that where declaration of the need for detention to deal with the 
Emergency was issued by an authority, lower than*tfie State Government, 
it was to cease in effect unless confirmed by the State Government within 
15 days, after a review; (b) that the appropriate government would review 
the need for continued detention within four months of the date of deten-
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tion and thereafter at intervals of four months; and (c) that where an 
order of detention had been made by a State Government or by an sub­
ordinate authority, the State Government was required to send to the 
Center a report on the detention within 20 days.
In January 1976 the MISA was again amended. The new provisions 
further eroded the safeguards against abuse that the original Act had 
included. The amendment stipulated that an individual whose detention 
had been revoked or disallowed earlier may be redetained and that no 
person against whom an order of detention had been made shall be enti­
tled to the communication of the grounds of detention or be afforded 
the opportunity to make representation. It further mandated that 
the grounds on which an order of detention had been made shall be treated 
as confidential and shall be deemed to refer to matters of state and 
that it shall be against public interest to disclose the grounds.
Finally, it required the Central Government to obtain details on deten­
tions from the State Governments. The major objective of this amend­
ment was to eliminate those safeguards which would have offered detenus 
relief from detentions ordered under the Act.
The MISA underwent a third and final "emergency amendment" in 
August 1976. This amendment related to detentions in connection with 
the Emergency and was made applicable with retrospective effect from 
June 29, 1975, the date the MISA was first amended during the Emergency, 
by presidential ordinance. It extended the maximum period all such 
"emergency detentions" from 12 to 24 months. The cumulative effect
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of the amendments to MISA was the virtual elimination of all restraints 
against the abuse of preventive detention powers by the Government parti­
cularly as it related to detentions under the new provision 16A, of the 
Act that authorized detentions to deal with the Emergency. The Shah 
Commission's conclusions on the use of MISA emphasizes the indiscriminate 
use to which it was put during the Emergency;
MISA was used as a weapon against all kinds of activities, 
not even remotely connected with the security of the State, 
public order or maintenance of essential supplies. Govern­
ment servants accused of corruption or misbehavior, petty 
traders violating licensing conditions, persons involved 
in land disputes, contractors supplying inferior material 
for construction works, those contesting Government deci­
sions in a civil court, those selling milk and other com­
modities at inflated prices, workers in factories pressing 
their demands or criticizing the management, persons accused 
(not convicted) of committing irregularities or defal­
cation in cooperative societies and banks, those not coop­
erating in family planning programs of the Government or 
refusing to get themselves sterilized —  all came within 
the all pervading sweep of the MISA. Particularly in U.P., 
MISA was used extensively against those alleged to be oppo­
sed to family planning or not actively cooperating with the 
program of family planning. Thus MISA was used for purposes 
totally beyond the purview of ---  the Act. 65
The Defence of India Act too was used extensively for similar pur­
poses. The Defence of India (Amendment) Act of July 1975 incorporated 
words like "internal security" and "internal disturbances" into the pre­
amble to the Act thereby granting the Administration greater latitude 
for its employment. The other preventive detention measure which was 
used, though not as widely as the MISA or the DIR was the Conservation 
of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Act (COFEPOSA) originally 
passed in December 1975.
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The COFEPOSA Amendment of August 1975 provided that no person de­
tained under the Act may be released on bail, bail bond or otherwise; 
that no detention order under the Act may be held invalid or inoperative 
merely because some of the grounds of the detention order are vague, non- 
existent, not relevant, or invalid for any reason; and, that if deten­
tion is made for dealing with the Emergency no grounds need be conveyed 
to the detenu and no review of the charges by the Advisory Board may be 
permitted. Within a year of the Emergency, over 2,000 alleged smugglers 
had been detained and their property worth more than a crore of rupees 
had been seized and attached. Sixty thousand raids were conducted on
the premises of suspected smugglers, black marketeers and hoarders and,
since "illegally acquired property" had been made subject to confiscation 
under the 20-point economic program passed by Parliament, these raids
led to the confiscation of property worth hundreds of millions of rupees 
70more.
There was extensive abuse of the various preventive detention
measures during the Emergency. The aggrieved party was denied all relief
by the inclusion of COFEPOSA and MISA in the IXth s c h e d u l e , i n  August 
1975, thereby rendering them nonjusticiable. The Shah Commission has re­
ported that the manner in which MISA was used was "nothing short of 
perversion and mockery of its provisions" and that all the safeguards
that had been promised when the bill was enacted had been totally dis- 
72regarded. The same can be said of the use of COFEPOSA and Defence 
and Internal Security of India Rules (DISIR) by the authorities during 
the Emergency.
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Among the thousands of those detained, there were many who were 
guilty of no more than belonging to opposition political parties or to 
groups and organizations that had been banned. In fact the banning of 
several political organizations contributed substantially to the wide­
spread abuse of preventive detention by the Government.
In what was described as a bid to curb the activities of communal
organizations and political groups believing in the cult of violence,
73the Government of India, on July 4, 1975, banned 26 organizations.
The ban was imposed under the Defence of India Rules and it included the 
Rashtriya Swayam Sevak Sangh (RSS), the Jamat-E-Islami (JEI), the Ananda 
Marg, the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) (CPML) and groups 
allied to these and other splinter groups which, as described below, were 
attracted to the notion of violence to bring about political change.
The most influential of the banned organizations was the R.S.S., 
which was widely believed to dominate the Jan Sangh by providing it not 
only with the hard core of its leadership but with its ideological in­
spiration as well. The RSS was founded in 1925 reportedly to enable 
the Hindu Community to cope with the communal riots and crises widely 
prevalent in those days. It preached a form of militant Hindu national­
ism and trained youths into a cadre-based para-military organization 
with emphasis on military drill and use of swords and lathis (wooden 
clubs). It was banned in February 1948 after the assasination of Mahatma 
Gandhi along with other communal and para-military organizations. The 
ban was revoked after a few months following assurances by the then
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RSS leader Golwalkar that it would abjure politics and would confine its 
activities in the future to purely cultural and social matters. However, 
after the formation of the Jana Sangh Party, the RSS developed such close 
ties to it that in the popular mind the two were inextricably linked.
Over the years the RSS had espoused doctrines of extreme Hindu cultural 
chauvinism under the rubric of "Indianization," though in the more recent 
past it had succeeded in moderating many of the extremist views earlier 
adopted by it.
The Jamat-E-Islami (JEI) was regarded in official circles as a 
Muslim counterpart to the Hindu RSS. Like the latter, it was influenced 
by a well defined communal orthodoxy that could not unreservedly accept 
the secular principle that Indian democracy had embraced. Though far 
less influential politically than the RSS, it nonetheless was a thorn 
in the side of the Government because of the constant threat it posed, 
along with the RSS of provoking communal upheavals.
The Ananda Marg and the thirteen organizations associated with 
it which were banned under the July 4 order embraced a peculiarly 
esoteric politico-religious doctrine, the Progressive Utilization 
(Proutist) theory, propounded by the Ananda Marg founder, P. R. Sarkar.
The Marg was opposed to nonviolence, nationalism, communism and democracy. 
It preached an esoteric doctrine which held the ideal government to be 
a dictatorship of Sadvipras (loosely translated as the morally and 
spiritually enlightened). It organized its members into four hierarchical
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categories with distinct roles and responsibilities and indulged in 
secret rituals and para-military drills and exercises which captured 
the imagination of many and gained it a considerable following said to 
number close to 250,000, including 60,000 overseas. Its greatest 
strength was in West Bengal and Bihar, particularly among members of the 
administrative services. Initially, it confined its activities to edu­
cational and welfare matters but later seems to have become progressively 
more political. At any rate, in official circles it was suspected of 
planning and perpetrating violent activities and even assasination and 
murder of defectors from its ranks.
The CPI (M.L.) and eight other Maoist agrarian terrorist groups, 
loosely referred to as "Naxalites" subscribed to revolutionary vio­
lence to bring about a more just society in place of the present "oppressive" 
system. The original CPI (M.L.) was formed in April 1969, as India's 
third communist party. It claimed to be based on Mao's thoughts and 
teachings and saw the principal contradiction in India as that between 
feudalism and the masses of peasantry. Its leadership was dominated by 
the communist leaders who had survived the abortive Naxalbari and 
Srikakulam peasant uprisings of 1967-1968 and it espoused the Maoist 
tactics of "peoples' war" as the only means to destroy feudalism. The 
CPI (M.L.) departed from the other two Indian communist parties - the 
pro Moscow Communist Party of India (CPI) and the independent Communist 
Party of India - Marxists (CPI (M)) in its rejection of the parliamentary 
route to power which the other two had accepted.
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In the intervening years since 1969, the Indian Maoists too had 
succumbed to factionalism and splintered into the various groups banned 
on July 4. These factions engaged in sporadic guerilla activity direct­
ed against the feudal landowners in rural India, especially in Andhra 
Pradesh, but were always overwhelmed by the superior government forces.
It is true that they did pose a security problem to the authorities, 
but it was one of modest proportions because of the party's numerical 
and organizational weaknesses.
On August 5, the Mizo National Front and other allied organizations, 
including the Mizo National Army, were banned for indulging in activities 
in furtherance of their objective of achieving an independent Mizoram 
comprising the Union territory of Mizoram and the adjacent Mizo and Kuki 
inhabited areas of Manipur and Tripura.
The ban charged the outlawed organizations of "indulging in activi­
ties prejudicial to the internal security, public safety, and maintenance 
of public order." Under the order, any person who managed or assisted 
in managing any of these organizations, promoted or assisted in promoting 
a meeting of any members of these organizations, attended any such meet­
ing, published any notice or advertisement relating to any such meeting, 
invited persons to support these organizations or assisted the operations
of these organizations in any other manner was liable for action under 
78the law. Following the ban order, the police all over India raided
and sealed the offices of the organizations and made scores of arrests. 79
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What is interesting about the outlawing of these organizations, is 
that most of the outlawed groups could have been banned, even without 
an Emergency, under the provisions of the Indian Penal Code. The fact 
that they had been allowed to function in the open was largely a matter 
of police tactic since it was believed by the Government that a ban might 
only serve to drive them underground. So long as such groups continued 
to operate in the open they could be penetrated by informers hnd spies, 
thereby making it easier for the law enforcement authorities to keep 
track of their activities and take requisite legal action against them 
as and when necessary. Now, in the wake of the emergency declaration, 
these tactical considerations were cast aside. Thousands of individuals 
were detained merely on grounds that they belonged to or were sympathetic 
to the banned party or organization.
The conclusion is inevitable that after the Government 
of India issued a notification banning certain organi­
zations, VIZ, RSS, JEI, Ananda Marg, CPML and others, 
most of the State governments acted almost in a frenzy, 
detaining persons on the slightest suspicion of associ­
ation with these organizations even though, in many cases, 
no reasonable grounds were available to detain them. In 
this they were repeatedly goaded by the Government of 
India, who continued to give directives to the States to 
launch a vigorous drive against these organizations on all 
fronts. 80
The detention of individuals based on their political affiliations 
was not confined during the emergency to those belonging to the banned 
parties. Among those arrested in the predawn hours of June 26, were 
most of the leaders of the Lok Sangharsha Samiti (People's Struggle
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Committee), the coalition of political parties which had been set up 
only the previous day to force the resignation of Mrs. Gandhi. On 
June 21 opposition leaders had begun to formulate plans for a nationwide 
protest against Mrs. Gandhi’s continuance in office. Then on June 24, 
when the Supreme Court denied Mrs. Gandhi’s petition for an unconditional 
stay of the operation of the Allahabad High Court verdict setting aside 
her election, the opposition parties decided to intensify their struggle 
against her. Five political parties set up the Lok Sangharsha Samiti 
and declared their decision to launch a ’’nationwide struggle” from 
June 29 to press for Mrs. Gandhi’s resignation.
The five parties were Congress (0), Jana Sangh, Bharatiya Lok Dal, 
Socialist Party and Akali Dal. The Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam, the party 
in power in Tamilnadu and the Communist Party (Marxist) also attended 
the opposition meeting on June 24 and indicated that they would convey 
their formal association with the Samiti at a future date. Jaya Prakash 
Narayan, the inspiration behind the Bihar Lok Sangharash Samiti and a 
leading critic of Mrs. Gandhi was also present at the meeting and ac­
corded it his wholehearted support. The Samiti was set up under the 
chairmanship of Morarji Desai with Nanaji Deshmukh, a top Jana Sangh 
leader as secretary and Asoka Mehta, President, Congress (0) its 
Treasurer.
Barely a fortnight before, a similar convergence of opposition 
parties in the Gujerat elections had resulted in the defeat of 
Mrs. Gandhi’s congress party there. Those elections, as well as the
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Bihar movement, had demonstrated to the opposition that despite their 
heterogenous ideological orientations they could agree upon a joint stra­
tegy and develop a common leadership to work against the Congress and 
the monopoly of power that the Congress wielded. It is reasonable to 
assume that this lesson had not been lost on Mrs. Gandhi either. In the 
climate of heightened political crisis that prevailed in India following 
the pronouncement of the Allahad High Court verdict, the appearance of 
a national united political coalition with the sole stated objective of 
forcing her removal as Prime Minister must have indeed seemed ominous 
to her.
Her response was a preemptive strike against the leaders of the 
movement as well as other political figures, including dissidents with­
in her own party. Those arrested in the first hours of the Emergency 
included Jaya Prakash Narayan, Congress (0) leaders Morarji Desai and 
Asoka Mehta, ELD leaders Raj Narain and Charan Singh, Jana Sangh 
leaders L.K. Advani and Atal Behari Vajpayee and Congress Parliamentary 
Party General Secretary Ram Dhan and Congress Working Committee member 
Chandra Sekhar who along with other dissident Congressmen had stayed
away from the party meeting called on to pledge loyalty to the Prime 
81Minister. The opposition was totally unprepared for the massive
arrests of its leadership. Only hours before he was arrested, Morarji
Desai, in an interview with the Italian journalist Oriana Fallaci, had
expressed incredulity at her query as to whether Mrs. Gandhi might not
have him arrested. He had vehemently denied the possibility and declared
82that she'd commit suicide first. He was, of course, mistaken.
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During the period of emergency thousands of individuals were detained 
purely on political grounds. As the Shah Commission report states:
Soon after the declaration of Emergency a large number 
of persons alleged to be members or sympathizers of the 
non-CPI Opposition Parties was detained, A large number 
of detenus in Madhya Pradesh, Gujerat, Karnataka, Raja­
sthan, Delhi, Maharashtra and, to some extent Bihar and 
U.P. were members of the Jan Sangh and its sympathizers. 
The Bharatiya Lok Dal Party members came in for special 
attention in Orissa, U.P. and Haryana. The Dravida 
Munnetra Kazhagam was the subject of a concentrated 
onslaught in Tamil Nadu when more than 400 of its members 
were detained under the MISA out of a total of 570 
political detentions in that State. 83
The purpose of the arrests was to cripple the opposition, though this 
was vehemently denied by the Government as the reason for the detentions, 
In its letter to Mrs. Gandhi dated November 6, 1975, the Lok Sangharsha 
Samiti commented on the arrests:
You say the Opposition Parties have not been banned, 
and they are free. But when the leaders and workers 
of these parties are arrested and put behind bars, when 
Parties cannot hold meetings to place their point of 
view before the people or answer the calumny spread by 
the Ruling Party and the Government, when the views of 
the Parties cannot be reported in the Press, and the 
people have no way of knowing what the Parties are doing 
or thinking —  do Parties function freely? Or is it that 
they have been consummately consigned to the limbos? 84
MISA was not only invoked against political opponents and so-called 
extremists but even against ordinary criminals and "anti-social elements" 
and economic offenders. Here again, the Shah Commissions’ conclusions 
are pertinent:
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Persons were detained under MISA for alleged criminal 
activities relating to more than five years before the 
detention and in several cases the alleged offences men­
tioned in the grounds pertained to an even remoter period 
dating back up to 15 or 20 years . . .
...In many cases the detenu was shown as having been acquit­
ted by the court in respect of several offences, yet these 
were made the grounds for detaining him under the MISA. . .
All kinds of petty criminals, those involved in offences 
under the Excise Act, Prohibition Act, Gambling Act,
Indian Arms Act ... and minor offences like ordinary 
theft, assault, "eveteasing", criminal trespass, etc., 
were detained under MISA for long periods in States 
like Madhya Pradesh, U.P., Bihar, Gujerat, Maharashtra, 
Delhi, Andhra Pradesh as well as, to a lesser extent, 
in other states. 85
The figures compiled by the Shah Commission on the detentions under 
MISA, and DISIR, reproduced in Table I, express the enormity of the 
assault on personal liberty of the individual under the Emergency.
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TABLE I
ARRESTS AND DETENTIONS IN VARIOUS STATES/UNION
TERRITORIES DURING EMERGENCY
SI. Name of State/ Detentions Arrests Under
No. Union Territory Under MISA DISIR
1 2 3 4
1 Andhra Pradesh 1135 451
2 Assam 533 2388
3 Bihar 2360 7747
4 Guj arat 1762 2643
5 Haryana 200 1079
6 Himachal Pradesh 34 654
7 Jammu & Kashmir 466 311
8 Karnataka 487 4015
9 Kerala 790 7134
10 Madhya Pradesh 5620 2521
11 Maharashtra 5473 9799
12 Manipur 231 228
13 Meghalaya 39 20
14 Nagaland 95 4
15 Orissa 408 762
16 Punj ab 440 2423
17 Raj asthan 542 1352
18 Sikkim 4 — —
19 Tamil Nadu 1027 1644
20 Tripura 77 99
21 Uttar Pradesh 6956 24781
22 West Bengal 4992 2547
23 Andaman & Nicobar Islands 41 88
24 Arunachal Pradesh — — 1
25 Chandigarh 27 74
26 Dadra & Nagar Haveli — 3
27 Delhi 1012 2851
28 Goa, Daman & Diu 113 — —
29 Lakshadweep — — —
30 Mizoram 70 136
31 Pondicherry 54 63
TOTAL 34988 75818
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The manner in which the detention powers under the amended MISA 
and other preventive measures was used during the Emergency constitutes, 
without doubt, an excess that affected virtually the entire nation. Yet, 
the abuse of authority that aroused the greatest popular resentment 
against the Emergency and found its expression in the vote against 
Mrs. Gandhi and her Congress Party in 1977 relates to the forced steri­
lization campaign undertaken by the Government. Sterilization, as 
Professor Morris Jones has stated, stood out as the "most scandalous
infringement of a peculiarly intimate personal liberty" and the "mark
87of deep private pain" that the Emergency occasioned.
The need for an effective program to limit the population growth 
rate was widely recognized in Indian administrative circles. It was 
recognized that unless India succeeded in reducing its "population ex­
plosion," whatever expanded resources the economy generated would go 
only toward meeting the additional consumption mandated by the growth 
in population. According to census figures, the population had grown 
from 359 million in 1951 to over 436 million in 1961 and was 548 million 
in 1971. The large increase was not altogether attributable to a high 
birthrate but was also the result of increased life expectancy and the
corresponding decline in annual death toll. Whereas in 1951 annual life
88expectancy was a mere 32.5 years, by 1971 it had climbed to 53.2 years 
as a result of better health and sanitation and more effective famine 
relief programs. The widespread epidemics and famines which had ravaged 
the countryside and taken millions of lives in the past had for the most
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part been eliminated, and, in combination with the reduced infant mort­
ality rate, the population grew at such a pace that the demographic pre­
ssures on economic development soon became overwhelming.
The program of family planning that had been followed by the Govern­
ment until the Emergency was largely voluntary with certain incentives 
offered to encourage participation in the sterilization program. As 
late as April 5, 1974, Dr. Karan Singh, the Union Minister of Health and 
Family Planning, had declared during his inaugural address to the Central 
Family Planning Clinic:
"While the fixing of targets is useful to guide the workers 
on the level of achievement, strategies have to be developed 
to see that the people themselves readily accept the program
without any compulsion. Family planning must be a voluntary
and people's program . . . Motivation, persuasion and crea­
ting health and family planning consciousness in the country
is one side of our effort. The other side is the provision
of services . . ."89
The Emergency witnessed a drastic departure from the voluntary 
character of the family planning drive. As before, the objective remained 
the same —  for families to limit the number of children to three. The 
methods of bringing this about changed, however. The program of incentives 
to encourage voluntary sterilization was considered inadequate, and it 
was therefore supplanted by a new program of stringent disincentives that 
ultimately degenerated into naked coercion. In a note to Mrs. Gandhi 
dated October 10, 1975, Dr. Karan Singh discussed the need for a "crash 
program to intensify family planning," writing, "the problem is now so
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serious there seems to be no alternative but to think in terms of intro­
duction of some element of compulsion in the larger national interest." 
Mrs. Gandhi too expanded on this theme, emphasizing the need for some 
degree of compulsion. In her address to the Joint Conference of Asso­
ciation of Physicians on January 22, 1976, she observed:
"We must now act decisively and bring down the birth rate 
speedily ... We should not hesitate to take steps which 
might be described as drastic. Some personal rights have 
to be kept in abeyance, for the human rights of the nation, 
the right to live, the right to progress ..." 91
Within months of the declaration of the Emergency the voluntary 
character of the Government's family planning program had undergone a 
transformation. Harsh measures were enacted both by the center and the 
states achieving the stated goal of reducing, by 1984, the birth rate
gofrom 3.5 to 2.5 percent. The program of incentives and disincentives 
was soon perverted into a macbre campaign that focused on compulsory 
sterilization. Incentives no longer rewarded just the person undergoing 
sterilization but the "motivator" as well. Rukhsana Sultana, a friend 
of Sanjay Gandhi who was active in the sterilization campaign in Delhi 
is reported to have earned Rupees 84,210 for "having motivated" 8407 
people to undergo sterilization.
The disincentives too were stringent by any standard. With unseeming 
haste, state after state passed their family planning packages. These 
varied considerably in the schemes of rewards and punishments they pro­
posed, with no uniformity of approach in regard to the adopted population
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control measures. Generally speaking, however, the disincentives re­
ferred to denials of certain privileges and concessions such as maternity 
leave, financial loans and advances, allotment of accomodation and land, 
free medical treatment, scholarships and educational allowance for child­
ren and similar perquisities which had through long useage come to be 
treated as part and parcel of the employment terms of a government ser­
vant. Among the various programs of family planning enacted by the 
States, that of Himachal Pradesh was characterized even by Mrs. Gandhi 
as rather harsh. The measures were spelt out in a letter from the 
Governor of the state to the President of India, dated November 2, 1976.
"In addition to the package of incentives and disincentives, 
the State Government has decided to make family planning 
obligatory for all Government employees. A Government 
servant having two children of different sexes would be 
considered an "eligible person"... The State Government 
has also approved "The Himachal Pradesh Government Servants 
(Special Provisions relating to Family Planning) Rules" 
incorporating the incentives and disincentives announced 
by the Government in this regard. Under these rules an 
"eligible person" who fails to get himself or his spouse 
sterilized within three months from the commencement of 
these rules will be disqualified in respect of the following: 
(a) earning of annual increment or crossing efficiency 
bar; (b) confirmation and promotion; (c) medical reimburse­
ment or treatment at Government hospitals; (d) allotment 
of Government accomodation. In case a person is already 
residing in a Government accomodation, he will be required 
to pay the market rent or six times the standard rent 
whichever is higher; (e) Government loans including . . 
advances and (f) maternity leave in the case of women 
employees. 94
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Maharashtra enacted a Bill mandating sterilization after registration of 
the third child, with up to two years in prison for those who violated 
the law. The Haryana measure advocated the dismissal of all "eligible" 
Government employees who did not get themselves sterilized within a sti­
pulated time. According to a report in the Sunday Telegraph (London) , 
in U.P., each teacher was required to provide 12 candidates for steri­
lization every three months. Failure to do so resulted in the withholding
97of salary or even dismissal. In Mathura 150 teachers were jailed for 
20 days when they protested against the measure and in Alamgarh another 
400 were suspended until they had met their quotas.
The brutal implementation of the new and harsh strategy to curb 
population growth was most evident in the North. Further, it was only 
after Sanjay Gandhi, Mrs. Gandhi's younger son, made family planning a 
major plank of the platform of the Youth Congress, of which he was by 
then the undisputed leader, that the sterilization campaign acquired 
its frenzied character. By that time Sanjay was not only the acknowledged 
leader of the Youth Congress, but was also widely recognized as being 
second only to Mrs. Gandhi in the power and influence he wielded. So, 
when he pushed a four point Youth Congress program which included, be­
sides family planning, the planting of trees, the eradication of illi­
teracy and the abolition of caste and dowry systems, the program was 
referred for speedy execution to all Congress—ruled states.
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The passage below is representative of the sterilization target - 
mongering about that went on in various states as government officials 
in their eagerness to curry favor with Sanjay lost all moral perspective 
and developed an oppressive policy that terrorized millions of Indians. 
The passage from a directive dated September 30, 1976, addressed to 
district officers from the Joint Director for Family Planning of the 
State of Maharashtra read:
"I wish to inform you that Shri Sanjay Gandhi is visiting 
Maharashtra State about October 28, 1976, and the Chief 
Minister desires that before the visit of Shri Sanjay 
Gandhi Maharashtra State must have completed 5 lakhs 
sterilizations. You will appreciate the seriousness 
with which the Chief Minister has issued instructions, 
and therefore, though the task is stupendous, we shall 
have to leave no stone unturned to achieve this objective." 99
The tactics of compulsion were widespread, especially in the North.
The sterilization drive in two villages of Northern India has been des­
cribed by an Indian journalist as "the most callous rape of rights and 
dignity experienced anywhere in the twenty months of the Emergency."
Not surprisingly, it was the weaker sections of the population —  the poor, 
the backward classes and the minorities that suffered the most from the 
arbitrariness and insensitivity of a Government that recognized no res­
traints on its authority. Unchecked power in the hands of petty offi­
cials who, with the assistance of the police, sought to reach the incredibly 
high sterilization targets established by State authorities resulted in 
hundreds of thousands of individuals being coerced into undergoing 
sterilization. There was no longer an avenue for redress of their griev­
ances, no matter how grave.
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Table II providing the Shah Commission Report’s figures on steri­
lizations during the Emergency bespeaks of the grisly eagerness with 
which the campaign was executed.
Among the other abuses of authority by the State against individuals 
that the Shah Commission investigated, one that evoked a large number 
of complaints was in connection with "the treatment meted out to public 
servants in so far as it related to their service conditions generally 
and with particular reference to their summary dismissal, compulsory/ 
premature retirements and supersessions." 10%
There was a departure from accepted norms and practices on two 
counts. First, during the Emergency, the Government made appointments 
to important offices of persons who had either been rejected as unfit 
by the Public Enterprises Selection Board, the body entrusted with selec­
ting senior executives of public undertakings or whose selections did 
not conform to normal procedures. These officers as the Shah Commission 
concluded were selected only because they were perceived as willing in­
struments who would "further the interests of the center of power in 
gross violation of established administrative norms and p r a c t i c e s .
Secondly, both the center and the States dealt harshly with those 
bureaucrats who did not exhibit the degree of enthusiasm about the 
Emergency expected of them. To deal with them the various governments 
resorted to dismissals, forced retirements and supersession. There were 
25,962 cases of premature or compulsory retirements made during the 
Emergency that were referred for review by the post Emergency Government.
TABLE II —  STERILIZATIONS: TARGETS & ACHIEVEMENTS
Name of State/UT

















1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Andhra Pradesh 2.94.200 1,65,163 4,00,000 6,00,000 7,41,713
Assam 67,300 --- 1,47,545 1,70,000 — 2,26,205
Bihar 2,02,500 --- 1,65,531 3,00,000 6,00,000 6,80,000
Gujarat 1,82,400 --- 1,53,000 2,00,000 3,78,240 3,17,000
Haryana 74,300 45,000* 57,942 52,000 2,00,000 2,22,000
Himachal Pradesh 18,600 — 16,830 31,500 1,00,000 1,00,740
Jammu & Kashmir 7,000 — 9.502 31,000 — 15,794
Karnataka 1,39,000 — — 1,20,671 2,44,500 6,00,000 4,88,861**
Kerala 1,48,400 — 1,56,622 2,22,500 — 2,06,600
Madhya Pradesh 1,63,800 — 1,12,000 2,67,500 7,00,000 10,01,000
Maharashtra 3,18,300 5.68,000 6,11,000 5,62,000 12,00,000 8,33,000
Manipur 1,600 — 847 4,500 — 6,286
Meghalaya 1,500 — 2,100 3,500 — 7,513
Nagaland —  — — --- --- 1,000 355
Orissa 1,09,200 — 1,25,040 1,95,500 4,62.000 3,22,984 S
Punjab 43,100 — 53,083 46,500 2,50,000 1,39,905
Rajasthan 1,06,100 — 86,000 1,75,000 3,50,000 3,64,760
Sikkim — — — — — 262
Tamil Nadu 2,11,300 — — 2,70,691 5,00,000 6,00,000 5,69,756
Tripura 3,400 — 4,140 9,000 10,000 12,600
Uttar Pradesh 1,75,000 — 1,28,000 4,00,000 15,00,000 8,37,000
West Bengal 1,96,100 — 2,06,421 3,92,500 11,00,000 8,80,000
Andaman & Nicobar Islds. 200 — 242 500 1,300 1,376
Arunachal Pradesh 100 — 22 600 — 268
Chandigarh 1,300 — 1,163 2,000 — 2,590
Dadra&Nagar Haveli 350 — — 241 600 630 695
Delhi 11,200 — 22,510 29,000 1,00,000 1,38,517
Goa, Daman&Dlu 4,400 — — 2,800 8,000 — 5,571
Lakshadweep 50 — 56 200 --- 149
Mizoram 900 — — 905 1,800 679Pondicherry 3.400 — 4,688 5.300 7.300 8.030
TOTAL 24,85,000 26,24,755 42,55,500 «1,32,209
* With Central Government'o approval. 
** Up to 28/2/77.
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As of June 1, 1978, 16,538 had been taken up for review and of these 
14,187 orders had been reversed and the affected officers reinstated,
1488 cases were still under consideration, leaving only 863 cases in 
which the reviewing authority found insufficient cause for the early 
retirement of the officers concerned. Similarly, reviewing authori­
ties reversed large numbers of dismissals and supersessions of civil 
servants that occurred during the Emergency, lending credence to com­
plaints that there was political motivation behind such orders. 105
Pressure was brought to bear even upon the judiciary. High Court 
judges who did not decide in favor of the Government in cases that came 
before them suddenly were transferred out of their regular jurisdictions, 
purportedly "in the interests of national integration." 106 Legally, 
of course, it was within the Government's power to effect the transfer 
of High Court Judges after consultation with the Chief Justice of India. 
However, in the past this power had seldom been exercised and then only 
with the consent or at the request of the judge being transferred. But 
in May 1976 a report announced the transfer of 16 judges with the comment 
that "this process will probably continue in appropriate installments at 
reasonable intervals."1^^ Among those transferred were Justice J. M. Sheth 
who had ruled in favor of the Gujarati language Sarvodaya Journal 
Bhumiputra in its challenge of a precensorship order. Justice J. R.
Vimadlal who had joined Justice P. S. Shah in declaring that "a detenu 
is not a convict and the power to detain is not a power to punish,"1®^ 
and Justice Sesha Rangarajan, who had delivered a stinging rebuke to the
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the Government in the case relating to the detention of the journalist 
Kuldip Nayar of the Indian Express. Of this^Raj Mohan Gandhi wrote in 
Himmat in June 1976, "A transfer can be a form of punishment". So 
it would seem to have been in many instances of transfers during the 
Emergency, and particularly so in the case of Justice Vimadlal who was 
transferred from Maharashtra to Andhra Pradesh even though he had only 
six months of active service remaining before retirement.
Justice J. L. Aggarwal, who, along with Justice Rangarajan, had 
heard the arguments in the Nayar case was reverted from Additional Judge 
of the Delhi High Court to the Junior status of a Sessions Judge despite 
recommendations from both the Chief Justice and the Law Minister that he 
be confirmed as a Justice of the High Court.
As the transfers continued, it became obvious to the judges that 
"a finding against the Government was an invitation to transfer."
Only when Justice Sheth filed a petition challenging his transfer was 
there an end to this particular form of punishment of judges who did 
not see eye to eye with the Government. A full bench of the Gujarat 
High Court allowed Sheth's petition on grounds that there had been no 
meaningful consultation with the Chief Justice, as required by the 
Constitution, prior to the issuance of the transfer order and as such 
the order was invalid and therefore unenforceable. According to Kuldip 
Nayar the verdict in the Sheth transfer "stopped the transfer of 44 more 
judges."
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The Emergency and the Press
Of the many changes to the democratic system the Emergency wrought, 
none so dramatised, especially to the outside world, the collapse of 
Indian democracy as the virtual destruction of the freedom of the press 
in India. The free press was one of the first casualties of the new 
order. When emergency was declared a few minutes before midnight on 
June 25, 1975 it was accompanied by a disruption of electricity to 
Bahadur Shah Zafar Marg, the "Fleet Street" of Delhi, where most of the 
major newspapers had their offices and presses. The following day,
power supply to the other leading dailies located outside the already 
affected area was also discontinued and only after the censorship mach-
•I 1 Oinery had been set up was electricity restored to the Delhi dailies.
Since a free press, which provides a forum for the expression of 
competing views, opinions, ideologies and philosophies is integral to a 
functioning democracy, and since the Indian Press, until the Emergency, 
was widely acknowledged to be one of the freest in the world, its reduc­
tion during the Emergency to mere propaganda outlets for the Government 
merits attention. No examination of the Emergency can be complete, in 
fact, without an analysis of the Indian press situation during this 
period. The assault on freedom of the press began early, continued with 
such zeal and was so effective in intimidating most sections of the press 
that L. K. Advani, the Minister of Information in the post-Emergency 
government, would later taunt the press saying, "when you were merely 
asked to bend, you chose to crawl."
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The right to freedom of the press is not specifically mentioned in 
the Indian Constitution as it is in the U.S. Bill of Rights. The Consti­
tution refers only to the freedom of speech and expression of which the 
freedom of press was treated as an integral element. In the first two 
cases on freedom of speech and expression, decided in 1950, the Supreme 
Court had to deal with the freedom of circulation and censhorship of the 
press. In Romesh Thappar vs. State of Madras, the Court observed:
There can be no doubt that freedom of speech and expression 
includes freedom of propagation of ideas and that freedom 
is secured by freedom of circulation. Liberty of circu­
lation is as essential to that freedom as the liberty of 
publication. Indeed without circulation the publication 
would be of little value. 115
and in Brij Bhushan
There can be little doubt about the imposition of censor­
ship on a journal is a restriction on the liberty of the 
press which is an essential part of the right to freedom 
of speech and expression declared by Article 19 (1) (a). 116
These two cases decided together by the Court had challenged res­
pectively the Madras Maintenance of Public Orders Act, 1949, and the 
East Punjab Public Safety Act, 1949. The Madras Act authorized the State 
Government to prohibit or regulate entry into or the circulation, sale 
or distribution of any document or class of documents "for the purpose 
of securing public safety or maintenance of public order." The Punjab
Public Safety Act authorized precensorship by the government" for the 
purpose of preventing or combating any activity prejudicial to public
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1 1 Q
safety or the maintenance of public order." It is significant that
the Court ruled the impugned orders unconstitutional on very narrow 
grounds. The Court merely held that preservation of public safety and 
order was not among the recognized restraints on the freedom of speech 
and expression, under the Constitution. The respondent's contention 
that restrictions in the interests of State security as authorized by 
Art. 19(2) was broad enough to cover all actions taken towards maint­
aining public order and safety was rejected by the Court.
The Court, though it declared freedom of press as an integral element 
of the freedom of speech and expression, was less concerned, it would 
seem, about the scope and effects of curbs on the press than about the 
constitutionality of the curbs imposed. The rulings thus merely served 
to encourage the Government to increase the number of restrictions on 
the freedom of speech and expression. The First Amendment Act provided 
three additional restraints; namely, friendly relations with foreign 
states, public order and incitement to an offence. Later, the 16th Amend­
ment authorized the imposition of restraints in the interests of the 
sovereignty and integrity of India. In all, there were eight restrictions 
on the freedom of speech and expression, including freedom of the press. 
These related to (1) the sovereignty and integrity of India; (2) the 
security of the State; (3) friendly relations with foreign states;
(4) public order; (5) decency or morality; (6) contempt of court;
(7) defamation; and (8) incitement to an offence.
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As her style of politics grew more autocratic, Mrs. Gandhi's atti­
tude towards the press changed from one of cordiality to that of virtual 
1 1 9hostility. In keeping with her decreasing tolerance of all dissent
she did not take kindly to the criticism of her that appeared with fre­
quency in the nation's press even as the political and economic situation 
in the country deteriorated and public opinion began to turn against her; 
all such criticism was denounced as the voice of monopoly capital des­
troying the people's confidence. When Emergency rule was established
the Administration set about with ruthless efficiency to destroy the 
freedom that the Indian press had enjoyed in considerable measure since 
independence. In as much as freedom of the press is fundamental to a 
functioning democracy, the attempt during the Emergency to institutionalize 
an authoritarian system of government demanded the virtual destruction 
of a free press in the country. As V. K. Narasimhan, a leading editor
has written "The Emergency could not have lasted for a single month in
121the form in which it was maintained ... if the press had been free."
Censorship was imposed on the Indian press during the Emergency 
'under Rule 48 of the Defence and Internal Security Rules which authorized 
the government to censor or precensor matters in respect of the defence 
of India, civil defence, public safety, maintenance of public order and 
efficient conduct of military operations. A statutory order under Rule 
48 was issued listing the subjects that fell within the scope of pre­
censorship. In practice, however, censorship was exercised through ever- 
expanding guidelines which issued forth from time to time from the office 
of the Chief Censor and it was used primarily to silence the opposition
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and protect Mrs. Gandhi and her administration from public scrutiny 
and criticism.
The initial set of guidelines orally communicated to the press on 
June 26 included injunctions against the publication of rumors, the re­
production of "objectionable" matter already published in any Indian or 
foreign newspaper and the publication of anything likely to bring into 
hatred or contempt or excite disaffection toward the Government.
Everything not announced by the government, it seemed, would be treated 
as rumor and everything critical of the Government, as objectionable.
The foreign news organizations were warned on June 28, by the new 
Information Minister Vidya Charan Shukla that they risked expulsion
from India if they failed to submit their dispatches or broadcast scripts
123for censorship before sending them outside India. The foreign
correspondents were also informed that under certain circumstances, they 
would be held responsible for news about India that their organizations 
published or broadcast, even if the news did not originate with the 
correspondents themselves. The penalty for noncompliance was ex­
pulsion.
Within a week of the Emergency declaration, the censorship apparatus 
was in place and fully functional. Censorship guidelines, as issued by 
the Chief Censor, frequently exceeded the scope of Rule 48 of the Defense 
and Internal Security of India Rules under which censorship had been 
imposed. Not only was there prohibition of items of news relating to 
defense, public safety, public order or military operations, but newspapers
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and journals were barred from publishing any material which could be con­
strued as even remotely critical of the Emergency. Even quotations from 
Gandhi, Tagore and Nehru, leaders of the Indian struggle for independence,
were disallowed if their words could be interpreted in such a manner as
125to imply criticism of present conditions. No blank spaces or columns
were allowed since these would have indicated evidence of precensorship.
Cushrow Irani, the managing director of The Statesman, and at the time,
the Chairman of the news agency. The Press Trust of India, claimed on
July 29 that several newspapers had been charged with failure to publish
Mrs. Gandhi's photograph on their front pages frequently enough. 126
Under the regulation, the very publication of the censorship guidelines
was itself a violation of censorship. In effect, censorship orders were
"arbitrary in nature, capricious and were usually issued orally without
127any relation to the provisions of Rule 48. A record of the censorship
instructions maintained by the Duty Room of the Censor Department offer 
ample evidence that many of these instructions were issued with the sole 
objective of suppressing news critical or possibly critical of the Govern­
ment. Following is a partial list of the representative illustrations 
provided by the Shah Commission on such censorship directives. 128 
"No story is to be cleared pertaining to Parliament business 
or Supreme Court appeal filed by Prime Minister. No reference to the 
case" (12th July, 1975).
"There has been a "bundh" in Ahmedabad, organized by the ruling 
party (Janta Front). If the agencies and the ocrrespondents' copies
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say that the "bundh was a flop" it may be allowed, provided the des­
cription of the "bundh" does not go against Censor instructions."
"Any statement made by the Chief Minister, Gujarat, criticizing 
any action taken by the Centre should be spiked, but if his statement 
is innocuous it may be allowed. In case of any doubt, please ring up 
Additional Chief Censor, Shri Ü. C. Tiwari." (26th July, 1975).
"Please ensure that Allahabad High Court judgement today upholding 
MISA detenues’ right to move High Court under Article 226 is not published 
in the State. Instruct your Censor in Allahabad to kill story" (30th 
October, 1975).
"KMLP (Gujarat) has been dissolved. There is likelihood of some 
members issuing statements withdrawing support to the Janta Front Govern­
ment in Gujarat. Such statements should be allowed. Statements pledging 
support to the Janata Front Government by some of the members should be 
spiked" (Instruction CC) 11th February, 1975.
"All the statements made by the Janata Front Leaders alleging that 
Centre or Congress was out to topple their Ministry or that Janta Front 
would take to agitation, etc., should not be allowed. The statement of 
KMLP leaders dissolving their party, in support of the Janta Front are 
also not to be allowed. Anything which is unhelpful to the present plan 
of the Centre should be killed." (15th February, 1976).
Even the reporting of parliamentary and court proceedings was subjected 
to censorship during the Emergency. The first set of guidelines to cover 
these subjects was issued on July 13, in anticipation of the reopening
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of the Supreme Court the following day after summer vacation, and the 
forthcoming parliamentary session slated to open on July 21. The guide­
lines for the reportings of proceedings in Parliament declared that state­
ments made on behalf of the Government could be published either in fulli 
or in a condensed form provided the contents did not infringe censorship. 
Nothing else pertaining to the sessions could be published except the 
result of voting and the names and party affiliations of the members 
speaking for or against a subject. Rules relating to the coverage
of court proceedings were not quite as specific, though it appeared that 
the new guidelines could, as the London Times observed on July 14,
"prevent the press from publishing the ruling of the Supreme Court if it 
gives an unfavorable judgement on Mrs. Gandhi's appeal."
On July 22, the day after the opening of the monsoon season of 
Parliament, supplementary guidelines were issued for coverage of parlia­
mentary proceedings. These prevented publication of the movement of 
members within the House, e.g., ruling party members moving to opposition 
benches or vice versa, references to empty seats in the Opposition 
Benches, or the names of absent members. The guidelines also laid down 
that remarks from the Chair in either House should not be allowed as a 
part of the proceedings of the House.
On January 4, 1976, even more stringent guidelines were issued in 
anticipation of the new session of Parliament due to commence shortly. 
These laid down that all news, reports and comments relating to parlia­
mentary proceedings would henceforth be governed by Rule 48 of the Defence
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and Internal Security of India Rules and hence all such news items would 
have to be cleared by the Censor Officer before their publication.
A Censor Room was even established in the Parliament for that purpose.
Two further sets of guidelines were issued on January 14 and March 7,
1976; they further expanded the scope of censorship of parliamentary 
proceedings by laying down that nothing could be published which would 
in any manner impair the image of the Parliament as the voice of the 
people and as a sovereign body. Naturally, the publication of reports
relating to the parliamentary discussion of censorship was expressly 
forbidden. As the Information Minister expressed it, it was the Govern­
ment's intention to see that "in future there will be no confrontation 
between the legally and democratically elected government and a section 
of the press."
As the censorship regulations related to the foreign press in India, 
in the beginning, it too was subjected to the total censorship that was 
imposed on the domestic press. This was later modified to precensorship 
on certain subjects; those who did not comply were summarily expelled.
On July 21, the precensorship requirement was replaced by a set of 
"guidelines^ the foreign correspondents were obligated to observe. "The 
purpose of censorship" the opening paragraph of the guidelines declared,
"is to guide and advise the press to guard against publication of unauthori­
zed, irresponsible or demoralizing news items, reports, conjectures or
I O C
rumors." It went on to list a host of restraints on publication of
news about India which if followed would have, as A. M. Rosenthal,
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managing editor of The New York Times put it, made "the remnant of 
coverage from India suspect by reducing it only to material issued by or 
approved by the Government."
Although the new regulation abolished the requirement that foreign 
reporters submit their dispatches to the Censor's office prior to its 
filing, this did not signify, by any means, a major loosening of the 
curbs on the foreign press. It merely shifted the onus of responsibility 
onto the correspondent since under the regulations of July 21 they were 
required, on threat of expulsion, to sign a pledge that started with:
"I undertake to comply with the Government of India's censorship guide­
lines for the press and instructions issued thereunder." That the
foreign press corps was reluctant to give such an undertaking soon 
became evident when on July 23, Mark Tulley, a BBC correspondent known 
for his sympathies for India, decided to leave the country voluntarily 
rather than submit to the draconian regulations, which made fair report­
ing on India difficult.
The guidelines were revised once again, and in place of the pledge 
that they would abide by the censorship regulations, foreign reporters
were asked to sign a statement assuming full responsibility for their
138dispatches. There was, of course, the tacit understanding that the
dispatches would comply with all the regulations that had been issued 
previously and that violation would be met with expulsion. And, indeed, 
those who ignored the rules were either expelled or did not have their 
visas renewed; and, correspondents attached to newspapers considered un-
1 O Qsympathetic by the Government were refused entry to the country.
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The Western press, especially the American, was so suspect in the Govern­
ment eyes that when John Saar, a correspondent for the Washington Post, 
which had been without a representative since the early days of the 
Emergency when its resident correspondent was expelled, went to India 
he is reported to have gone there as a businessman, not as a journalist. ^40 
On his return he wrote a series of five articles for the Post which con­
stituted some of the most in-depth reporting on the Emergency Government
in India. In September 1976 the censorship of the foreign press was
officially withdrawn although the Government continued to discourage most 
Western journalists from covering India.
The assault on the domestic press was both more determined and more
successful. The Government started with censorship, modified it to pre­
censorship of specific subjects, and finally to self censorship for those 
who complied with the guidelines for reporting. If and when a newspaper 
or journal published what the Government viewed as violating the existing 
censorship regulations, it was required to submit to precensorship.
According to the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting Report 1976/77, 
sixty newspapers were required, during the period when censorship had 
supposedly been relaxed to mere self censorship, to submit to precensorship 
on specific subjects, some even to total precensorship. Journalists, 
editors and publishers who did not embrace the Government line eagerly 
enough were subjected to a variety of pressures designed to coerce them 
into submitting to the censorship regulations. Reporters who did not
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succumb were, more often than not, detained. According to the White 
Paper on the Misuse of the Mass Media, during the Emergency, 253 
journalists were arrested and 110 detained under the MISA and 60 under 
the DIR.
Of the national dailies. The Statesman, India's most prestigious 
newspaper, and The Indian Express, the largest newspaper chain with cir­
culation of over one million, were the major victims of the policy of 
intimidation and harassment carried out by the authorities against in­
dependent minded publications. Not only were these two English
language papers subjected at different times to precensorship with all 
the delaying tactics that attended it, they were also subjected to a 
host of other punitive measures. In the case of the Indian Express, 
there definitely seems to have been what an observer has described as 
"a well orchestrated manoeuvre at the highest official levels to take 
over and eliminate the Indian Express group of newspapers."
In pursuance of its objective of asserting control over these two 
newspapers, the Government sought to foist its own nominees as directors 
of boards. Although The Statesman succeeded in resisting the Government 
demands, by December 1975 six of the eleven directors of the Express 
board, including the Chairman, were Government appointees. Within months, 
at a time when publisher Goenka was down with a heart attack, the newly 
reconstituted board prevailed upon Goenka's son to terminate the services 
of S. Mulgaokar, the editor-in-chief. He was replaced by V. K. Narasimham, 
former editor of The Financial Express, also of the Express group of
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papers. He, however, did not turn out to be the pliable instrument the 
authorities had hoped for and soon Goenka was being pressured to have 
Narasimhan replaced as well.
With The Statesman, the Government failed to get its way when it 
sought to intervene in the selection of an editor. In the early months 
of the Emergency, the contract of The Statesman's overall editor;, N. J. 
Nanporia, expired and he was replaced. Mr. V. C. Shukla, the Information 
Minister objected to the new appointment on two accounts. One, that 
Nanporia was "being made to pay for the complete support to the Govern­
ment since Emergency" and two, that the new appointee, S. Nihal Singh, 
the former resident editor in Delhi had not "behaved properly" and was 
therefore unacceptable. Shukla demanded the reinstatement of
Nanporia but was rebuffed by The Statesman's managing editor, Cushrow 
Irani; whoj unlike the majority of publishing executives in India; did not 
accept without protest the destruction of press freedom during the 
Emergency.
For the independence they had displayed in the past and for their 
modest attempts now to retain some semblance of press dignity, publica­
tions like The Statesman and The Indian Express were continuously per­
secuted by the Government; some of the smaller publications were even 
forced to close down. The Statesman was even threatened with con­
fiscation of its printing press in Delhi for printing an issue of the 
journal Seminar which allegedly had contravened censorship requirements. 
The Government backed away only after the paper challenged the order in
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court. The harassment of The Indian Express was worse. The power supply 
to its Delhi presses were shut off for almost four days for alleged non­
payment of electricity bills and only after the Delhi High Court inter­
vened in response to a writ petition filed by The Express was electricity 
restored. The Court again came to the rescue of the paper when the Delhi 
Municipal Corporation, by now completely under the domination of Sanjay 
Gandhi, seized and sealed The Express building in Delhi and attached 
the paper's central air conditioning plant and other equipment, supposedly 
to collect on taxes in arrears. This time, the Court issued a stay 
order since the arrears in question related to a case from five years ago 
which already was under a stay order pending final outcome of the case.
Both Irani and Goenka were also subjected to personal harassment 
as were a number of other "unfriendly" publishers, editors and journalists. 
At Irani's refusal to allow the Government to appoint its nominees to 
The Statesman's board, proceedings were started against him on a charge 
that went back to almost six years previously. He was charged with vio­
lating, in 1970, the provisions of the Companies Act by acquiring a pub­
lishing subsidiary without Government approval. Later, without expla­
nation his passport was impounded, and for over a year, until the Emergency 
ended, he was prevented from travelling abroad. As for Goenka, he and 
his family were repeatedly threatened with MISA and other "grave con­
sequences" if he did not relinquish all control of the paper willingly. ^47
Finally, the Government sought to cripple financially those news­
papers which it considered unfriendly to the government cause. Various
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tactics were used which included delays induced by the censor which 
cut into the papers’ street sales, by reducing and even denying their 
lines of credit at nationalized banks and by withholding State sponsored 
advertising from them. In particular, the advertising policy of the
Government was transferred into a political instrument and was employed 
to reward and punish newspapers and periodicals, in a clear departure 
from established policy and practices. On the basis of their political 
affiliation, their support of the Government and their attitude toward 
political development, newspapers were categorized as "friendly," 
"neutral" or "hostile" with the allocation of advertising revenues of 
the Government clearly favoring the "friendly". Thus, National
Herald, a proCongress daily, founded by Jawaharlal Nehru, benefitted 
enormously under the new policy. Its managing director was Mohammed 
Younus, a close friend over the years of the Nehru family, who was 
designated during the Emergency as Special Envoy to the Prime Minister, 
and who was also a member of the inner council that Sanjay Gandhi pre^ 
sided over. With an A+ (positively friendly) rating it increased its 
share of Government advertising from its Delhi edition alone from 
Rupees 17,298 in 1974 to Rupees 132,917 in 1976, even though its circula­
tion during the same period had declined slightly from 11,048 to 10,831. 
Likewise, another national daily, Amrita Bazaar Patrika, also with an 
A+ rating received in 1976, Rupees 1,010,696 compared to Rupees 457,340 
in 1974; it too had registered a decline in readership in that period.
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At the same time that "friendly" papers were being rewarded hand­
somely, a total of 89 other newspapers and periodicals were denied Govern­
ment advertisements for varying lengths of time, as punishment for 
the independence they exhibited, which the authorities construed as 
hostility to them. Even private corporations were directed by the 
Directorate of Advertising and Visual Publicity (DAVP) to align their
policies with that of the Government's and not to release advertisement
1 S3to those periodicals and newspapers that the DAVP had delisted.
As for the advertisement support which the Congress Party received, 
figures compiled by the Shah Commission and reproduced in Table III lend 
credence to opposition charges of the politicization of the advertise­
ment policy of the Government during the Emergency.
The DAVP patronage of the Congress Party also extended to the pur­
chase of advertisements in the Party souvenirs which totalled Rupees 
80,325 in 1976, up from Rupees 3,868 in 1974, whereas the opposition 
parties in 1976 did not receive a single rupee's worth of advertising, 
though they had received Rupees 1,403 worth in 1974.
The politicization of the news industry was at its blatant worst 
in the manner in which the Government media, especially the All India 
Radio (AIR) was employed to build up Sanjay Gandhi, Mrs. Gandhi's son, 
as a great national leader and to further the image of the Congress Party, 
the Government and the Prime Minister. According to the Shah Commission
Report, between January 1976 and January 18, 1977, the AIR in Delhi
1 *56alone carried 192 items on Sanjay in its main news bulletins. Further,
188
TABLE III
ADVERTISEMENT SUPPORT TO PARTY PUBLICATIONS BY THE 
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AIR news reporting was so unfair to the opposition that in December 1976, 
AIR bulletins devoted only 34 lines to them and 2,207 lines to the 
Congress as against the 571 and 522 lines respectively in December 
1974. 157
Three major presidential ordinances were promulgated in December 
1975 and later enacted by the Legislature into law with the sole objective 
of institutionalizing press control. First, the ten year old Press 
Council, an independent body of journalists and newspaper interests com­
mitted to promoting freedom of the press, was summarily abolished. It 
is widely believed that the dissolution of the council was effected in 
time to prevent it from rendering a verdict on a complaint before it.
The complaint charged that B. George Verghese, a leading journalist was 
removed as editor of Hindustan Times by K. K. Birla, the owner of the
paper, as a result of direct political pressure from above; the Press
1 SftCouncil was expected to uphold the charge.
The second measure withdrew the legal immunity of journalists 
covering parliamentary proceedings. At the same time, a large number 
of journalists whom the Government considered unsympathetic had their 
accreditation privileges, which enables them to cover the activities of 
the Government by attending major new conferences, legislation sessions, 
court hearings, etc., withdrawn. ^^9
It was, however, the Prevention of Publication of Objectionable 
Material ordinance that spelt out in detail the grand design the Govern­
ment had to destroy all vestiges of press freedom in India. It incorpora-
190
ted several coercive features and empowered the Government to mete out 
harsh penalties to authors, editors, publishers and even printers for 
publishing, circulating or distributing "objectionable material." Such 
material was so broadly defined as to include virtually anything the 
Government may disapprove of. "Words, signs or visible representations" 
likely to "bring into hatred or contempt or excite disaffection towards 
the Government," or which might "cause fear or alarm to the public . , . 
whereby any person may be induced to commit an offence against the State 
or against the public tranquillity" or be defamatory of the President, of 
India, the Vice President of India, the Prime Minister, the Speaker of 
the House of People or the Governor of a State were among material 
defined as "objectionable" under the new measure.
Beyond the adoption of these stringent curbs on the press the Govern­
ment took the additional step of dismantling the leading news agencies.
The two major English news agencies, the United News of India and the 
Press Trust of India and the Hindi news agencies, Samachar Bharati and 
Hindustan Samachar were coerced by the Administration through threats 
and stratagems to merge "voluntarily" and surrender their functions to 
a new body Samachar. Samachar remained both administratively and edi­
torially fully under the control of the Government and it functioned 
primarily as a government conduit for propaganda in the manner in which 
the State controlled raido and television already did. With the creation 
of this body, the tradition of a free press ended in India, and there­
after the press too became the captive of the Government.
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As the forgoing analysis of the actions of the Emergency suggests, 
this period witnessed a systematic perversion of the fundamental concepts 
of constitutionalism and led to the institutionalization of an authori­
tarian regime in place of the democratic system the nation had adopted 
at independence. The changes to the political and constitutional sys­
tem made during this period are remarkable for their broad sweep, their 
disregard for constitutional constraints and above all for their total 
deviation from known democratic norms.
Without doubt, the Emergency violated basic democratic concepts.
There was suspension of civil liberties, denial of the due process of 
justice and the revocation of the rules of law. All meaningful political 
opposition was disallowed, public dissent stifled and the freedom of the 
press destroyed. Permanent changes to the political order were enacted 
through constitutional amendments. These altered the distribution of 
power among the branches of government, reduced the scope of citizens' 
rights, curtailed judicial review, and gave parliament absolute authori­
ty to amend the Constitution. Free of judicial scrutiny of administra­
tive actions, the Emergency period witnessed repression in many forms 
such as in the widespread abuse of preventive detention measures, in the 
sterilization program, and in the efforts to politicize the civil service. 
Furthermore, there was the emergence of extra constitutional authority 
that centered around Sanjay Gandhi. With no electoral or official 
position, he exercised immense power, second only to Mrs. Gandhi's, but 
with no accountability whatsoever.
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In short, the Indian Emergency of 1975 was characterized not merely 
by the institution of a government with expanded powers to meet an ex­
traordinary situation, but by the emergence of a government which usurped 
and exercised enormous powers to perpetuate itself in power.
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CONCLUSIONS
On January 18, 1977, Mrs, Gandhi announced that fresh elections to 
the Lok Sabha would be held in March, It seemed at the time that she 
would once again romp home to victory. After all, over the 19 months of 
the Emergency, the economic situation had improved, there was relative 
calm on the social and political fronts and most importantly, the Oppo­
sition appeared to have been effectively crippled, with most of its lead­
ers still in detention. The victory which was expected would lend 
Mrs. Gandhi's authoritarian rule the legitimacy which,since the imposition 
of the Emergency, it had lost in the eyes of the world and among broad 
sections of the Indian populace as well.
Following the announcement, most of the political prisoners, in­
cluding opposition leaders, were released from prison, censorship was 
withdrawn and other emergency measures were relaxed so as to permit poli­
tical activity prior to the elections.
Once again, the non-communist opposition comprising the Bharatiya 
Lok Dal, the Jan Sangh, the Socialists and the Congress (0) came together 
to form a united front, the Janata Front, to contest the elections.  ̂
Opposition efforts received an added lift when Jagjivan Ram, a leading 
national figure in Mrs, Gandhi's cabinet, who had been at the center of 
Indian politics since independence, resigned his cabinet post and his 
Congress Party membership charging that the Party had ceased to be a demo- 
cratic organization. The Congress for Democracy (CFD) which he now 
formed joined forces with the Janata Front. J. P., the leader of the
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preemergency united opposition, still eschewing party politics in prin­
ciple, nonetheless gave the front its blessings and he too made common 
cause with it to bring about Mrs. Gandhi's defeat at the polls. The 
elections soon turned into a referendum on the Emergency. The Janata 
campaign slogan "democracy versus dictatorship" galvanized the public 
and all the pent up resentments against the emergency rule finally found 
its expression in the elections.
In the elections held on March 16, 1977 Mrs. Gandhi and her Congress 
Party, which had ruled India uninterruptedly since independence, suffered 
an astounding defeat. Mrs. Gandhi herself lost her seat to Raj Narain 
whom she had defeated in 1971 two to one and who had later brought the 
lawsuit which had resulted in her conviction. Many Congress leaders closely 
associated with the excesses of the Emergency period also lost, as did 
Sanjay, in his first venture into electoral politics. In all, the Congress 
managed to win only 153 seats compared to the 350 seats it had swept in
3the 1971 elections. The Janata won 271 seats in the 542 seat parliament 
and also received the promise of support from Ram's Congress for Demo­
cracy and from other smaller parties. Without doubt, the election verdict 
was an incredible expression of public resentment against the arrogance 
that had characterized the exercise of power during the Emergency.
Within hours of the announcement on March 21 that Mrs. Gandhi had 
gone to personal defeat and the Congress was trailing badly, B. D. Jatti, 
the acting President of India, on Mrs. Gandhi's advice revoked the state 
of emergency declared on June 25, 1975.
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The Emergency represented a crisis of values, institutions, and 
functions that underlay the Indian political system. During this period, 
Indian democracy which had gained its legitimacy through the representation 
of the interests of its politically articulate participants failed to 
meet their demands. What had been a reconciliatory political system was 
transformed under the Emergency into what David Apter has described as 
a mobilizing regime. His description of the two systems is germane to an 
understanding of this process which was described in detail in Chapter III.
The role of government in a reconciliation system is 
not organization; rather, it works to reconcile diverse 
interest; it mediates, integrates, and above all, coor­
dinates, rather than organizes and mobilizes... Local 
decision-making and local capital investment mean a great 
dependence of the development process on village and local 
committees... The integrational function of government 
may be inundated by a wave of internal conflicts between 
governmental bodies. In other words, the malfunctioning 
of the structures may eventually come to weaken the ability 
of the government to perform its functions, with the 
result that the system will begin to change into something 
else. 4
The system as it emerged violated known boundaries of political 
action and behavior by the rulers who no longer seemed answerable to 
those whom they claimed to represent. Among some of the intelligentsia 
there was a growing belief that not only did the crises that preceded 
it not warrant the imposition of emergency but that the powers under the 
Emergency had been expended primarily to accumulate yet further power. 
Even the much touted accomplishments of this period, they concluded, 
could have been achieved earlier through the exercise of strong and
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effective, yet not oppressive leadership. Instead, in the name of poli­
tical stability, economic progress and social justice^a new system had 
evolved which provided neither the channels for articulation of grievances 
nor the institutions and processes for their redress. And in March 1977, 
the Indian public when offered the opportunity to pass verdict on the 
Emergency, concluded that they had paid too high a price for whatever 
benefits it was that it had supposedly brought htem.
The salient fact that emerges from the forgoing chapters is that 
since 1971, when Mrs. Gandhi became the undisputed leader of the Congress 
Party, the Government and the nation, the Indian political system was 
transformed from a constitutional democracy to an authoritarian polity.
The dimensions of this change can be comprehended best by comparing the 
political system which emerged during this period against that which 
preceded it.
Rajni Kothari's description in 1970 of his model of Indian politics 
offers an apt and accurate description of the Indian system before it 
underwent major changes in the Gandhi era. He viewed the Indian model 
as one of modernization of an ancient and plural society in the context 
of an open polity. It was, according to him
a multisystemic model in which a hitherto fragmented 
and plural society (structures and values) is exposed 
to a new set of universal norms, confronted with a pur- 
posively adopted framework of institutions, directed 
to new purposes of nation unification and planned pro­
duction, and finds its rewards in the distribution of 
divisible benefits on the one hand and the dispersal 
of political opportunities on the other. 5
206
India was a fragmented and plural society which espoused the liberal 
democratic values of the West and on achieving independence in 1947, 
adopted a framework of democratic institutions and processes to achieve 
the goals of economic modernization and national unification. As an 
egalitarian order committed to the ideal of a welfare state, it sought 
to distribute the benefits of the system equitably while at the same 
time, the open nature of its polity appeared to assure the dispersal of 
political opportunities.
Indian democracy as discussed in Chapter I was a fragile union bet­
ween a traditional society and Western liberal ideology and institutions.
The Constitution provided for a representative and responsible government, 
a guarantee of the individual's fundamental rights, albeit with limitations, 
and recognized the concepts of the rule of law and due process. At the 
same time, it also remained vulnerable to subversion of several of its 
democratic features because of the provisions relating to the restrictions 
on rights, to the declaration of emergency, and to the amendability of 
the Constitution.
The grant of rights was severely circumscribed in the interests of 
the security of the state, public purpose, public order, public morality 
and other grounds enumerated in Chapter I. Additionally, the civil 
liberties of the citizen were subject to suspension during times of 
Emergency. What constituted justifiable grounds for an emergency or how 
long such an emergency could last was left vague and ill defined. So 
long as an emergency lasted the Government functioned not as the limited
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constitutional government that it was in normal times, but as an authori­
tarian government with expanded powers and with few recognizable constraints 
on the exercise of such powers. Furthermore, even in normal times it 
was possible through amending the Constitution to increase the Government’s 
powers or reduce the citizen's rights. The procedures prescribed for 
amending the Constitution were simple and provided no protection at all 
against a tyrannical majority in parliament.
But for all its incipient weaknesses India was, until Mrs. Gandhi's 
time, a working democracy with periodic, free, and fair elections, a res­
ponsible government, an independent judiciary, a free press, and a commit­
ment to the rule of law and the dignity of the individual.
Following the 1971 elections, which established unprecedented Congress 
Party dominance in the nation at large but even more so at the center and 
thereby provided Mrs. Gandhi with unfettered freedom of political action, 
the rules by which Indian politics until then had been played were revised. 
The purposively adopted framework of democratic institutions was modified. 
The federal and pluralistic system with its separation of powers and the 
system of checks and balances among the different branches of government 
became increasingly centralized and personalized. In the process, it 
ceased to be directed to the purposes of national unification and planned 
production which Dr. Kothari has alluded to.
Though Mrs. Gandhi herself was a national figure and in that sense 
a unifying symbol, the ideological polarization resulting from her popu­
list demagoguery forced a split within the Congress Party ranks and
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exacerbated political tensions in the country. The resulting demise of 
collective leadership within the party furthermore upset the delicate 
balance among competing interests represented within it and thereby in­
creased political factionalism leading to disunity. As for planned pro­
duction, there was no longer an agreement on fundamentals, and planning 
was therefore slipshod and inadequate. Without a sustained program to 
improve production to keep up with the rising expectations aroused by 
Mrs. Gandhi's radical rhetoric, actual production fell far short of pro­
mise and this in turn undermined the credibility of the Government. Few 
divisible benefits from the system flowed to the public or were enjoyed 
by them. With the economy in near shambles and general poverty on the 
increase, the most conspicuous beneficiaries of the existing order 
appeared to be the Congress ministers and leaders whose ostentatious 
lifestyles presented a vivid contrast to the poverty of the masses they 
presumably represented. Scandals and charges of corruption proliferated 
implicating State leaders and even central cabinet ministers of 
Mrs. Gandhi's choice. Meanwhile, her reluctance or inability to stem 
Congress corruption,combined with her son's role in the notorious Maruti 
car project)contributed to a public perception of her tacit approval of 
a political system whose benefits only the powerful and the privileged 
enjoyed.
At the same time, the dispersal of political opportunities, even 
within the Congress Party itself, turned restrictive. Increasingly, 
political patronage came to be based on the degree of support and loyalty
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to the Prime Minister. This was a major departure from the practices 
of the past under which the strength of a nominee's popular support was 
the most important factor in the selection and elevation of political 
leadership. Under the changed rules, many actors who had dominated the 
political stage until then and many others who had expected to suddenly 
found themselves relegated to minor roles or even eliminated from the 
political scene altogether. The machinations of the leaders scorned 
together with the inexperience and)in many instances^ the incompetence of 
the new leaders undermined the effectiveness of the Congress Party which 
for nearly a quarter of a century had provided stable leadership to the 
country.
The restructuring of the Congress Party leadership leading to the 
induction into it of new elites without established bases of political 
support and the accompanying collapse of consensus within it wasj without 
doubt;a major determinant of the political unstability that culminated 
in the Emergency. At the same time, the interjection of ideological ten­
sions into the Party which,hithertojhad remained singularly pragmatic 
heightened political polarization of both the leaders and the masses.
This resulted in heightened political consciousness and increased expec­
tations which the system could not fulfill and which then led to irres­
ponsible behavior on the part of both the rulers and the ruled, far ex­
ceeding the limits of responsible political behavior indicated in a func­
tioning democracy. Such behavior, in turn, resulted in increasing resort 
to repressive tactics and its legitimization as an instrument of admin­
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istration. The inability of the Administration to satisfy legitimate 
demands of the various segments of society and the frequent employment 
of repressive measures to put down the agitational efforts to enforce 
these demands increased popular frustration which was exploited by power­
ful political groups both within the Congress and outside to mount an 
effective opposition to Mrs. Gandhi and her administration.
The threat of a unified opposition in place of the inchoate mass 
of parties and factions that had opposed the Congress until then emerged^ 
as newly formed opposition coalitions won significant political victories 
in Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and elsewhere, but most importantly in the mid­
term elections to the Gujerat assembly held on June 8, 1975. By the time 
the Opposition, more unified than at any other time in the past, announced 
its objective of forcing Mrs. Gandhi's resignation as Prime Minister in 
light of the Allahabad Court verdict setting aside her election to the 
Lok Sabha, Mrs. Gandhi had already lost much of the popular support that 
had swept her into power in 1971. It was the Opposition's hope that an­
other powerful popular movement could be forged to sweep her out of power.
The declaration of the Emergency was Mrs. Gandhi's response to the 
Opposition's threat. Her actions while the Emergency lasted amounted to 
a subversion of the principle of constitutionalism and led to the insti­
tutionalization of a full-fledged authoritarianism. The Indian political 
system during that period ceased to be a democracy in all but name.
The ways in which emergency powers were employed in India to bring 
about radical alterations to the Constitution and to the political system
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provided under it raises serious questions about the vulnerability of 
democratic institutions and processes to subversion in times of crisis.
At issue here is not just the violation of any particular constitutional 
provision but the vitiation of a political order through ostensibly legal 
means. For, the point to be remembered is that the actions of the 
Emergency regime by and large conformed to constitutional requirements.
But regardless of whether they contravened constitutional provisions 
or not, the arrests and the silencing of political opposition, the sus­
pension of civil liberties, the imposition of censorship and the attempts 
to abridge the jurisdiction of the courts and to modify the principle of 
rule of law all undermined the foundations on which Indian democracy 
had rested until then.
The danger of abuse of emergency powers in India is ever present 
because the constitutional provisions dealing with them are loose and 
without safeguards. This becomes especially clear when the Indian emer­
gency provisions are compared against the criteria Clinton Rossiter sets 
out in Constitutional Dictatorship to govern the assumption of dictatorial 
powers by a democratic regime during times of emergency.
Rossiter's first criterion is that no such regime should be initiated 
unless it is indispensable to the preservation of the state and its con­
stitutional order.  ̂ While there was in India the need for firm govern­
ment action to restore law and order, the extreme step of imposing an 
emergency to accomplish this appears to have been unwarranted. Rossiter 
next suggests that the decision to institute a dictatorial regime should
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not be left to those who will ultimately wield the crisis powers. ^
The Indian Constitution does grant the legislature the ultimate power 
of extending an emergency beyond two months while vesting the expanded 
powers mainly in the executive. However, in practice this is not much 
of a safeguard because the Prime Minister who advises the President on 
the need for a declaration of emergency and who in reality wields the 
emergency powers, is also the leader of the majority party in the legis­
lature. In 1975, the Congress Party held over two-thirds majority in 
both the Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha.
To reduce the abuse of emergency Rossiter recommends that all re­
adjustments in the organization of the government should be in keeping 
with constitutional requirements: that no institution be adopted, no
right invaded, no procedure altered other than is absolutely necessary 
to overcome the particular crisis; and that the measures so adopted be
Q
not permanent in character or in effect. With respect to the Indian 
Emergency, most of the actions of the Emergency government did conform 
to the technical requirements of the Constitution. There was no need to 
violate constitutional provisions for emergency rule because these pro­
visions are so broad and loose. Since the constitution offers no pro­
tection against legislative tyranny, the institutionalization of authori­
tarian powers in India took a perfectly constitutional route. However, 
as seems abundantly clear from the facts set down in Chapter III, the 
changes made to the political system were fundamental, representing a 
revision or reversal of many democratic institutions and processes 
hitherto accepted.
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The rule that the "dictatorship" during the Emergency should be 
carried on by persons representative of every part of the citizenry
9interested in the defense of the existing constitutional order may 
appear on the surface to have been observed also in as much as the 
Parliament, which may be said to represent all sections of the citizenry? 
did ratify the Emergency and had voted on the measures enacted under it.
In reality, the Emergency government was a highly personalized one that 
centered around Mrs. Gandhi, her son Sanjay, and their inner circle 
of advisers and confidants. The Cabinet and the Parliament were merely 
rubber stamp institutions which ratified the decisions of this small 
group and thereby lent it a spurious legitimacy. Additionally, in view 
of the arrests of opposition leaders and their absence from Parliament, 
the suspension of normal parliamentary procedures, and the air of inti­
midation and fear all around, even this seeming parliamentary participation 
in emergency rule would appear to be mostly democratic trappings.
Rossiter then states that ultimate responsibility should be maintained 
for all the actions taken under the emergency. Not only is there no 
such provision in the Indian Constitution, but whatever slender protection 
there was against abuse of emergency was eliminated by removing all matters 
relating to an emergency from judicial review.
Rossiter insists that an emergency regime must be terminated as soon 
as the crisis that engendered it is over, that there should be specific 
provision for its termination and that the decision to terminate it should 
not he left to the crisis regime. The Indian Constitution is remiss
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on all these points. It provides no protection against the indefinite 
perpetuation of an emergency regime which enjoys a majority in Parliament. 
Finally, Rossiter advises that the termination of the crisis should
be followed by a return to the political and governmental conditions ex-
1 2is ting prior to the institution of the crisis regime. In the Indian
case, because of major amendments to the Constitution there can be no 
return to the preexisting conditions unless the Constitution can be 
amended again to nullify the Emergency alterations.
It is clear from the preceding comments that procedural safeguards 
are required to protect Indian democracy from powerhungry leaders who 
might seek to establish authoritarian rule through seemingly legal means. 
Since wanton violations of democratic rule occurred during the Emergencj^ 
there must be, first of all, a tightening of the constitutional provisions 
on emergency in accordance with the Rossiter strictures. In particular, 
radical changes to the political and constitutional order totally unre­
lated to the crisis should be specifically barred. For, it must not be 
forgotten that an emergency regime is, by definition, the creature of 
a basically democratic order established for the purpose of managing 
more efficiently a crisis that threatens the political system itself.
It is designed to be a temporary state of affairs. Measures which seek 
to institutionalize it, being undemocratic in intent and effect, are 
therefore contrary to the concept of an emergency. A provision restricting 
the kind of changes that can be initiated or enacted during an emergency 
to those which have a direct bearing on the emergency will assist in
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limiting the duration of emergencies, since governments wishing to take 
up other important legislative matters would be prevailed upon to declare 
an end to the existing state of emergency before taking up such other 
issues.
On the larger question of the institutionalization of authoritarian 
processes in normal times the only sure and certain protection against 
it is an altered approach to the Constitution itself. It has been the 
misfortune of Indian democracy that its leaders have tended to view the 
Constitution merely as an instrument. Because of this attitude, no air 
of sanctity or reverence attaches to the Constitution and its amendment 
is approached with no more deliberation than the passage of ordinary laws. 
Furthermore, one party dominance in Parliament combined with the pro­
cedural ease with which the Constitution can be amended has resulted in 
the erosion of democratic values, institutions and processes described 
earlier. With no grand democratic tradition to fall back on and no 
visionary leaders, political expedience has dictated the institutionalized 
decline of democracy. While a flexible approach is indeed required to 
deal with the host of political and constitutional problems bound to arise 
in a new nation, such an approach should not entail the compromise of 
the very basis of the political system which the Constitution was designed 
not only to reflect but to protect as well.
The Kesavanda Bharati verdict was correct in enunciating the principle 
that parliament may not alter the basic structure of the Constitution.
Now it only remains for the Court to spell out authoritatively those areas 
which comprise the basic structure.
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Parliamentary supremacy was not envisioned in the Indian Constitution 
at the time of its adoption, though over the years something akin to it 
has evolved. To some extent the courts are responsible for this develop­
ment since early judicial rulings on the scope of Parliament's powers 
tended to uphold the exercise of powers by it far in excess of what is 
permissible under a system which does not recognize parliamentary supre­
macy. These rulings by justices educated and trained under the British 
constitutional system, which incidentally does acknowledge supremacy 
of the Parliament, served as precedents and influenced subsequent judicial 
rulings. The result has been that the Indian courts have not provided 
protection against the aggrandizement of power by the government. In 
the absence of a strong democratic tradition to act as a restraint against 
the abuse of power, the Indian Parliament, especially under Mrs. Gandhi's 
leadership, has used its powers to defeat the democratic underpinnings 
of its political system.
The first major step to reverse such a trend in the future would be 
for the courts to deny unequivocally the notion of parliamentary supre­
macy and to affirm the inviolability of democratic principles such as 
citizens' rights, rule of law and the due process of justice.
Even assuming a departure from the passivity that has characterized 
the judiciary for almost three decades, no substantive limits on parlia­
mentary power can be effected, so long as the infamous IX schedule re­
mains part of the Constitution. So long as patently unconstitutional 
measures can be enacted and protected from any judicial scrutiny of their
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merits by harboring them in the Schedule, parliament cannot be expected 
to observe the constraints on law-making imposed under other provisions.
A democratic constitution ought not to provide a safe harbor for unconsti­
tutional laws which undermine democracy itself. If» as proponents claim; 
such a schedule is necessary to circumvent lengthy, cumbersome and ex­
pensive litigation likely to slow down the radical social and economic 
reforms needed to bring about social justice, then there should be a 
clear limitation on the subjects that belong in it. The Schedule was 
created to protect land and agrarian reforms that sought to correct the 
inequities of existing land relations in India. But, as it stands now, 
any governmental measure can be extended protection under it, provided 
the requisite Parliamentary majority supports its inclusion in the 
Schedule. Perhaps the original intent can be reaffirmed and the IX 
Schedule can be restricted to land reforms only.
Towards the latter days of the Emergency there was a widespread 
feeling that somehow the Constitution had failed to protect the ordinary 
citizen from an  oppressive government. And indeed, the actions of 
Emergency government as documented in Chapter III lend credence to this 
belief. Under the Emergency, the Indian national was treated more as a 
subject than as the citizen the Constitution proclaimed him to be; and 
neither the courts nor the Constitution could do much to provide him the 
protection which he, as a citizen of a democracy deserved to have had. 
What is more, it can happen all over again, because in its present form 
and subjected to the body of judicial precedents relating to it, the
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Indian Constitution remains virtually the same which enabled Mrs. Gandhi 
to usurp and exercise vast powers against the citizens.
In the long run, perhaps only a new constitution drawing upon the 
experiences and errors of the past can protect democracy in India. A 
constituent assembly, representative of all segments of Indian society, 
would have to be convened to undertake such a task. The assembly's task 
would be to evolve a constitutional document which not only enshrines 
lofty democratic ideals but provides adequate protection against their 
subversion. The new document could define the essential features of 
the Indian political system and deny the institutions of government the 
authority to change these. The details regarding the composition, the 
strength, the charter, etc., of the constituent assembly can he worked 
out by the parliament.
It is outside the scope of this study to detail the form the new 
Constitution should take. However, in light of the discussion of the 
Indian political system undertaken in the forgoing chapters a few sugges­
tions are in order. First of all, the Constitution should embody and 
protect the republican, representative, constitutional and secular charac­
ter of Indian democracy, the responsible and federal form of its govern­
ment, the guarantee of certain fundamental rights of the citizens and 
the recognition of the supremacy of the constitution, the rule of law 
and the separation of power among the different branches of government.
Any new constitution must pay closer attention to those areas most 
vulnerable to abuse. The procedure for amendment of the constitution
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should be made more rigid and certain areas specifically excluded from 
amendments. Not only should the basic character of the system be pre­
served but vital areas such as the citizens' fundamental rights, the 
freedom of the press and judicial review, which are fundamental to the 
notion of democracy, should be well protected. Such reasonable restric­
tions on fundamental rights as are necessary in the larger interests of 
society should be spelt out with the express stiulation that there would 
be no further abridgements of such rights. Ideally, the provision on 
preventive detention should be eliminated. However, in view of the per­
vasiveness of violence on the Indian political scene, it is unlikely that 
preventive detention would be excluded from the provision on individual 
liberty. What can be eliminated is the possible abuse by the government 
of its preventive detention powers. This can be achieved by providing 
for strict controls by the courts over its employment. Grounds for such 
detention, its duration, and the rights of the detainees should be spelt 
out and precluded from further revision. The government must be subjected 
to rigorous standards of proof to justify its use of preventive detention 
and there should be provision for the swift and impartial scrutiny and 
enforcement of the safeguards against the abuse of such detention. As 
a further measure to strengthen the citizen's right to liberty the Con­
stitution should prohibit the suspension of the Writ of Habeas Corpus 
even during times of emergency.
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the provisions dealing with 
the declaration and continuation of a state of emergency should be tight­
ened. Accountability for government actions should be recognized both
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during emergency and in normal times. Judicial review should be strength­
ened and the independence of the judiciary affirmed. All pretensions to 
parliamentary supremacy should be disallowed and the supremacy of the 
constitution asserted. If there is to be a provision such as the current 
IX Schedule its scope should be narrow. To preserve the federal character 
of the political system there should be a reapportionment of the powers 
and responsibilities between the center and the states which favors the 
states more than it does currently. Furthermore, the future transfer 
of powers from the states to the center should be made more difficult 
through more stringent requirements.
It is for constitutional scholars and the representatives of the 
people to design a new constitutional document which, at the same time, 
would be flexible enough to meet changing social, economic and political 
conditions and would also be able to remain true to constitutional 
democracy. At the present this is only a hope. The reality is a Con­
stitution which still permits subversion of its democratic principles, 
political leaders with no concept of national interest who seem to be 
obsessed with their personal concerns and an electorate which in recent 
years has been disillusioned thoroughly by the bankruptcy of its leader­
ship. Time alone will tell what kind of a future democracy has in India.
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POSTSCRIPT
After research on this project was completed in the autumn of 
1979, another spectacular turn of events in Indian politics has restored 
Mrs. Gandhi to power as Prime Minister of India. In the midterm elections 
to the Lok Sabha in early January of this year, her Congress Party achi­
eved a stunning victory, winning 351 seats in the 542-seat Assembly.
The promise of legislative support from Congress' electoral ally, the 
Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK), which won another 16 seats, gives 
Mrs. Gandhi, once again, a more than two-thirds majority in Lok Sabha.
To achieve this modern day political miracle after her humiliating 
electoral reverse of 1977, Mrs. Gandhi needed strong allies; and as the 
Manchester Guardian Weekly pointed out on January 13, 1980, she had such 
allies in Morarji Desai, Charan Singh and Jagjivan Ram, "the gerontocracy 
atop the Janata wave" who through their petty politicking brought about 
the dissolution of the Lok Sabha and the call for new elections. Much 
had befallen the Janata coalition which in 1977 had made history by 
bringing about the defeat of Mrs. Gandhi and her party, thereby ending 
the Emergency. The unity of purpose that had swept it to power had, in the 
intervening months, disintegrated. The strength and momentum evident 
during the campaign and in the early post-Emergency days soon vanished 
as old rivalries and personal considerations once again rose to the fore. 
And, instead of working together to forge a lasting alliance to consolidate 
their fragile hold on power and to ensure stability in the country, the 
elements within the coalition fell to vicious political infighting.
It culminated in the withdrawal of support of the Janata by Charan Singh's
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Lok Dal party, which had 77 seats in Parliament. In the elections that 
ensued, both the Janata Party and the Lok Dal were humbled, winning only 
32 and 41 seats respectively compared to the 203 and 77 seats they had 
controlled in the disolved House.
Without a coherent political philosophy and, therefore, without 
new initiatives or programs, the Janata, while it ruled, appeared utterly 
incapable of solving the perennial problems of unemployment, inflation, 
shortages of essential commodities, labor unrest and declining productivity. 
In contrast to this, the Emergency era must have appeared to many, in 
retrospect, as a period of political and economic calm, with students in 
school, labor under control, prices stable and shortages eliminated. That 
a state of Emergency ought not to have been necessary to accomplish economic 
improvement or maintain political calm was probably lost on the masses 
as Mrs. Gandhi hammered away at the contrast between the chaos that charac­
terized Janata rule and the alleged law, order,and stability under her 
Emergency rule.
Mrs. Gandhi also appears to have benefitted enormously from the 
turn of events in neighboring Afghanistan. As the Soviet army poured 
into Kabul and the United States hastened to respond to the Soviet action 
with, among other measures, the offer of arms aid to Pakistan, the need 
for strong and unified leadership at the center must have become apparent 
to many Indians. The Janata crowd, as it had functioned in the months 
immediately preceding the call for elections, had been so ineffectual 
that the masses probably could not conceive of such a leadership standing
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upto, let alone, prevailing over a rearmed and potentially threatening 
Pakistan.
As for the implications of the results of the 1977 and 1980 
elections, viewed as a whole, these are most interesting. They represent 
an assertion of certain values and expectations by the voters. Both 
elections amounted to a repudiation of incumbent leadership, but for wholly 
different reasons. In the 1977 elections the electorate's verdict was 
that it could not tolerate the repression and assault on human dignity 
by the government during the Emergency. In the more recent elections the 
voting public's message to the Janata leadership was that it was not 
enough to go back to the status quo ante-Emergency of political and 
economic anarchy, but that it was the responsibility of the Government 
to provide political stability and economic performance. Political 
liberty was the issue in 1977 and political and economic order the concerns 
in 1980. Having punished Mrs. Gandhi in 1977 for her transgressions, 
the Indian public has now awarded her a second chance to offer strong 
leadership, to provide political stability, and to bring about economic 
progress, but not at the cost of human rights.
It is too early to say whether Mrs. Gandhi has understood these 
simple lessons of the preceding elections or whether she can live up to 
public expectations of her. There are many who forsee a recurrence of 
the authoritarianism which the Emergency represented. Some of her recent 
actions, such as the dissolution of state assemblies where her party was 
not in power, the recall of all unsold copies of the Shah Commission report.
225
and the harassment of certain judges presiding over Emergency-related 
cases and the reemergence of Sanjay as a power center do lend credence 
to this point of view. More ominous, however, is the fact that the 
Congress Party she now heads has been shorn of all leaders with indepen­
dent bases of their own. The restructured leadership is totally beholden 
to her and to her son. There is no leavening factor within the party to 
influence her use of power. Others believe that having leamt her lesson 
that an all powerful center unencumbered by any opposition was not suffi­
cient by itself to bring about rapid and acceptable resolution of poli­
tical and economic problems, Mrs. Gandhi is unlikely to try that route 
again. For ray part, I perceive democracy in India as imperative, not 
merely preferable. I strongly believe that the regional integrity of 
India can be preserved only through a system of decentralized democracy 
which encourages political participation at all levels of the diverse 
ethnic and regional groups of the highly plural Indian society. If 
Mrs. Gandhi is as committed to the survival of India as I believe her 
to be, she has no alternative but to follow the democratic path.
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